Non-reproducible prior art post-G 1/23: Novelty versus inventive step (T 1044/23)

The Board of Appeal decision in T 1044/23 provides us with a first look at how the principles of G 1/23 will be applied to black-box prior art. The decision confirms that whilst novelty attacks based on prior use and sale of a non-reproducible product are possible, the path to an inventive step attack based on such disclosures may still be challenging in the face of the practical realities of well-protected trade secrets. G 1/23 and its interpretation by the Boards of Appeal highlights the potential important interplay between patents and trade secrets in an effective overarching IP strategy. 

Legal background: The shift from G 1/92 to G 1/23 on enablement

The recent decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) in G 1/23 revisited a question previously considered in G 1/92, relating to what constitutes prior art with respect to a novelty and inventive step assessment. According to Article 54(2) EPC:

"The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written description, by oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application.

Black-box prior art

Whilst Article 54(2) EPC therefore broadly captures all public disclosures as being prior art, the EBA in G 1/92 introduced a critical enablement requirement regarding "availability". Specifically, in G 1/92, the EBA found that a product on the market was not legally "available" under Article 54(2) EPC if the skilled person could not reproduce it without undue burden. In other words, the fact that a product cannot be reproduced meant that the product itself could not be considered prior art. 

The peculiar legal fiction established by G 1/92, whereby a product could be purchased or otherwise made available to the public, yet legally ignored in an assessment of patentability, required certain mental gymnastics to understand. G 1/23 effectively did away with this odd position. In G 1/23, the EBA found that a commercial product cannot be excluded from the state of the art solely due to non-reproducibility (IPKat). As confirmed in the headnote to G 1/23:

"A product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application cannot be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced by the skilled person before that date."

Case summary of T 1044/23: Polyethylene composition and prior use

We now have our first Board of Appeal to apply the order of G 1/23. The patent in question in T 1044/23 (EP 3161066 B1) related to a polyethylene composition suitable for injection moulding. The main issue on appeal was whether the prior sale of certain commercial resins, specifically products sold under the names DMDA-8904 NT 7 and DMDA-8907 NT 7, anticipated or rendered obvious the claimed invention. 

The invention aimed to solve the problem of providing a polyethylene composition with a specific balance of properties, including density, melt flow indices, and a specific polydispersity index known as the "ER value". At the first instance, the Opposition Division, citing G 1/92, rejected the opposition, reasoning that the commercial resins DMDA-8904 and DMDA-8907 were not prior art under Article 54(2) EPC because their manufacture was not enabled (OD decision, para. 19.5). The OD thus took the pre-G 1/23 approach to prior use, namely if the skilled person could not reproduce the product without undue burden, it was not "available" to the public (IPKat). 

On appeal, the Opponent argued that, following G 1/23, the reproducibility requirement was no longer a valid criterion to exclude a commercial product from the state of the art. The Opponent submitted evidence, including invoices and certificates of analysis, to prove that the resins had been sold and delivered before the priority date. The key question for the Board of Appeal was thus whether these "black box" resins, whose precise manufacturing process (catalyst and conditions) was seemingly a trade secret, could be cited against the patent for novelty and inventive step following G 1/23.

Novelty assessment: Applying G 1/23 to non-reproducible products

Citing the headnote of G 1/23, the Board of Appeal confirmed that a product put on the market cannot now be excluded from the state of the art solely because its composition or internal structure cannot be analysed and reproduced. The Board of Appeal concluded that the reproducibility requirement is thus no longer a valid condition to assess whether a product is state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC (r. 2.4.3). 

Having established and confirmed the new legal test for prior use under G 1/23, the Board of Appeal turned to the facts of the case. The Board of Appeal was convinced that the documents submitted by the opponent proved the public availability of the resins (r. 2.5.6). Furthermore, for the Board of Appeal, the evidence showed that the composition of these commercial resins fell squarely within the scope of claim 1 as granted (r. 2.6.1). The Board of Appeal thus concluded that the subject-matter of granted claim 1 lacked novelty with respect to these resins (r. 2.7).

Non-reproducible products in the problem-solution approach

The case in T 1044/23 then moved to an auxiliary request, in which the Patentee had amended the density range to exclude the specific density of the prior art DMDA resins. This was considered to restore novelty but was objected to for lack of inventive step (Article 56 EPC).

