AdWords - the Spanish point of view

AdWords are a hot topic and there is an ongoing interest in the various national legal view points concerning them, in particular after the Advocate General's opinion of 22 September 2009 (see the IPKat's post here).

In the light of this, the IPKat is proud to share the Spanish view point with his readers courtesy of Manuel Lobato and Fidel Porcuna (both Bird & Bird), who have co-authored "The liability of service providers in the information society. Reflections about the Opinion of the Advocate General delivered on 22 September 2009 in joined cases C-236 to 238 /08 Google v. Louis Vuitton and others before the ECJ."

Manuel, Fidel and their publisher have very kindly agreed to have their article posted on the IPKat and even provided an English translation. This Kat is a bit of an AdWords "addict" and very much enjoyed their insightful article, in particular their "Criticism of the position of the Advocate General" which is well worth a read!

The original Spanish version can be retrieved by clicking here.
The English translation (!) can be retrieved here.

Update: if anyone cannot open the links above, please e-mail Birgit with "Spanish AdWord paper" in the subject header.

The Romans, the Germans, the Spanish and interim TM relief

The IPKat's friend, scholar and MARQUES activist Carles Prat writes to him with a topic for discussion which he describes as "quite academic but which, in Spain, has reached some practical -- and undesirable -- consequences in the sense that many petitions for an interim injunction are rejected on this basis.

An interesting problem, which goes back to Roman law ... but Justinian (right) was not available for comment

Says Carles:

"1.- Let me set the factual basis first.

It is not uncommon that, in launching a trade mark infringement action (including a petition for an interim injunction) the defendant will argue that it holds itself a registered trade mark which is 'similar' (with same scope of protection) to the 'infringed' mark. This second mark is junior to the mark on which the action is based and is therefore subject to cancellation based on relative grounds. Often the trade mark infringement action is accompanied by an action to have this junior mark declared invalid.

The chain of the reasoning leading to the Spanish Courts to reject the petition for interim relief is the following:

(1) a registered trade mark is a 'right over property';

(2) a 'right over property' implies two sides: the 'negative' side, ie. the right to exclude others from using the property (the ius excluendi) and a 'positive' side, ie, a right on the part of the owner himself to use the property;

(3) if the trade mark right is a 'right over a property', the holder of the second registered trade mark, until this mark has been declared invalid (and this will not happen until the decision on the merits has been passed), enjoys a right to use his second mark (notwithstanding that it may be subject to cancellation proceedings);

(4) anyone who uses his own right may not be deemed to cause damage; 5) it can therefore not be said that the claimant and owner of the first registered trade mark enjoys a sufficiently strong legal position to obtain an interim injunction.

Needless to say, the result is contrary to common sense (the trade mark is deprived of its essence, "the right to prohibit...", when this is possibly most needed) and certainly the essential function of the trade mark is not greatly taken into account here ...

2.- Coming back to the academic part of the reasoning, what I want to ascertain is where other countries stand with respect to the thesis of the 'negative side' and of the 'positive side'. And here come my thoughts:

- As far as I know this concept originated at the beginning of the XXth century and was developed by German legal scholars.

- This is probably a different discussion from the one related to the 'true' legal nature of a trade mark right: whether a trade mark right is a 'simple' right to prohibit others from using your own mark, or whether it is a full 'property right'. I am aware that the German Courts have debated this at some length (even at a constitutional level) and they have settled the question by considering that trade marks are full 'property rights'.

- These two debates interact with each other in some respects: if one believes that a trade mark right is not a 'property right' but 'only' a 'right to prohibit' (ius prohibendi or ius excluendi), the question whether such right has one or two sides is probably superfluous, since those people who thought that a trade mark right did have two sides was because they compared it with a 'normal' property right over a tangible asset which the Romans already considered it embodied a 'positive side' (ius utendi et fruendi).

- If a trade mark right has a positive side then this right is bound to be the 'right to use'.

- The Spanish Courts and, as far as I am aware, the current English law and the former German Trade Mark Act (as well as the former Spanish Trade Mark Act) contained a specific reference to this 'right to use'.

