Showing newest posts with label Patent entitlement. Show older posts
Showing newest posts with label Patent entitlement. Show older posts

Thursday, 24 January 2008

You're no gent, says Court of Appeal

In October 2006 Mr Justice Mann (Patents Court, England and Wales) gave ruling in Cinpres Gas Injection Ltd v Melea Ltd [2006] EWHC 2451 (Ch) which very greatly upset the IPKat (see here). In short, Cinpres sought a declaration that it was entitled to be registered as owner of a patent for gas injection moulding technology used in the plastics industry. But did the inventor, James Hendry, make the invention when working for Cinpres -- or was he then working for Ladney, an American businessman who set up Melea as a patent holding company? Hendry first worked for Cinpres but left the company after falling out with it in 1985. A year and a quarter later, after entering into a settlement agreement with Cinpres that contained a confidentiality clause, Hendry took up a consultancy with Ladney with whom he worked till 1991. In 2001 Hendry returned to Cinpres, this time as a consultant. Meanwhile in 1996 the UK Patent Office had ruled that Hendry had discovered the invention while working for Ladney, in consequence of which Melea was registered as proprietor. Hendry, who had given evidence before the Patent Office in support of Ladney, subsequently wanted to give evidence that he had discovered the invention while working for Cinpres. Cinpres said it was not barred by the earlier proceedings from seeking a fresh declaration that it was entitled to the patent, since Hendry was willing to admit that he had perjured himself when giving evidence in the earlier proceedings and to testify that Ladney had procured, or taken advantage of, his decision to do so.

Mann J dismissed Cinpres' application. He agreed that Hendry had lied on oath and had both acquired and deployed knowledge of the invention while working for Cinpres. Also, the use of the invention was something that Hendry should have kept confidential under the terms of the settlement agreement with Cinpres; his perjured evidence was therefore relevant to a material matter. However, since Ladney had not actually induced Hendry to commit perjury and did not know of it or take any advantage of it, the decision in the earlier proceedings could not be impeached and it governed the issue of the ownership of the patent. Said Mann J:

"I appreciate that that result might be considered by some as less than satisfactory – the entitlement to the patent is governed by a decision which was reached after receiving and accepting perjured evidence and which might have been different if the truth had been told. However, that is the effect of the requirements of the applicable principles, as to which there was no dispute between the parties".
The Court of Appeal today reversed this decision (text in full on BAILII). The Court (Sir Igor Judge, President of the Queen's Bench Division, plus Lords Justices Jacob and Richards) commented that the parties had taken so many new points that the case was scarcely recognisable as that upon which Mann J originally had to decide.

The anonymous judge giving the decision of the Court of Appeal (the BAILII transcript posted today doesn't mention names, but the IPKat suspects it might just be Jacob LJ -- even though para. 52 mentions him in the third person ...). Anyway, the Court had some interesting things to say about the manner in which an appellate court should consider a finding of dishonesty by a trial judge:
"It is one thing for the Court of Appeal to hold a man a perjurer for the first time on appeal but quite another to hold that an established perjurer was more extensive in his perjury than held by the judge. The real question here is simply whether the Judge was wrong in his evaluation of all the evidence".
In this regard, said the Court,
"We are not satisfied that he reached the wrong conclusion on the facts. Ladney is not shown to have been complicit in Hendry's perjury at the time. It does not follow, however, that he has not himself adopted and relied upon that perjury and Hendry's false story".
The Court then effectively pinned Hendry's evidence on Ladney:
" ... we have come to the conclusion that Hendry's evidence the first time round should be regarded as that also of Ladney and that Hendry's fraud should be treated as also that of Ladney. Both Hendry and Ladney were actually parties to the first proceedings. Hendry was seeking to justify his claim to be the inventor, to be named on the patent as such and to have had the right to have assigned the property in the invention to Ladney. Ladney was claiming to be the owner of the right to apply for the patent by virtue of assignment from Hendry. They had a common foe, Cinpres, and made common, and completely intermixed cause against it. One could not succeed without the other. True it is that Ladney's claim was much the more valuable commercially, but we do not see that value has anything to do with it. Besides even Hendry had a commercial interest in the patent belonging to Ladney for he would be entitled to royalties if that were so. Not so if the patent belonged to Cinpres.