The Patentee argued that because the methods to prepare the DMDA resins were not publicly available and could not be reproduced, the prior art resins were not a suitable starting point for assessing inventive step. The Patentee essentially argued that one cannot rationally start from a product if one does not know how it was created.

However, the Board of Appeal was not convinced by this argument. Referring again to G 1/23, the Board of Appeal noted that the EBA had explicitly stated that "depending on the circumstances, also a non-reproducible product may be considered to represent the closest prior art"  (r. 5.1.6). The Board of Appeal concluded therefore, that even if the skilled person would not know how to reproduce these resins, this was not a sufficient reason to disregard them as the closest prior art. The Board of Appeal reasoned that because the resins were commercially available, a skilled person could use them as such or attempt to modify them. The Board of Appeal drew a parallel to the Coca-Cola example in G 1/23, noting that the inability to reproduce the original recipe does not stop a skilled person from trying to improve the product. 

Critically, the Board of Appeal distinguished a non-reproducible commercial product from a "defective or speculative disclosure," noting that the former is a "physical, tangible product" (r. 5.1.9). This is an important distinction, which means that following G 1/23 it is still possible to dismiss non-enabling speculation in the prior art, which is particularly important in the pharma industry where hypothesizing is often easy, but execution is hard. 

The Board of Appeal thus concluded that the commercial resins could be selected as the closest prior art. As in the case underlying G 1/23, the decision in T 1044/23 therefore confirms that the "starting point" in the problem-solution approach can be a product you can buy but cannot make.

The surviving value of trade secrets

Selecting a starting point is just the first step in the problem-solution approach. There remains the question of whether the invention is obvious in view of the closest prior art. The problem to be solved in this case was formulated by the Board of Appeal as the provision of an alternative polyethylene composition. The question was whether it would have been obvious for the skilled person to modify the DMDA resins to arrive at the claimed density range whilst maintaining the other parametric requirements (MIE, MIF, and ER values).

The Opponent argued that it was common general knowledge to adjust density by varying comonomer content and that the general process type (UNIPOL gas-phase) was known. They argued that the skilled person could reproduce the resins or obtain similar ones and then adjust the density.

The Board of Appeal, on the other hand, saw a distinction between general process knowledge and the specific know-how required to replicate a complex commercial polymer. The Board of Appeal concurred with the Patentee that the exact processes were likely confidential know-how: "it has not been shown that, by following these indications and with only routine experimentation, the skilled person would have been able to reproduce the DMDA resins or obtain materials having comparable properties" (r. 5.2.3). 

The Board of Appeal thus concluded that whether the skilled person could achieve the claimed composition without undue burden "remains a matter of conjecture". Consequently, the invention defined in the auxiliary request was not shown to be obvious. The appeal was therefore dismissed (in part regarding the auxiliary request) and the case remitted with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of the auxiliary request.

Final thoughts

The decision in T 1044/23 illustrates some of the practical boundaries of the EBA decision in G 1/23 with respect to novelty and inventive step. For a novelty assessment, if the product exists and matches the claims, novelty is destroyed with respect to the product. It does not matter that the product cannot be reproduced by a skilled person. 

For inventive step, G 1/23 allows the use of non-reproducible prior art as the starting point for inventive step. However, trade secrets may continue to provide considerable protection if they prevent the skilled person from working out how to arrive at the claimed invention. As we saw in the referring case to G 1/23, the important question is whether the skilled person can arrive at the invention as claimed and not the particular cited prior art product. If an opposing party cannot explain, in view of the protected trade secrets, how the skilled person would modify a specific, non-reproducible product to reach the invention, an inventive step attack may fail for lack of a reasonable expectation of success or enabling disclosure for the modification. T 1044/23 confirms that whilst G 1/23 removed the "legal fiction" that non-reproducible products don't exist, it did not remove the practical reality that you cannot modify what you do not understand. To this Kat, G 1/23 is one of the EBA's clearest and sensible decisions in recent years. 

All of this highlights the importance of an effective and thoughtful trade secret policy. In fields in which products must necessarily be placed early on the market at an early stage, the question of what processes and information would enable a skilled person to arrive at new commercially important developments, and whether these may be protected by trade secrets, may be a highly valuable strand in an effective IP strategy. 

