tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post8834386537436380111..comments2024-03-19T12:09:41.188+00:00Comments on The IPKat: Signs and wonders from the UK-IPOVerónica RodrÃguez Arguijohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05763207846940036921noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-66367922173736173592007-07-27T08:24:00.000+01:002007-07-27T08:24:00.000+01:00Ilanah is correct. The last paragraph of the PAN i...Ilanah is correct. The last paragraph of the PAN is contrary to ECJ jurisprudence, which establishes that Article 3(1)(a)/section 3(1)(a) only applies if the sign cannot function as a trade mark for any goods or services. By contrast Article 3(1)(b)/section 3(1)(b) applies if the sign cannot function as a trade mark for the specific goods or services in question. See POSTKANTOR.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-83599683260139253672007-07-26T16:54:00.000+01:002007-07-26T16:54:00.000+01:00I think what the ECJ said in the Philips case was ...I think what the ECJ said in the Philips case was that if your "mark/sign/thingy" was factually distinctive, then it could not be argued that a section 3(1)(a) nevertheless applied. This is different from saying that direct descriptions (and nothing more) of goods or services are effectively incapable under 3(1)(a). <BR/><BR/>Yes, its a very dangerous thing to say that certain "types" of marks are a priori unregistrable. On the other hand we also know that, absent an express public interest ground of objection, the ECJ are very adept at interpreting the existing grounds of objection to protect the public interest.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com