tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post7137051889907020662..comments2024-03-29T06:53:23.405+00:00Comments on The IPKat: IP Federation declares no role for IP disputes in proposed Hague Convention, while INTA takes a different approachVerónica RodrÃguez Arguijohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05763207846940036921noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-81056417502750383832017-10-31T15:51:26.919+00:002017-10-31T15:51:26.919+00:00 No one doubts that they can be enforced in the ve... No one doubts that they can be enforced in the very old fashioned way, and at great expense and length of proceedings including on appeal. But not on the basis of reciprocity as such in isolation -so please explain. In most instances, there is a convention which grants reciprocal recognition possibly a bilateral one, if not multilateral. However, IP is small fry here and dispensable and IP lawyers have not had to tackle this much save for a few isolated cases of applicable law pertaining to the right in question (and not judgments as such). The big issue is children, and abduction for which we are also about to jettison the current arrangements.<br /><br />Pseudonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-2939383142255993452017-10-30T20:12:03.649+00:002017-10-30T20:12:03.649+00:00Pseudonymous' comment assumes UK judgments can...Pseudonymous' comment assumes UK judgments cannot be enforced extraterritoriality without said convention, but of course this is not the case; albeit may very well depend on reciprocity factors and the like, but merely because the convention doesn't exist does not mean UK judgments cannot be enforced in foreign jurisdictions...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-18036205825953732542017-10-30T11:03:42.317+00:002017-10-30T11:03:42.317+00:00And rumour has it that the secretariat are so in t...And rumour has it that the secretariat are so in thrall to the US (to finally have them there), that it is only the EU and strangely enough Australia effectively fighting US strong arm tactics. This may yet be another case of the US sitting at the table and forcing a treaty to look like what it wants, or not getting its way and then not ratifying it. These strong arm tactics by the way are getting worse elsewhere such as the WTO, now that the old guard of nice guys is gone. Pseudonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-20659531809094758212017-10-30T09:21:33.826+00:002017-10-30T09:21:33.826+00:00Seriously? You don't want UK judgments recogni...Seriously? You don't want UK judgments recognised and enforced elsewhere (this time worldwide) automatically once you fall out of the Brussels Regulation (albeit there is Lugano)? So who will choose UK law and/or courts in future if judgments cannot be enforced elsewhere. I would have thought the UK legal profession would be out there in droves supporting this. Are you aware of how dependent the profession is on the Brussels Regulation? It goes unnoticed -practitioners seem to think that it is the lure of UK law/courts alone. No it is not -the UK is currently part of a great enforcement and recognition framework which it is in the process of extricating itself from. It must find another one. <br /><br />The reason not as many people choose US law and courts is that the US has traditionally stayed out of these PIL conventions. This has been a boon to the UK legal profession. Now the US is at the table for this treaty (under Obama but wait and see if Trump holds) and you are advocating the UK stays out too even after it drops outs of Brussels!! <br /><br />So let's apply UK judgments only in the UK and let there be no scope for them to be applied elsehwere. Is that what the future holds as a great outward looking trading nation for you?Pseudonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5574479.post-2224769848072211372017-10-29T14:23:22.295+00:002017-10-29T14:23:22.295+00:00Speaking as a resident of a country which presentl...Speaking as a resident of a country which presently trying break away from the jurisdiction of a supra-national court (the CJEU), I can't see the attraction of a convention such as this, which would indubitably cede some sovereignty to the courts of other nations. Comity is clearly desirable but such a rigid structure just invites abuse. Forum shopping will become more widespread (cf <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_District_Court_for_the_Eastern_District_of_Texas#Patent_litigation" rel="nofollow">Eastern District of Texas court</a> for patent litigation), and given the enormous variation in legal standards across the world, how could a signatory country effectively bar the enforcement of the judgments of another signatory even though the latter's legal system was riddled with corruption or state interference? Yes, there are some get-out clauses but why get into a treaty obligation you know you are going regret later?<br />And I am confused about what the draft is saying concerning default judgments. In Article 5 (e) and (f) it appears to be a pre-requisite that a defendant has fully engaged with the judicial process in the original state, in effect, putting default judgments outside the scope of the convention, yet Article 14 expressly allows them. To my mind a default judgment should never be enforcible elsewhere under a convention such as this. <br />And Article 13 on Settlements is worrying. The exact wording is "Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment[, provided that such settlement is permissible under the law of the requested State]". All too often settlements are forced on one party in a dispute (usually the defendant) because there is inequality in the financial resources of the parties, rather because of the merits of their respective argument. Effectively giving a tool such as this, which clearly favours large (US?) corporations, an internatioanl reach will only exacerbate the situation.<br />And finally, what exactly is meant by the equivalence mentioned in Article 9? "A judgment recognised or enforceable under this Convention shall be given the same effect it <br />has in the State of origin"? If copyright ends up being included within the convention, does this Article imply that a finding of infringement in one state would, in effect, become enforcible in the territory of another signatory state even though the original grounds (say, the EU Dirtective standards) are incompatible with the domestic law (say, Fair Use in the USA) in the requested state?<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com