Further reading

Non-reproducible prior art post-G 1/23: Novelty versus inventive step (T 1044/23) Non-reproducible prior art post-G 1/23: Novelty versus inventive step (T 1044/23) Reviewed by Dr Rose Hughes on Tuesday, November 18, 2025 Rating: 5

9 comments:

  1. Thank you for this interesting post! Please allow me to briefly comment on certain aspects:

    You mentioned that G1/92 established a legal fiction, namely that non-reproducible products are not prior art. In G1/92, the EBoA however only explained what is required for a product to become "available to the public", and it was concluded that this term implies reproducibility without undue burden. This is no legal fiction, but merely a definition of the threshold that needs to be passed (in the same way as the term "public" has been defined in the case law).

    Indeed, the enablement criterion is still applied to written disclosures. It is one of the weaknesses of G1/23 that the EBoA failed to address (non-speculative and not obviously defective) written disclosures, and also did not explain where the EPC provides a basis for applying different standards to products and written disclosures - indeed, there is no such basis.

    It is further difficult to comprehend what empowered the Enlarged Board to overturn G1/92. After all, the law has not changed, but simply is now interpreted differently. What happened to the concept of legal certainty, one may ask?


    I further note that in the discussed decision, it is stated that ""it has not been shown that, by following these indications and with only routine experimentation, the skilled person would have been able to reproduce the DMDA resins or obtain materials having comparable properties". Does this not mean that the BoA re-introduced reproducibility as the decisive criterion for non-obviousness? It is clear that lack of reproducibility is no longer a criterion for novelty - so how can it be that it is a criterion for inventive step? After all, the definition of the state of the art is the same for both novetly and inventive step. If a feature is disclosed in the prior art, then it should be treated equally for both novelty and inventive step.

    It is also difficult to comprehend how the discussed decision fits in the problem-solution approach, as the assessment of obvousness is not based on the distinguishing feature and its technical effect, but rather on the question whether the features of the closest prior art can be realized. This is however typcially a given, and arguing inventive step based on features that are common with the closest prior art is typically rejected. Why should this be different when the closest prior art is not reproducible, respectively why should this matter for only inventive step, but not novelty?

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    1. "I further note that in the discussed decision, it is stated that ""it has not been shown that, by following these indications and with only routine experimentation, the skilled person would have been able to reproduce the DMDA resins or obtain materials having comparable properties". Does this not mean that the BoA re-introduced reproducibility as the decisive criterion for non-obviousness? It is clear that lack of reproducibility is no longer a criterion for novelty - so how can it be that it is a criterion for inventive step? After all, the definition of the state of the art is the same for both novetly and inventive step. If a feature is disclosed in the prior art, then it should be treated equally for both novelty and inventive step."

      Reproducibility of a product used to be a bar for said product to become prior art for novelty. This bar has been abolished by G1/23. For inventive step, reproducibility applies not to the prior art, but to the claimed product. The skilled person must be able to reproduce the claimed product without inventive effort.

      For inventive step, the reproducibility criterion thus does not apply to the feature of the prior art, but to the feature of the claim. While these (may) overlap, there is a fundamental difference there.

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  2. I think one important purpose of G1/23 was to move the issue of marketed products into the area of inventive step (rather than not available as prior art), and this 'pioneer' T decision is now taking us through the reality of how to deal with marketed products as inventive step prior art (whether their known or unknown internal composition can possibly be the closest prior art and how that is going to be handled by the skilled person). I'm sure there are a lot more interesting decisions to follow on this 'new' type of prior art which has never been properly considered before.

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  3. I have commented the decision in my blog. My conclusion goes in somewhat a different direction.

    With technical data on commercial products available, it might be possible at a pinch to decide for lack of novelty, but it should then be relatively easy to restore it.

    When it comes to inventive step, the situation is not as clear cut. On the one hand, commercial products are CPA, but on the other hand the lack of reproducibility does not allow to decide that that the claimed composition is obvious. This is a catch 22 situation.

    This is the fundamental problem with G1/23. The example with the Cola in Reasons 96 of G 1/23 is oversimplistic and not helpful.

    There is a long line of case law according to which a non-reproducible piece of prior art cannot be taken against a claim, be it for novelty and/or inventive step. Is this case law not any longer valid, or in case of a commercial product, is this line of case law is to be ignored? Difficult to follow either proposition.

