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Olivia Klimis |
A few weeks ago this Blog explored the
possible of implications of a case currently pending before the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Marc Soulier C-301/15, in particular
should the Court follow the Opinion of
Advocate General (AG) Wathelet. This reference for a preliminary ruling from France
concerns the compatibility with EU law of the 2012 loi (Law
No 2012-287 of 1 March 2012) adopted to allow and regulate
the digital exploitation of out-of-print 20th century books.
The AG held the view that such law
is not really compatible with EU law because it envisages a mechanism that,
contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, gives approved collecting societies - rather than authors - the right to
authorise the reproduction and the representation in digital form of
out-of-print books.
In my comment to the Opinion,
I highlighted how the law on out-of-print books might not be the only
case of potential incompatibility with EU law. In particular, in early July
France introduced Loi No 2016-925 on la liberté de la création, l'architecture et
patrimoine (freedom of
creation, architecture and cultural heritage), which introduces new
provisions into the French Intellectual Property Code (IPC) to
regulate the publication of a plastic, graphic or photographic work by an
online communication service. In particular, new Article 136-2(1) IPC provides
that the
publication of a plastic artwork, graphic or photographic work by an online
communication service is subject to the consent, not of
authors, but rather ... one or more collective management organisations (CMOs)
appointed to this end by the French Ministry of Culture.
But what are the exact
principles and provisions governing the arrangement envisaged by new Article
136-2 CPI? Is there really a risk of incompatibility with EU law?
Katfriend Olivia Klimis (senior
counsel at De Gaulle Fleurance & Associés, working
between Brussels and Paris and specialising in IP and EU law), with the help of Nicolas
Lescot (also at De Gaulle Fleurance & Associés),
provides a thorough and thoughtful analysis.
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“The great ride of [French] posterity” (B Roubaud) |
Here's what Olivia writes:
The
exact meaning of Article L. 136 of the IPC
Article
L.136-2 of the IPC can be translated as follows:
“I. The
publication of a plastic artwork, graphic or photographic work from an online
communication service shall entail the right of reproduction and the right of
representation [i.e. communication to the public] of this work
by automated images referencing services to be managed by one or several
[collective management organizations] approved to this end by the Ministry of
Culture. In the absence of designation [of a CMO] by the author or his
successors in title at the work publication date, one of the CMOs is deemed to
be in charge of the management of those rights.
II.
The approved [CMOs] are solely entitled to conclude any agreement with
automated images referencing services operators to authorize the reproduction
and representation of plastic artworks, graphic or photographic works by these
services and perceive the corresponding fees according to article L. 136-4 [Article
L. 136-4 provides that the remuneration scheme and terms of payment will be set
in agreements between CMOS and referencing services operators or, in the
absence of such agreements, by a commission composed equally of
representatives from CMOs and referencing service operators]. The
agreements concluded with the operators shall also specify how the operators
will comply with their obligations to provide the CMOs with the works
exploitation records and any information necessary to the distribution of the
fees to the authors or their successors in title”.
This
means that the referencing and display by search engines of all plastic artworks,
graphic or photographic works made available online [by
whom? The author? The law does not say…] is
subject to the consent, not of authors, but of one approved CMO [whether
it was appointed by the author as his or her representative of not…].
The CMO will set the remuneration scheme in agreement with the search engine
operator, calculate the fees based on the records that will be sent by those
operators regarding all copyright protected uses and distribute the fees
collected to the authors.
This
provision is another example of the French “cultural
exception”. Whether it actually protects French
culture, by depriving authors of the possibility to decide how they want to
manage their rights and making their content more difficult to find, remains to
be seen.
|
Can the French Senate crow
louder than the EU legislator? |
The
corridors of power – How the French Senate passed article 10 quater
When Article 10 quater was submitted to
the Parliament, it was the subject of tremendous debates, rejected several
times by the National Assembly at
the request of government and restored each time by the Senate [see
in particular here and here].
The
French government opposed to that provision on the ground that it was
contrary to EU law, in particular Svensson and the
limitations of liability provided by the E-Commerce
Directive. In their view, that question
should be discussed in the context of the European copyright package.
The
senators rebelled against the state of EU law regarding search engines and the
slowness of the European Commission to “address boldly the Google issue across
Europe”. In their view, it was urgent to protect artists and in particular
photographers against misappropriation of theirs works by search engines.
