The Court began by observing
that the notion of ‘distribution’ constitutes an independent concept of
EU law. This means that its "interpretation
... cannot be contingent on the legislation applicable to transactions in which
a distribution takes place".
By
adopting the InfoSoc Directive, among other things the EU intended to implement
into the EU legal order the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (WCT). As such Article 4(1) of the InfoSoc Directive must be
interpreted with regard to Article
6(1) WCT. This means that the notion of ‘distribution to the public ... by sale’
in Article 4(1) of the Directive has the same meaning as the expression
‘making available to the public … through sale’ in Article 6(1) WCT.
In Donner and Blomqvist the Court held that "distribution to the public is characterised by a
series of acts going, at the very least, from the conclusion of a contract of
sale to the performance thereof by delivery to a member of the public."
Use of the phrase "at the very least" means
that:
"[I]t
is not excluded that the acts or steps preceding the conclusion of a contract
of sale may also fall within the concept of distribution and be reserved,
exclusively, to the holders of copyright.
Although
the Court has already held that distribution to the public must be considered
proven where a contract of sale and dispatch has been concluded ..., the same
is true of an offer of a contract of sale which binds its author. In fact, such
an offer constitutes, by its very nature, an act prior to a sale being made.
As
regards an invitation to submit an offer, or a non-binding advertisement for a
protected object, those also fall under the series of acts taken with the
objective of making a sale of that object. Indeed ... a trader who directs
his advertising at members of the public residing in a given Member State and
creates or makes available to them a specific delivery system and payment
method, thereby enabling those members of the public to receive delivery of
copies of works protected in that Member State, makes, in the Member State
where the delivery takes place, a ‘distribution to the public’ under
Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/29."
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The Laccio tables, among the pieces of furniture subject to the German litigation |
As a
result,
"There may be an infringement of the
exclusive distribution right, under Article 4(1) of [the InfoSoc
Directive], where a trader, who does not hold the copyright, sells protected
works or copies thereof and addresses an advertisement, through its website, by
direct mail or in the press, to consumers located in the territory of the
Member State in which those works are protected in order to invite them to
purchase it ... [I]t is irrelevant, for a finding of an infringement of the
distribution right, that such advertising is not followed by the transfer of
ownership of the protected work or a copy thereof to the purchaser."
Conclusion
This new CJEU decision appears to extend greatly the scope of
the distribution right. The Court justified this outcome by recalling, among
other things, that the InfoSoc Directive intends to provide a high level of
protection to authors and [perhaps even more importantly] copyright
owners.
One may wonder whether this ruling represents a departure
from earlier CJEU case law, notably Cassina.
The Court itself addressed this point, and held that:
"although
it is true that .... the concept of distribution to the public of the
original of a work or a copy thereof .... entails a transfer of the ownership
of that object, the fact remains that an infringement of the distribution right
can be observed where consumers located in the territory of the Member State in
which that work is protected are invited, by targeted advertising, to acquire
ownership of the original or a copy of that work."
A more detailed analysis of this ruling will follow soon. For
the time being, a very interesting part of the decision is how the Court stressed
that the interpretation of copyright exclusive rights cannot be
contingent on the legislation applicable to transactions in which a
distribution takes place.
Thus, one may now wonder, for instance, about the
compatibility with EU law of the right of distribution under UK law. Section 18 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988 defines it as the right to ‘issue to the public of copies of the work’, this being
the ‘the act of putting into circulation’ by or with the consent of the
copyright owner copies of works not previously put into circulation.
"It is clear that
the act of offering or exposing copies for sale is not capable of amounting to
putting copies into circulation."
But following today’s decision in Labianca, is it still so? How is it
possible to reconcile the meaning of ‘issuing’ copies with the idea that now to
have an act of distribution issuing copies is not at all required?
In the UK, if an act is a primary infringement but an offer to to that act is not, the offer can nonetheless be prevented through a quia timet injunction on the basis that it constitutes a threat to carry out an act of infringement.
ReplyDeleteGiven that background, it is largely irrelevant in the UK whether the act of advertising is a primary infringement or not. So while UK *legislation* may not fully implement this judgment, UK *law* already does.
It would be interesting to know whether quia timet relief is available in Germany; one would assume not, or there would have been no need for a reference.
Would this be a case of "justified geoblocking" if DDS prevented German consumers visiting their website in the future to avoid further infringement and further litigation from Knoll?
ReplyDeleteThis decision illustrates the problem of judicial legislation without all member states at the table. The possibility of quia timet relief was clearly something that should have been considered. However, why did the Bundesgerichtshof think that it needed to know whether the Directive granted more limited rights than German law?
ReplyDelete