Can operators of physical marketplaces be considered
"intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an
intellectual property right", so that "rightholders are in
a position to apply for an injunction" against them, pursuant to the third
sentence in Article 11 of the Enforcement
Directive? Put it otherwise: how does the landmark decision of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in L'Oréal
v eBay [noted here, here,
and here] apply in an offline context?
This - in a nutshell - were the issues on which the Nejvyšší soud České rep (Czech Supreme Court) had
sought guidance from the CJEU in its reference
for a preliminary ruling in Tommy
Hilfiger Licensing and Others, C-494/15.
This morning the CJEU delivered its judgment [without a prior
Opinion of the Advocate General in this case (Melchior Wathelet)], holding that the operator of a physical marketplace may
be forced to put an end to trade mark infringements committed by
market-traders.
The judgment is not yet available on Curia, but
this is what the press release states:
"The company Delta Center is the tenant of the marketplace
‘Pražská tržnice’ (Prague market halls). It sublets to market-traders the
various sales areas in that marketplace.
Manufacturers and distributers of branded products discovered that
counterfeits of their goods were regularly in Prague market halls. On that
basis, they asked the Czech courts to order Delta Center to stop renting sales
areas in those halls to people who committed such infringements. The
[Enforcement] Directive allows trademark holders to bring an action against
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe their
trademarks.
The trademark holders consider that, like the operators of online
marketplaces covered by the judgment in L’Oréal,
the operator of a physical marketplace may, pursuant to the directive, be
forced in law to bring trade mark infringements committed by market-traders to
an end and to take measures in order to prevent new infringements.
The Nejvyšší soud (Supreme Court, Czech Republic), before which
the case is now pending, asks the [CJEU] whether it is actually possible to
order the operator of a physical marketplace to put an end to trademark related
infringements committed by market-traders and to take measures seeking to
prevent new infringements.
|
Looking for some counterfeit food to confiscate ... for the sake of IP protection |
In today’s judgment, the Court finds that an operator which
provides a service to third parties relating to the letting or subletting of
pitches in a marketplace, and which thus offers the possibility to those third
parties of selling counterfeit products in that marketplace, must be classified
as an ‘intermediary’ within the meaning of the directive.
The Court states that whether the provision of a sales point is within
an online marketplace or a physical marketplace is irrelevant because the scope
of the directive is not limited to electronic commerce [in my opinion this conclusion
is correct, as nothing in the Enforcement Directive (and similarly in the
InfoSoc Directive) suggests that injunctions are limited to 'online'
intermediaries].
Consequently, the operator of a physical marketplace may itself
also be forced to put an end to the trade mark infringements by market-traders
and to take measures to prevent new infringements.
Similarly, the Court states that the conditions for an injunction
issued by a judicial authority against an intermediary who provides a service
of letting sales points in market halls are identical to those applicable to
injunctions addressed to intermediaries in an online marketplace.
Thus, not only must those injunctions be effective and dissuasive,
but they must also be equitable and proportionate. They must not therefore be
excessively expensive and must not create barriers to legitimate trade. Nor can
the intermediary be required to exercise general and permanent oversight over
its customers. By contrast, the intermediary may be forced to take measures
which contribute to avoiding new infringements of the same nature by the
same market-trader. In addition, the injunctions must ensure a fair balance
between the protection of intellectual property and the absence of obstacles to
legitimate trade."
A more detailed analysis will be provided when the judgment is
made available: stay tuned!
And this, ladies and gentlemen, is why the UK has seen the light and voted for it.
ReplyDeleteThis is going too far. Makes you want to brexit even when you want to remain. Under what rule of intepretation of a provision designed for the online environment does this arise? Makes a mockery of the deliberate and laboured way the jdugment handed down yesterday by the Court of Appeal (online trade mark infringements)has proceeded.And once again warmly applauded by the copyright part of this blog. The CJEU does not think too hard when it comes to counterfeiters. Does this mean if I rent premises to a company (and I never see them again)and it turns out they are running a dodgy IP business from there I can be drawn into it?
ReplyDelete@Anonymous at 11:34: Thanks for your comment, but neither Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive now Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive are specifically designed for online environment (Recital 59 in InfoSoc Directive refers to particular case of 'digital environment' but is not limited to it).
ReplyDeleteI have yet to read judgment in full, but also Arnold J (whose Cartier judgment - that you mention - was praised by Kitchin LJ) has said that the notion of intermediary is hardly limited to online ones: http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/who-is-intermediary-for-sake-of-article.html
ReplyDeleteforgive me if I continue to disagree with your "analysis" and your adulation of Arnold. There have many misgivings expressed about this approach to EU law and poorly argued lower court English judgments won't help -no fan of Arnold.Some of us might like to live in a world where the jack boot approach to IP rights enforcement is confined to the English mainland (as others hopefully learned their lesson). Don't export it and I regret the CJEU decision and hope there is an opportunity to disapply it now that precedent will be on the way out.
I agree. This is going too far. The whole economic basis for giving incentives to trade mark owners is so that the state (and others) are absolved from the cost of supporting the trade marks system in some respects. If we do not incentivise private trade mark owners to enforce by placing the obligation of enforcement on others (and forcing them to do so - I note that neither the police nor trading standards are so forced) then we are effectively making their advertising work for them - a free ride I think they call it. Why cannot trade mark owners do their own dirty work?
ReplyDeleteI have defended a number of market cases over the years in the criminal courts and all of which have failed because it is impossible for a market owner to know what is and what is not infringing - the say so of the brand owner has, time and time again, proven to be invaluable to the defence case in this regard.
A nonny mouse
Having now read this judgment, it is a full application of L'oreal. No conditions, no knowledge test, and no hearing and no AG's opinion either.However, at para 33 et seq, there is a reference to national law -so a knowledge test may be applied.
ReplyDeleteWe ask businesses of all types to take on all sorts of societal obligations as part of their social license. Lawyers do AML checks on their clients. Sellers and shippers check they are not breaking sanctions, stock markets monitor traders for suspicious trades. Compliance is a fact of business life. Why? because unregulated spaces are taken over by cheats and bullies - denying freedoms to everyone else.
ReplyDeleteThese same tools will be adopted to stop other rights abuses as the UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the related national action plans take root.
This is basic due diligence, notably in dealing with those that have already been found to have dealt in fakes.
The obligations are not open ended. They must be equitable and proportionate. They must not be excessively expensive and must not create barriers to legitimate trade. That is a pretty heavy caveat.
Many intermediaries have a care that their services are not abused. When was the last time you saw OneDrive or DropBox used for piracy, or fakes in a department store of concessions like Selfridges?
We already learned from financial markets what happens when no one is responsible. Don't expect the real economy to allow itself to be experimented on to destruction through platforms without basic responsibilities to society.
It is precisely because criminal liability is generally not the right model, both in finance and here, that such civil court orders exist.
The judgment can now be accessed here, in case anyone is interested.
ReplyDelete