COPA v Wright: Civil Restraint Orders and Vexatious Litigation

The word ‘saga’ is perhaps overused to describe long and drawn-out litigation. However, that term feels justified when reporting on the latest instalment of the Dr. Wright v. COPA litigation. The High Court, in a judgment from Mr Justice Mellor (Crypto Open Patent Alliance v Wright [2025] EWHC 1139 (Ch)), has now made an order that will make it very much more difficult for Dr. Wright to pursue claims in England & Wales. Is this the end of the road?

 

What was this case about?

The story of this litigation is somewhat difficult to summarise, and as we do not use AI in the text of IPKat posts, I will give it my best human thought-derived summary.

Dr. Wright claimed to be the inventor of Bitcoin and the real person behind the potentially pseudonymous ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’. According to the English High Court, he is not.

 

He has brought a large number of claims related to his claim to be Nakamoto, including for defamation and infringement of IP rights, mainly copyright. Most of those unfortunate parties are involved in the cryptocurrency industry. As far as I can tell, he has lost or discontinued all of those cases.

The claimant is the Crypto Open Patent Alliance (COPA). COPA claims to be “a non-profit community of like-minded people and companies formed to encourage the adoption and advancement of cryptocurrency technologies and to remove patents as a barrier to growth and innovation”. Mellor J delivered an unusual ex tempore judgment at the conclusion a trial in March 2024 granting the declaration sought by COPA that Wright was not Nakamoto. The Judge went on to deliver a written judgment in May 2024 (Crypto Open Patent Alliance v Craig Steven Wright [2024] EWHC 1198 (Ch)), in which he dismissed Wright’s claim to have invented Bitcoin, and admonished his evidence as being full of “lies and forged documents” which were given “in support of his biggest lie: his claim to be Satoshi Nakamoto.” Wright appealed, with Arnold LJ refusing permission. Arnold LJ explained in that refusal that Wright had no right to appeal to the UK Supreme Court, but he did it anyway, causing even more costs to be incurred.

 

Following that trial, Wright issued another claim, this time against an apparently non-existent partnership and SquareUp Europe Ltd, claiming £900 billion in respect of alleged IP infringement. COPA said that this was a clear breach of an earlier anti-suit injunctions. Wright carried on, and Mellor committed Wright for contempt of court, giving him a suspended prison sentence of one year.

 

Keeping up?

 

The effect of all of this is very significant. A huge number of people have been affected financially and personally. COPA put in evidence that costs awards had been made in various litigation conservatively valued at £10 million. COPA’s are likely a significant proportion of that; the Bird & Bird partner with conduct of the case, Phil Sherrell, has to date made 23 witness statements and 4 affidavits. The total number of days of court time involved in Wright’s various cases is nearing 100 days, which will have “delayed justice for other court users”. The judge, Mr Justice Mellor, described how Dr. Wright had put two of those individuals sued for defamation through “five years of personal hell”.
 

What to do about a problem like Dr. Wright

According to the judge, Wright has shown “no remorse”, quoting him as saying that he was “unstoppable”. While Wright may genuinely feel aggrieved by how things have turned out, the courts are a finite public resource, and defendants need to be protected from vexatious litigation.
 
That leads us back to the present application. COPA (and SquareUp) applied for (1) a civil restraint order (a form of procedural restriction on litigants to hamper their ability to abuse the court’s systems), and (2) to refer the case to the Attorney General (AG).
 
Reviewing the history of the case, including much of the information set out above, the judge agreed to make a General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO), which is the harshest of the different types of CRO available. It is only available where a party has persistently issued claims or applications which are “totally without merit” (TWM), a less harsh form of CRO would not be sufficient/appropriate. Mellor J found that Wright had persistently brought claims and applications that were TWM, that there was a very significant risk that Wright would pursue more TWM claims, and that the order would be just and proportionate. The judge made clear that the GCRO did not prevent Wright’s ability to use the courts, only that it put the obstacle of needing to make an application and satisfy a judge that the claim has merit.
 
Further, the judge made a reference to the AG for consideration of an application by the AG under s.42(1) Senior Courts Act 1981 which would place an even broader bar on Wright bringing civil proceedings without leave of the court than the GCRO.
 

Is this the end?

On past evidence, probably not. Wright might try to appeal, he might try to circumvent the orders, and he might move to other jurisdictions. It seems unlikely that he will ever be able to get a claim off the ground in the UK that relates to his claim to be Nakamoto, at for the initial three years for which the GCRO is in force.
 

What do we take from this?

First, it is worth pointing out that a large number of lawyers (including in particular COPA’s solicitors Bird & Bird and its counsel Jonathan Hough KC and Jonathan Moss) have really put a shift in on this litigation. Most litigators have faced trenchant and obsessive opponents, and especially litigants in person, but few will have encountered this level of vexatious litigation. Mellor J said that “Wright's conduct stands apart when one considers its scale and effects on innocent victims and the court service.”
 
Second, it is a worthy reminder that parties faced with vexatious litigants have options to bring an end to relentless litigation. Many are forced on a cost-benefit analysis to settle even claims that obviously have no merit, so in this regard it appears to be the sheer value of Wright’s claims that forced COPA et al to take a stand.
 
Third, Mellor J makes various comments about his suspicion that Wright was using AI to generate documents. This is becoming quite common in litigation involving litigants in person (‘pro se litigants’) and is quite difficult to deal with. Such documents can be generated easily and effectively without cost, yet to review, check and rebut them is an expensive business. This Kat’s view is that AI could be a game-changer in allowing access to justice for those who cannot afford expert legal advice, and could help in structuring submissions in a more organised and effective manner that could streamline litigation. However, there will need to be active case management to prevent its misuse, and possibly some changes to rules about disclosing where AI has been used. The judiciary recently updated its guidance on the use of AI, which gives some indications that work has been created using AI and states:
 

“If it appears an AI chatbot may have been used to prepare submissions or other documents, it is appropriate to inquire about this, ask what checks for accuracy have been undertaken (if any), and inform the litigant that they are responsible for what they put to the court/tribunal.”