- I am under the impression, however, that EU trade mark law (Directive and CTM Regulation) either did not want to get involved with this fairly academic point or clearly established a system where a trade mark right is conceived as a mere right to exclude others: (i) art. 5 of the Trade Mark Directive (despite the use of the plural in the heading) refers to one single right (the right to prohibit or ius prohibendi); (ii) art. 5 of the CTM Regulation (which uses the singular) just refers to the ius prohibendi too; and (iii) art. 95 lifts the 'presumption of validity of a CTM' in case this is challenged, which, interestingly, might be interpreted as making reference to some sort of implicit right to use, which 'conditional' upon the mark not being challenged... A 'conditional right'? (the Directive contains no provision similar to art. 95 of the CTM Regulation).

- In my view a trade mark right does not contain a 'right of use'. In the current EU system one does not need a registration to use a sign in trade. Trade mark rights are exercised in order to exclude others. This does not of course mean that the right is not assignable etc. (ie that one can have full protection over that right 'as though it was a property right' in most respects). However, it does not provide a proper 'right to use'. There is an obligation (more correctly, a burden) to use, if one wishes to maintain the registration, but this is a different question.

- However, as we have discussed, it looks like English law and the former German law (not, I am told, the current, post-harmonisation Act, but it may well be that scholars believe that this has not changed the position) contain, or did contain, an express recognition of such 'right to use'. They do not take it to the same extreme as the Spanish Courts have (as explained above) and have considered that, if there is another mark more senior than that trade mark whose 'right of use' is being claimed, then this right of use 'ceases' to operate. The same reasoning would apply to art. 95 of the CTM Regulation (if we considered that it contains an implicit right to use). I would however wonder what is then the purpose of a 'right to use' which the holder may only exercise when he does not need it. Is this a real 'right to use'?

All this is a little too academic (but we lawyers also like these discussions, do we not?) but, as you can see, at least in Spain it has had in many cases (fortunately the Trade Mark Court in Alicante recently decided otherwise) significant practical consequences.

So my questions are as follows:

- Do trade mark rights have a 'negative' side and a 'positive side'?
- If so, does the 'positive side' include a 'right to use'?
- If it does, does it operate also when it conflicts with a senior mark?
- If so, what is the point in considering that a trade mark has a 'positive side'?"

The IPKat welcomes discussion on this issue as much as Carles does. Please post your comments below so that they can be shared with other readers.

Spain condemned for non-implementation of resale rights directive

It's only available in French and Spanish, but the European Court of Justice ruling in Case C-32/07 Commission des Communautés européennes v Royaume d’Espagne makes it plain that the Spanish are in breach of their Euro-commitments by failing to implement correctly the provisions of Directive 2001/84 on droit de suite au profit de l’auteur d’une œuvre d’art originale (the resale right directive).

Right: it's magnificent and it's art -- but can you identify the creature on the left?

Since the judgment is so short, the Kat is reproducing it more or less in full here. If any kind person wishes to post an explanation below, he will be forever grateful.

"1 Par sa requête, la Commission des Communautés européennes demande à la Cour de constater que, en ne prenant pas les dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives nécessaires pour se conformer à la directive 2001/84/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 27 septembre 2001, relative au droit de suite au profit de l’auteur d’une œuvre d’art originale (JO L 272, p. 32, ci‑après la «directive»), ou, à tout le moins, en ne lui communiquant pas lesdites dispositions, le Royaume d’Espagne a manqué aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de cette directive.

2 Ainsi qu’il ressort de l’article 1er, paragraphe 1, de la directive, celle-ci a pour objet d’instituer un droit de suite au profit de l’auteur d’une œuvre d’art originale.

3 Aux termes de l’article 12, paragraphe 1, premier alinéa, de la directive, les États membres devaient mettre en vigueur les dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives nécessaires pour se conformer à celle-ci avant le 1er janvier 2006 et en informer immédiatement la Commission.

4 N’ayant pas reçu d’informations lui permettant de considérer que les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer la transposition de la directive dans l’ordre juridique espagnol avaient été adoptées dans le délai prescrit, la Commission a engagé la procédure en manquement prévue à l’article 226 CE. Après avoir mis le Royaume d’Espagne en demeure de présenter ses observations, la Commission a, le 4 juillet 2006, émis un avis motivé invitant cet État membre à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour se conformer à cet avis dans un délai de deux mois à compter de la réception de celui-ci.

