|
They certainly have pink knees, but they are not Pinckney |
IPKat readers who follow all things copyright will
remember Case C-170/12 Pinckney,
an exciting reference from the French Court of Cassation concerning
jurisdiction in online infringement cases and interpretation of Article 5(3) of
the Brussels I Regulation. The case was recalled
a few days ago in the context of new reference C-441/13 Pez Ejduk (Katpost here).
The fate of the Pinckney case was uncertain, as Advocate
General Niilo
Jääskinen's Opinion (Katpost here) was that the the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) should declare it inadmissible.
Thankfully, after a summer spent thinking about
this case, the Court did not follow the AG on this point, and this morning
released its handy 48-paragraph judgment, declaring the reference ...
admissible.
Background
The request for a preliminary reference was made in
the context of proceedings between Mr Pinckney, a French resident, and
Mediatech, a company established in Austria, concerning a claim for damages resulting from the
infringement of Pinckney’s copyright in twelve songs.
In 2006 Pinckney discovered that
those songs had been reproduced
without his consent on a CD pressed in Austria by Mediatech, then marketed by
two UK companies through various internet websites accessible from his
residence in Toulouse.
Mr
Pinckney sued Mediatech before the Toulouse Regional Court seeking compensation
for damage sustained on account of the infringement of his copyrights.
The
defendant unsuccessfully challenged the
jurisdiction of the French courts. Mediatech appealed against, arguing
that the only courts having jurisdiction were the courts of the place of the
defendant’s domicile (Austria), or the courts of the place where the damage was
caused (UK). This time the Tolouse Court of Appeal agreed with Mediatech, so it
was the turn of Mr Pinckney to appeal the decision before the French Court of
Cassation. This decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following
questions to the CJEU:
‘1. Is
Article 5(3) of … [the Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that, in the
event of an alleged infringement of copyright committed by means of content
placed online on a website,
– the
person who considers that his rights have been infringed has the option of
bringing an action to establish liability before the courts of each Member
State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been
accessible, in order to obtain compensation solely in respect of the damage
suffered on the territory of the Member State before which the action is
brought,
or
– does
that content also have to be, or to have been, directed at the public located
in the territory of that Member State, or must some other clear connecting
factor be present?
2. Is
the answer to Question 1 the same if the alleged infringement of copyright
results, not from the placing of dematerialised content online, but, as in the
present case, from the online sale of a material carrier medium which
reproduces that content?’
The response of the CJEU
First
of all, as it often happens, the CJEU reformulated the questions of the French
court as essentially seeking clarification
|
Ehm ... Where to sue? Antoine didn't know ... Until today |
"whether
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that
where is an alleged infringement of a copyright which is protected by the
Member State of the court seised, that court has jurisdiction to hear an action
to establish liability brought by the author of a work against a company
established in another Member State, which has in the latter State reproduced
that work on a material support which is subsequently marketed by companies
established in a third Member State through an internet site which is also
accessible in the Member State of the court seised." [yes, this is much clearer, muses Merpel, but
shorter statements might have helped avoiding a headache]
The CJEU
then recalled that the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred
or may occur’ in Article 5(3) is intended to cover both the place where the
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, so that the
defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts for either
of those places.
|
Damages remain those occurred in that Member State only |
While it is
true that copyright is subject to the principle of territoriality, copyrights
must be automatically protected, in particular by virtue of Directive 2001/29, in all Member States, so
that they may be infringed in each one in accordance with the applicable
substantive law. It follows that, as regards the alleged infringement of a
copyright, jurisdiction to hear an action in tort, delict or quasi-delict is
already established in favour of the court seised if the Member State in which
that court is situated protects the copyrights relied on by the plaintiff and
that the harmful event alleged may occur within the jurisdiction of the court
seised.
This means
that
"the
answer to the questions referred is that Article 5(3) of the Regulation must be
interpreted as meaning that, in the event of alleged infringement of copyrights
protected by the Member State of the court seised, the latter has jurisdiction
to hear an action to establish liability brought by the author of a work
against a company established in another Member State and which has, in the
latter State, reproduced that work on a material support which is subsequently
sold by companies established in a third Member State through an internet site
also accessible with the jurisdiction of the court seised. That court has
jurisdiction only to determine the damage caused in the Member State within
which it is situated.”
Merpel
thinks that this looks like a sensible interpretation of the Brussels I
Regulation. However, it also shows the shortcomings and practical difficulties
posed by the principle of territoriality in the context of both dematerialisation
of works and their online exploitation and, above all, infringement.
Given the narrow remit of the test developed by the Court, its answer is unsurprising. All the French court has to do is to ask whether a harmful act may occur having its effect in France, and if the answer is yes then the French court has jurisdiction over that act. In respect of an allegation of infringement of a French copyright, this leads to an inevitable "yes" in every case.
ReplyDeleteWhat the court has expressly ruled out is making any assessment of whether an Austrian company selling to a UK company which then markets a product on the internet is in fact infringing copyright. This is really crucial. The court has made it quite clear that it is up to the French court to say that an Austrian company selling to a UK company inevitably infringes French copyright by virtue of the subsequent acts of the UK company. That is a matter for the French court. Looked at like this, it becomes a perfectly sensible but very narrow decision. You are entitled to sue someone in your national court for a breach of your national copyright; the court has jurisdiction to hear that claim, but jurisdiction is not going to help you if you cannot also prove that the defendant committed an infringing act.
Yes, I agree with the last post - it is Shevill all over again. For that reason the CJEU (p'raps - I have not read into the case)ought to have said that the question has already been decided.
ReplyDeleteI am the Peter Pinckney in this case.
ReplyDeleteFirstly: the 2 UK companies mentioned do not exist. They are in fact 2 individuals who are untraceable having given false names and adresses to the company who pressed the CD copies.
Secondly: I have brought the action against the pressing company who have admitted pressing illegally soley on the basis of copyright infringement. Probably on advice from their legal team they have used delaying tactics from the outset ,I think in the vain hope that I would just give up.
the next stage in this case continues, I would ask any interested, IP lawyers to look at the below linked funding page
ReplyDeletehttps://www.fundedjustice.com/en/projects/27503-Pirated-Music