tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post820985502335439169..comments2024-03-29T12:23:31.959+00:00Comments on The IPKat: AG Szpunar advises CJEU to rule that copyright cannot subsist in military report in important fundamental rights caseVerónica Rodríguez Arguijohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05763207846940036921noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-88829931668685523082018-10-31T09:52:47.527+00:002018-10-31T09:52:47.527+00:00Sorry, by fundamental rights I of course meant
Un...Sorry, by fundamental rights I of course meant<br /><br />Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)Mark Perkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04030941302733537832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-23792226425431387602018-10-30T14:06:18.939+00:002018-10-30T14:06:18.939+00:00@Mark Perkins.
I am interested in what you would ...@Mark Perkins.<br /><br />I am interested in what you would define as fundamenal rights, which you assert that States do not possess. Given that EU copyright law is something of a blend of common law copyright and droit d'auteur rights, it is hard to see the fundamentals. Arguably the Berne Conventions established the fundamentals of international copyright protection, and although they refer throughout to the 'author' (hardly surprising since one of the driving forces behind the original convention was French), nowhere in the Conventions is it noted what the fundamental rights are, or whether or not States should be entitled to the same or similar rights as other owners. Indeed it is implicit from Article 2(4) that States have the discretion to decide whether its official texts of a legislative, administrative or legal nature shall be protected by copyright. It follows from this that States which do so decide must also obtain the rights afforded to other, natural copyright owners. <br />I fully accept that States do not enjoy moral rights, for the simple reason that such rights attach to the human creator, irrespective of who is employer may be, and are generally not transferable except on the death of the author. As far as I am aware this case, moral rights are not at issue.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-72192133945137283722018-10-30T10:02:28.122+00:002018-10-30T10:02:28.122+00:00Article (in French)
La propriété de l’Etat et le ...Article (in French)<br /><br />La propriété de l’Etat et le crépuscule du Léviathan intellectuel<br /><br />https: // scinfolex.com/2018/10/29/la-propriete-de-letat-et-le-crepuscule-du-leviathan-intellectuel/Mark Perkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04030941302733537832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-87473301802232091712018-10-29T21:24:58.098+00:002018-10-29T21:24:58.098+00:00(NB. The confidentiality arguement does not hold, ...(NB. The confidentiality arguement does not hold, as the classification level of the documents was/is too low to prevent diffusion.)<br /><br />I think that the AG has it right in 3 aspects, and debatable in a 3rd.<br /><br />The confidentiality arguement does not hold, as the classification level of the documents was/is too low to prevent diffusion. It is a clear case of the state attempting to use copyright as censorship mechanism. This is in fact one of the reasons that the US does not recognise copyright in Federal documents.<br /><br />States may hold copyright, but they do not have 'fundamental rights'. This would also be true for all moral (ie. fictious) agents. The implications are less clear, but clearly the balancing act between a moral agents copyright and natural agents fundamental rights are different than between 2 moral agents or 2 natural agents. <br /><br />Moreover, in particular states are not the beneficaries of fundamental rights but their protectors. Fundamental rights in the origins are protections of individuals vis a vis states.<br /><br />The debatable area is the level originality question - and here I would guess a case by case analysis would be in order.<br /><br />An interesting article (in French)<br /><br /><br />Mark P.Mark Perkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04030941302733537832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-57633501620611077922018-10-29T15:05:26.661+00:002018-10-29T15:05:26.661+00:00I have troubles understanding why the AG considers...I have troubles understanding why the AG considers it “natural” that communication of a work covered by copyright, even without copyright holder’s authorisation, falls within the scope of FoE in Europe (para. 35 of the Opinion). Unless the freedom of the press is concerned (and the statement in para. 35 is arguably much more general), the freedom of information (and in particular the right of access to information from unwillful provider) has an extremely limited recognition in Europe. Of course, the case in general deals with media freedom, but the statement in para. 35 makes no reservation to this point, assuming a much more general application/ interpretation. It has not been until the recent ECtHR judgment in Magyar that the general right of access to information (that others are not willing to impart) was for the first time recognised in Strasbourg. And even in that case such recognition did not go further than admitting the right of access to public documents. <br /><br />The general right of access even privately-held information which others are not willing to impart (as is the case in most instances of a “communication of a work covered by copyright […] without […] authorisation”) simply does not exist in Europe (for now), and, leaving aside the question on whether it’s good or bad, stating to the contrary creates a fundamentally flawed presumption.<br /><br />Am I missing something here?<br /><br />Anyone aware of any comments from the FoE specialists on this case? Would really appreciate any references to those.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12164118371719700289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-48559067114641379422018-10-25T23:35:29.218+01:002018-10-25T23:35:29.218+01:00I have to say I agree with Kant on the matter of w...I have to say I agree with Kant on the matter of whether copyright subsists in military reports. If the AG is right in his analysis on this point, then surely most newspaper reports, and indeed most news reporting, will fail this test, leaving only opinion pieces to qualify for copyright. This runs counter to what the Court said in Infopaq (C-5/08, paragraphs 37-39 of the judgment) regarding the intellectual creativity involved in writing headlines as well as the main body of news reports.<br />The second point I find troubling is the suggestion that copyright is intended to benefit individuals not governments. While that flows naturally from the <i>droit d'auteur</i> approach to copyright, that argument could easily be developed until it undermines the rights of large corporations to pursue copyright infringement claims, which of course is at odds with the much disputed articles 11 and 13 of the proposed DSM Directive.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-69060220687244233832018-10-25T16:00:25.285+01:002018-10-25T16:00:25.285+01:00I have not read the original opinion but if the su...I have not read the original opinion but if the summary is correct, it is an amazing viewpoint. A report about factual events cannot be original? Rubbish. I am sure that no two people provided with the same basic material would create the same report. What about the OS maps? These are created using factual information with no creative input. Does that mean there is no copyright protection in them and they are free for all to copy and sell?<br /><br />It may well be that the public interest in the documents overrides their copyright protection but to say that they are not prima facie protectable is wide of the mark IMO.Kantnoreply@blogger.com