5 La réponse des autorités espagnoles audit avis motivé ayant fait apparaître que les dispositions nécessaires à la transposition complète de la directive n’avaient pas encore été adoptées, la Commission a décidé d’introduire le présent recours.

6 Dans son mémoire en défense, le Royaume d’Espagne conteste la recevabilité du recours en invoquant un prétendu manque de précision de la requête. Selon cet État membre, la Commission s’est, en fait, bornée à formuler des appréciations générales sur le manquement reproché ne permettant pas au Royaume d’Espagne d’être informé des dispositions précises de la directive nécessitant une transposition en droit interne.

7 À cet égard, il y a lieu d’observer que, ainsi qu’il ressort du dossier, les autorités espagnoles ont reconnu elles-mêmes, dans leur réponse à la lettre de mise en demeure, que certaines dispositions de la directive, précisément identifiées dans cette réponse, n’avaient pas encore été transposées dans l’ordre juridique national. Partant, le Royaume d’Espagne ne saurait utilement prétendre, pour sa défense, qu’il n’avait pas connaissance des articles de la directive nécessitant une transposition dans son ordre juridique.

8 Il convient, par conséquent, de rejeter l’exception d’irrecevabilité soulevée par le Royaume d’Espagne et de déclarer recevable le recours de la Commission.

9 Quant au fond, le Royaume d’Espagne indique que la législation espagnole, notamment l’article 24 du texte codifié de la loi sur la propriété intellectuelle, approuvé par le décret royal législatif 1/1996, du 12 avril 1996, qui régularise, clarifie et harmonise les dispositions en vigueur en la matière (BOE n° 97, du 22 avril 1996, p. 14369), assure une transposition partielle et anticipée de la directive. Toutefois, il ressort du mémoire en défense de cet État membre que l’ensemble des mesures nécessaires à la transposition complète de cette dernière n’ont pas été adoptées dans le délai prescrit.

10 À cet égard, il suffit de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I-8227, point 24; du 14 juillet 2005, Commission/Allemagne, C‑433/03, Rec. p. I‑6985, point 32, et du 28 juin 2007, Commission/Portugal, C‑410/06, non publié au Recueil, point 10).

11 En l’espèce, il est constant que, à l’expiration du délai imparti dans l’avis motivé, toutes les mesures destinées à assurer la transposition de la directive dans l’ordre juridique espagnol n’avaient pas été adoptées.

12 Il s’ensuit qu’il y a lieu de considérer comme fondé le recours introduit par la Commission.

13 Par conséquent, il convient de constater que, en ne prenant pas, dans le délai prescrit, toutes les dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives nécessaires pour se conformer à la directive, le Royaume d’Espagne a manqué aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de cette directive".

Spanish art here
Spanish art at auction here

Right of integrity over bridge fails

The IPKat is intrigued by a story sent to him by Mariona Baldo (thanks Mariona!) concerning copyright in a Spanish bridge. Architect Santiago Calatrava unsuccessfully sued the city council of Bilbao and two construction firms after they added a footbridge to a bridge over the River Ria that he designed. Although the judge found "There has been an appreciable alteration of the work…which changes its unmistakable personality…it has ceased to be a self-contained work,” he ultimately found that there had been no violation of Calatrava’s right to integrity because the public interest required an addition to the bridge to allow pedestrians to traverse sufficiently freely. Said the judge:

"The alteration has occurred; but the right to the integrity of the work is not violated, the author being obliged to bear it in the interest of the public served by the bridge."

This is Spain’s first case about the right of integrity concerning engineering works.

The IPKat is glad that common sense has prevailed here. It would make life extremely difficult if architects could object to alterations to buildings which others have commissioned from them, and would enable them to control other people’s ‘real property’. More fundamentally, the IPKat questions the wisdom of granting a right of integrity over works of architecture in the first place. This wouldn’t be such a problem in the UK since an architect’s right of integrity only gives him the right to have his name removed from buildings which have been altered in a way which is derogatory to his reputation.