Cat in Bamboo, Hiroshima
by Mirikitani, Smithsonian
Friedman divides globalisation into three phases. The first, starting with the 'discovery' of the Americas, runs from 1492 to 1800, which he argues is the globalisation of countries. The second phase is from 1800 to 2000, a time dominated by the Industrial Revolution, in which companies become globalised. In our present era, from 2000, it is the individual who joins globalisation. Not everyone wins, and periods of increased globalisation are often followed by periods of political turmoil. The ICT sector is a dominant sector driving change in our current wave of globalisation.
The US Chamber of Commerce is concerned that, "some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the ICT sector to localize rather than globalize." Their report, written by economic, legal and policy consultants, argues regulations and laws are unduly, and ineffectively, burdening industry without achieving political goals, and with negative economic impact. On the intellectual property side, the report argues this trend includes, "requirements that products contain intellectual property [be] developed domestically, supposedly to make them more secure." These IP requirements, in conjunction with standards, subsidies, competition laws and other levers, lead the Chamber to conclude:
As a result, non-security interests—e.g., economic protectionism and political control—are becoming increasingly intermingled with real security concerns, undermining the legitimacy of essential security oriented policies. Indeed, when governments commingle such interests, it makes it difficult to reject or refine any of their policies that are:
(i) justified on ostensible security concerns but actually based principally on industrial objectives, or
(ii) based on legitimate security interests but unnecessarily trade restrictive.
These trends raise serious economic risks to the global economy.
The arguments in the report are generally sound, but caveats on the economic analysis are, as is often the case, relegated to the last chapter. It is difficult to unpack the claim that, "If China continues to pursue deglobalization in the ICT sector, economic modeling based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project and defined shocks to the baseline of Chinese economic data suggests an annual reduction in China’s GDP anywhere from 1.77–3.44%, or at least $200 billion based on 2015 GDP. By 2025, this would equate to a reduction in China’s GDP of—at a minimum—nearly $3 trillion annually." While it is likely that increased protectionism will not benefit the Chinese economy (although Japanese import restrictions/protectionism may have benefited that economy), the magnitude is debatable.
I would have liked to see more consideration of other aspects of globalisation. The report notes, without irony, "Many a Chinese farmer’s child went from agriculture and garment stitching directly into high-tech assembly over the past decades, and that has pushed down electronics unit costs and generally lifted wages lately in other segments, hence costs of production." And economists wonder why we have such a dismal reputation.