tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post24298624566700206..comments2024-03-29T12:23:31.959+00:00Comments on The IPKat: Nintendo ruling confirmed lex specialis nature of Software Directive:does this have implications for UsedSoft exhaustion?Verónica RodrÃguez Arguijohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05763207846940036921noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-59837756087872238772018-09-19T19:16:36.615+01:002018-09-19T19:16:36.615+01:00>> "In particular, it would seem that i...>> "In particular, it would seem that interpretation of exhaustion of the right of distribution pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Software Directive would not extend to digital subject-matter other than "pure" software."<br /><br />Nope. Both the Computer Program Directive and the Copyright Directive contain the same Article 4 exhaustion of distribution rights clause that says works are subject to the first-sale doctrine.<br /><br />See here:<br /><br />Computer Program Directive:<br /><br />"Article 4<br />Restricted acts<br /><br />2. The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof."<br /><br /><br />Copyright Directive:<br /><br />"Article 4<br />Distribution right<br /><br />2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the<br />original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent."<br /><br /><br />So, all software in the EU, whether it is productive or video game software, features the same resale rights. Video games being evaluated by the Copyright Directive doesn't change a thing regarding the right to resell since the Copyright Directive's right to resell is the same as the Computer Program Directive's right to resell.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-57446674450513235122014-01-27T12:56:00.484+00:002014-01-27T12:56:00.484+00:00Like many things, how a question is phrased reveal...Like many things, how a question is phrased reveals quite a bit about how the subject is viewed by the person making the post.<br /><br />"Truth" then, often is a silly-putty term, and like other terms that carry subjective connotations perhaps should not be used by either side in a legal debate. Everyone wants to be 'truthful,' and if your view is 'truthful,' then the other side <i>must</i> not be truthful if they do not agree with you (ignoring of course the shades of truth that the real world brings and likewise ignoring the maxim that the best lies have a kernel of truth).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-7661379694368508152014-01-27T07:23:10.701+00:002014-01-27T07:23:10.701+00:00I am a little surprised that here and in your earl...I am a little surprised that here and in your earlier report you say that the CJEU held that technological measures may be circumvented legally in certain circumstances.<br /><br />While this is true it is not an accurate reflection of what the court found.<br /><br />The court held that that the prohibition only extends to technical measures which pursue the objective of preventing or eliminating acts not authorised by the rightholder (para 31 of the judgment).<br /><br />Thus there is subtle and important difference rather than circumvention being legal in exceptional circumstances it is the other way around. Circumvention is only illegal in the particular circumstance where the measure in question pursues the objective of protecting the exclusive rights granted under copyright. <br /><br />In all other circumstances they may be circumvented legally.Fred Loguehttp://www.newmorningip.comnoreply@blogger.com