    In the communication under Art 15(1) RPBA in T 438/19, the board argued that the product ENGAGE could be replaced by a similar product with the help of the teaching of a further document, and that this would lead to a lack of inventive step. This could be a practical route. Since the proprietor has (wisely?) withdrawn all requests, we will not know the last word on this point.

    G 1/23 will be the cause a lot of headaches or difficulties.

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  4. Even though a non-reproducible product commercially available before the filing or priority date is not an admissible closest prior art or cannot be used otherwise in the assessment of inventive step, and this results in the grant of a patent, it appears the exclusionary effect of the patent would be very narrow at best, since the patent could not cover commercial activities based on a prior art product esp. its use and its sale. Any buyer of the commercial product would thus enjoy an unfettered freedom to operate vis-à-vis the patent. A big fish indeed falling through the net of the patent.

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    1. Mr Hagel,

      I think that we should not confuse the cause and the effect.

      The cause is the commercially product available before the filing or priority date.

      The effect is whether it can be used to attack N or IS.

      If a non-reproducible product is commercially available before the filing or priority date, it cannot be said that it is N destroying , when its composition and/or its method of manufacture it is not known. This corresponds to a long line of existing case law: a non-enabled product cannot be opposed to a patent. It might well be used theoretically as CPA, but if it turns out that it is non-enabled, its use as CPA leads to nowhere. This was the case of the AR in dispute.

      In the conference on case law 2025 of yesterday, when presenting G 1/23, Mr Bokor was of the opinion that a product sold under a confidentiality agreement is not publicly available. When a commercially available product is not enabled as the producer keeps its composition and method of manufacture confidential, this boils down to a commercialisation with an implicit confidentiality agreement.

      If the properties made publicly available correspond to or are similar to those of the claimed properties, then the situation is different.

      If a product identical to the non-enabled commercially available product can be obtained with the help of the available prior art, or if the known properties of the commercially available product correspond to those claimed, then N can be challenged.

      If a similar product to the non-enabled product can be obtained with the help of the available prior art, then IS can be challenged. The fact that the commercially available product is not enabled becomes then irrelevant since it can be replaced. This is what hapenned in T 438/19.

      It still makes sense to grant a patent if the only prior art available, a commercial product marketed before the effective date of the claim, is not enabled or the information about its properties do not correspond to what is claimed.

      This was the situation in the present case. Claim 1 as granted was N stricken as the properties made publicly available corresponded to those claimed.

      When it came to the AR, the non-enablement was manifest, and hence the claim could not be considered obvious. The non-enabled product could not be replaced by a similar product.

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  5. I believe that G1/23 could be interpreted as saying that all properties of the marketed product which are substantially dependent on its internal structure (and not binding to an antibody, giving to a patient, etc) are deemed disclosed as prior art for novelty and inventive step even if they are unknown and there is no reason to investigate them. Two problems arise, one is on how to decide which properties are prior art and which are not. Second is to consider what prior user rights (defence from infringement) parties have in terms of having taken advantages of those properties without knowing about it. This is a totally new form of prior art with much working out to be done as to its impact (and how it differs from products in nature as prior art, etc)

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    1. @ Pedros,

      I beg to disagree with the statement in the first sentence of your comment. It still exists a long line of case law according to which a non-enabled product cannot be opposed to a patent. I do not believe that this line of case law has been superseded by G 1/23.

      It is not because a product has been commercially available that it is possible to ignore the fact that this prior art might not be enabling. If it is not enabling, it cannot, in principle, be opposed to a patent.

      I do however agree that the question is to decide which properties are prior art and which are not.

      For the surplus, I invite you to look at my reply to Mr Hagel.

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    2. Thank you DXThomas. I think G1/23 takes away the 'enablement of the prior art' issue for the purposes of citing for inventive step, and so the case law has changed in my opinion in a very fundamental way. Unknown (uninvestigated) properties of non-enabled marketed products could arguably now be prior art, and I know people who work in the pharma area who are worried about how properties that could assist therapy in prior art marketed products might now be cited for inventive step. G1/23 did not change many things, but because it opened up a new type of inventive step citability it could have a lot more consequences for inventive step than realised. We shall see what actually happens! Thank you again for your comment.

      Delete

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