Does banking secrecy prevail
over IP enforcement?
In a nutshell this is the issue on which the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of
Justice) is seeking guidance from the ever-active Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in Coty Germany, C-580/13.
“Must Article 8(3)(e)
of Directive 2004/48/EC be interpreted as precluding a national provision
which, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, allows a banking
institution to refuse, by invoking banking secrecy, to provide information
pursuant to Article 8(1)(c) of that directive concerning the name and address
of an account holder?”
Yesterday Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalon issued his Opinion [although unsurprisingly not
yet available in English, the Opinion is available in - among other things -
Italian]. He first highlighted that this case requires exploring further Article 8
of the Enforcement Directive, which so far has been dealt with mainly in the
context of copyright owners seeking to enforce their rights against users who illegally
download (and subsequently share) content from the internet.
The AG advised the CJEU to rule that Article
8(3)(e) of the Enforcement Directive is to be interpreted in the sense that -
unlike what the situation is currently in Germany, pursuant to Article 19 of the Markengesetz - Member States may not allow banks
to invoke banking secrecy unconditionally to refuse information
(requested pursuant to Article 8(1)(c) of this directive in the context of civil proceedings to be brought against alleged infringers) regarding the name and
address of the holder of an account.
Background
Coty Germany holds an
exclusive licence for the Community trade mark Davidoff Hot Water. In 2011 it
purchased a counterfeit bottle of the relevant perfume on sparkasse.de by using a
pseudonym, and subsequently asked a bank, Sparkasse, to
disclose the bank details of the seller of the allegedly infringing product.
Sparkasse refused invoking banking secrecy.
Litigation
thus ensued. Following a victory at first instance, Coty lost in appeal.
Eventually the case made its way to the German Federal Court of Justice, that
decided to stay the proceedings and seek guidance from the CJEU.
|
Things get invariably hot at the CJEU |
The AG Opinion
The AG began his
analysis by observing that what is at stake in this case is the compatibility
of German law with Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive.
As is apparent from
Recital 21 in the preamble to this directive, the right of information within
Article 8 is instrumental to the guarantee of an effective IP protection.
However such right is not absolute, as Member States
may pose limitations to its exercise. Although among the possible limitations
listed in this provision there is no express mention of banking secrecy,
according to the AG this could fall among the relevant limitations for "the processing of personal
data" (not protection of confidentiality of information), pursuant to
both Article 8(3)(e) and Article 2(3)(a) of the directive.
The AG
held the view that a national law like Article 19 of the
German Markengesetz has two effects: (1) a direct effect that prevents the
effectiveness of the right of information within Article 8 of the Enforcement
Directive, and; (2) an indirect effect that adversely affect a
fundamental right, this being the effective protection of IP rights as mandated
by - among other things - Articles 17, 47 and 52(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).
In turn banking secrecy may
fall within acceptable limitations to the right of information, on
consideration that the Enforcement Directive is without prejudice to the
protection of personal data, whose protection is mandated by - among other
things - Article 8 Charter.
To determine whether a
national law on banking secrecy is compatible with EU law it is necessary to
examine it from a fundamental rights perspective.
Article 52 Charter provides
that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised
therein must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and
freedoms. Overall, "[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality,
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect
the rights and freedoms of others."
The latter may be in
principle the case of banking secrecy and the protection of personal data of
the clients of a bank, pursuant to Article 8 Charter. However, to be
legitimate, any limitation to the fundamental right to effective protection of
IP rights must meet all the conditions set in Article 52 (and this is for the
national court to determine):
(1) be provided by the law [the
AG discussed the meaning of 'law' in his Opinion in Scarlet];
(2) respect the fundamental essence of the rights and freedoms
involved [the
AG appeared to suggest that this would not be the case of a national law - like
the German law - that would make effective enforcement depend exclusively on the waiver - for whatever reason - of banking secrecy];
(3) be adequate and necessary [could
Coty Germany obtain the information needed through other means?, wondered the
AG] to
achieve the achieve the objective pursued; and
(4) respect the principle of proportionality.
All in all
This yet another interesting
case that is likely to have broad implications, considering that the
relationship between effective IP protection and protection of alleged
infringers' personal data has generated a heated debate in the past few years.
It is also another case in
which the CJEU has been called to perform a challenging task, ie provide guidance as to how
different fundamental rights should be balanced. In the past the outcome of
exercises of this type has been vague statements that have generated more
than one headache.
It is sufficient to recall
the 2014 decision in Telekabel [here], in
which the Court assessed the compatibility of blocking orders on internet service providers (ISPs) with EU
law. While concluding in the sense of their legitimacy, the Court stated that
orders must be open-ended (thus disregarding the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon
who had instead taken the view that orders should be specific), and ISPs -
while enjoying the fundamental freedom to conduct their business, pursuant to
Article 16 Charter - must also adopt the most appropriate measures to bring
infringements to an end and prevent new ones from occurring, bearing in mind
the need to balance the fundamental rights of copyright owners (within Article
17(2) Charter) with those of users to access information lawfully available on
their services (in compliance with Article 11 Charter).
But how is this to
be done in practice? The Court did not provide much guidance. Hopefully things
will be different when it decides Coty
Germany ... But will they?
Caro Eleonora,
ReplyDeleteOne detail: A Sparkasse isn't an ISP, but a banking institution ("cassa di risparmio"): "Essa versava il prezzo del prodotto sul conto bancario della Sparkasse"
One fairly risky way to beat the other party out of the bush might be to charge back his account (EU SEPA Lastschriftverfahren) without authorisation, and hope that he files an official complaint. If the amount "stolen back" is equal to the test sale, then the risk is that it is too small to elicit a reaction. If a largish amount is lifted, then the risk is that the criminal court might (rightfully) take a fairly dim view of the tactic.
The location of the seller's credit union (Magdeburg) suggests a small-scale operation, or the use of a clueless intermediary. In any case, the real operators probably have already moved on a long time ago.
Thanks Roufousse: I have just corrected the post!
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