Contrariety to EU law
First of all, the compulsory collective
management system provided violates the requirement set by Article 2(a) and
Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive of a prior express consent by the author for
any reproduction and communication to the public of his work. As highlighted by
AG Wathelet’s Opinion in Marc Soulier, that consent is an essential prerogative of
authors and, in the absence of EU derogating legislation, a tacit consent
cannot be presumed. This harmonized rule applies not only to the assignment of
rights stricto sensu but also to the collective management
thereof (see previous post here).
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HOW to record copyright-protected uses by search
engines?!? |
Secondly,
by automatically empowering the CMOs to collect fees on behalf of the authors,
Article L. 136 IPC is incompatible with Article 3 (1)
of InfoSoc Directive whether
in its current interpretation by the CJEU in Svensson and BestWater [here and here] or in its potential future
interpretation following AG Wathelet’s Opinion in GS Media:
·
Either the work is publicly (and lawfully according
to Svensson) available online, the referencing of the
work by the search engine is not an act of communication to
the public and thus may not be subject to the payment
of a fee;
· Or access
to the work online is subject to restrictions which
are circumvented by the search engine (or is unlawfully made available according
to Svensson), the referencing is an act of
communication to the public and thus requires the author’s prior
express consent.
Moreover,
since search engines usually display the results as thumbnails,
this implies a resizing of the pictures, ie an adaptation which might also
require the author prior express consent under the right of reproduction
(Article 2 (a) of the InfoSoc Directive). As
observed during the debates at
the Parliament, this question has not yet been clarified by the CJEU, so that
the hyperlinking saga is far from over.
Last
but not least, having search engines pay for all
natural results displayed by their automated referencing services appears to be
incompatible with the safe harbour set by Article 14 of E-Commerce Directive, as interpreted by CJEU in Google France.
The qualification of Google Images as a hosting
service was acknowledged by the Paris Court of Appeal and French Supreme Court in the Aufeminin case.
Here, the resizing of images was held to be an automated technical
act required by the functionnality of the search engine.
|
A Google Images’ Kat
worried of being tracked by a French CMO |
And how to record copyright protected uses in
practice? Not even the CJEU is quite sure about what is lawful or not. In the
absence of notifications by right holders, the recording obligation may place
an excessive burden on search engines and therefore be contrary to Article 15
of the E-Commerce Directive, as interpreted in the SABAM/Netlog case. This is supported by
the Supreme Court judgment in the Aufeminin case.
Do
we have to worry?
Whatever
the CJEU decides with regard to hyperlinking in the future, it seems that the
French legislator will not find a way to justify Article L. 136 IPC under EU
law. The only escape is through the creation of a new provision in the
copyright package, which could be inspired from the private copying levy system
(Article 5.2 (b) of the InfoSoc Directive).
In
the absence of EU derogation, the implementation of Article L. 136 IPC, which
requires agreements to be found between CMOs and referencing services
operators, will likely face practical difficulties. In particular, it can be
expected that search engines operators will not agree to pay a levy which is
contrary to EU law. In fact, similar initiatives regarding press
content in Spain and Germany even
led Google to de-reference national newspapers or even deactivate its Google
news service."
Thanks so much for this great analysis Olivia!
A few issues this raises:
ReplyDeleteWhat about images published with a Creative Commons Attribution or Share-Alike license (excluding non-commercial licenses), images for which copyright has expired, or images that are not subject to copyright in the first place (eg. images created by US government employees during the course of their official duties)?
Will the collecting societies have different rules for membership or distributing royalties when representing works of non-members under this law? For example, SAIF requires members purchase stock in the corporation. If they are chosen to represent authors for Google Images results, will individuals be required to purchase stock in SAIF and will they be required to license their works to SAIF in all jurisdictions (SAIF has agreements with collecting societies in other countries). Will royalties be distributed to all authors equally (I think this is an almost impossible task for the millions or billions of images indexed by Google) or will it be distributed by other formulas, eg. stock ownership in the society or the way GEMA (German collecting society for music) distributes royalties based on the type of music (more to classical songs, less to pop songs)? I think such restrictions would violate international (excluding intra-EU) IP treaties and possibly foreign (outside EU) antitrust/competition laws if the only way for image creators to exercise their right to royalties from licensing to Google Images was to give collecting societies control of licensing their work outside France or if the collecting societies had rules that give a preference to French works or works that have serious artistic value, or restrict the way creators could independently license their works.
This post and other English-language blog posts on this subject discuss EU directives and laws, but does the European Convention on Human Rights prohibit this law? For example, does this affect the right to copyright/property of the creators of images? Does the law violate international (excluding EU) IP treaties like the Berne Convention or WTO trade agreements?