Putting it another way it would be wrong to say that Hendry was a "mere witness" in the first proceedings. He was more than merely a witness for Ladney – he was Ladney's "comrade in arms". His fraud by way of perjury was being adopted by Ladney and should be regarded as Ladney's. Hendry himself clearly could not resist the earlier judgment being set aside on the grounds of his fraud. Given that, the whole judgment is unravelled and should be set aside".
The IPKat notes the genuine indignation of the Court, whose judgment opened with the stern comment that
"Mann J had the unenviable task of deciding, as between two liars and perjurers, what the truth was (or at least what was most likely) about the making and ownership of the invention the subject of the Patent. ... James Hendry was one of the liars. The other was Michael Ladney. Neither deserves the courtesy of a 'Mister'".
Merpel is delighted with the outcome of this appeal. A sensitive Kat, she has suffered for fifteen months from the notion that British patent law could operate in such a manner as to deprive Cinpres of a patent to which it was morally and, in her opinion legally, entitled.

The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth here
When truth is fiction here

Thursday, 25 October 2007

House of Lords overturns CA in Yeda appeal

The long-awaited patent appeal in Yeda Research and Development Company Limited v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc and others [2007] UKHL 43 was handed down yesterday. The IPKat heard the news from his Australian friend Duncan Bucknell. Unusually, a majority of three of the five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary could be described as IP judges: Lord Hoffmann, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (the other judges being Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Mance).

In short, this was an appeal by Yeda against the Court of Appeal's refusal to allow amendments to its reference to the Comptroller General of Patents, under the Patents Act 1977 s.37(1), of the question of the true proprietorship of a patent owned RPR. This patent was for a treatment for cancer involving the use of certain chemicals in combination. Yeda initially filed a reference, alleging that it should be a joint proprietor of the patent along with RPR, asking that scientists working on its behalf should be named as co-inventors. Subsequently, following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 267, Yeda applied to amend its statement by

* adding references to other rules of law on which it relied for its title to the patent, and

* alleging that its scientists were the sole inventors and that the patent should therefore be transferred into the name of Yeda alone.

By the time the application for amendment was made, the two-year limitation period stipulated under the Patents Act 1977, s.37(5), had expired.

In this action the questions for determination were
(i) what a person claiming entitlement to a patent in someone else's name had to prove: was it enough for him to show that he was the inventor and that the registered proprietor was not, or did he have to allege that the registered proprietor had procured registration by breach of some other rule of law? and

(ii) whether, after the expiry of the two-year limitation period, a person could amend a claim for joint entitlement, to make it a claim to sole entitlement.
Allowing the appeal, the House of Lords (for whom Lord Hoffmann gave the main speech) said as follows:
* Sections 7(2) and s.7(3) of the Patents Act 1977 provided an exhaustive code for determining who was entitled to the grant of a patent.

* the first step in any dispute over entitlement was to decide who was the inventor of the claimed invention: this was the actual deviser of the invention.

* by s.7(4), a person who sought to be added as a joint inventor bore the burden of proving that he contributed to the inventive concept underlying the claimed invention; a person seeking to be substituted as sole inventor bore the additional burden of proving that the inventor named in the patent had not contributed to the inventive concept.

* there was nothing in the statute that said that entitlement depended on anything other than being the inventor. Nor was there any justification, in a dispute over who was the inventor, for importing questions as to whether either claimant had some personal cause of action against the other.

* the result in Markham was correct, the broad principle it established -- that any claim to entitlement to a patent, even by someone claiming simply to have been the inventor, required reliance upon "some other rule of law" -- was wrong, so that decision would be overruled. The first set of amendments sought by Yeda was thus unnecessary.

* an amendment of a claim for joint entitlement to a claim to sole entitlement was not the assertion of a new claim;

* proceedings under s.37(1) were not an ordinary civil claim, but rather a reference of a question to the comptroller. The statement accompanying the reference was not analogous to a claim form asserting a cause of action in a court of law, and the question of whether a claim to full entitlement was a new or different claim was irrelevant.

* the real question was whether amendment of the statement of facts would make the reference a new one. Plainly, it would not. In this case the reference had been made within the two-year period, identifying the statutory questions referred to the comptroller. The comptroller was still being asked to decide those questions and it was difficult to see how any amendments to the accompanying statement could make it a different reference.
The IPKat thinks this is plainly right and that it makes good sense too.

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