First, a case refresh...
News review
On appeal (T 844/18) the Broad Institute argued that the EPO's approach to priority was incorrect. The patentee’s arguments may be summarised as follows: (I) Entitlement to priority should not be assessed by the EPO, (II) the EPO incorrectly interprets the phrase “any person” in Article 87 EPC and Article 4 Paris Convention, and (III) US law should govern the interpretation of “any applicant” in Article 87 EPC when the priority application is a US provisional.
After hearing lengthy submissions on each of these arguments from the patentee and opponents, the Board of Appeal dismissed the Broad Institute's appeal. The Board of Appeal thus upheld the opposition decision that the priority claim was invalid, and that consequently the patent lacked novelty.
Schlich notes that the argument from the Broad Institute that received the most attention was the that "any person" in Article 87(1) EPC and Article 4(1) of the Paris Convention should be interpreted as "any one of" the applicants of the priority application. The Broad Institute had submitted a declaration from no-less eminent a person than Lord Neuberger to support their interpretation of "any". According to Schlich, at the hearing the Broad Institute also referred to recent EPO law indicating that right to claim priority cannot be exhausted (T15/01). However, the Board of Appeal agreed with the Opponents that the right of priority is a single, indivisible right. Thus, the Board of Appeal concluded that the right cannot be divided or separated into multiple priority rights. Schlich makes the very pertinent point that the position of the EPO on this issue may henceforth be supported by the written rationale of Board of Appeal 3.3.08 (once we have the written decision), as opposed to a mere reliance on the argument that this just how it has always been done at the EPO.
Another welcome addition to the commentary is provided by Novagraaf, who take the opportunity to remind readers of the pitfalls that exist for US applicants of a European patent application. The US has less stringent priority requirements than the EPO. This is because the US understands priority as applying to inventions. Thus, a priority claim is valid in the US if the priority application and the application claiming priority has merely one inventor in common. Therefore, when a US provisional application is filed in the name of an inventor, in the US the inventor does not need to assign their rights to the applicant of the PCT application prior to the PCT filing date.
The Broad Institute is not alone in falling foul of the trap opened up by the differences in the US and European requirements for a valid priority claim. However, whilst not uncommon, the Broad Institute's error is remarkable for the magnitude of its commercial implications. In view of this, the decision of the Board of Appeal not to refer the issue of priority to the Enlarged Board of Appeal has been welcomed by many practitioners as a triumph of the rule of law over commercial interest and influence.
The EPO
The minutes of oral proceedings have now been published. The minutes are a summary, as opposed to a transcript of proceedings. The minutes confirm that at the start of Day 3, the Board stated that they were then of the view that certain question of law concerning priority should be referred to the EBA (IPKat: here). The minutes do not detail what changed the Board of Appeal's mind on the matter of the referral. The minutes merely mention that the referral was discussed with the parties. Unsubstantiated rumour has it that members of the EBA were seen lurking in the corridors of the EPO, perhaps keeping an eye on developments? The Board of Appeal came to their decision to dismiss the appeal on the fourth day (of the 5 days scheduled), following 2 hours 40 minutes of deliberation over lunch: (IPKat: here).
We now await the written decision of the Board of Appeal, which will provide their reasoning in full.
Further reading:
- The opposition decision: EPO revokes CRISPR patent – a clear cut case of invalid priority?
- The mysterious declaration: The Broad's CRISPR patent: The curious case of the missing declaration
- The statement of grounds of appeal: "Should everyone else change, or just the Patentee?": Progress of the Broad's CRISPR appeal
- The Board of Appeal's preliminary opinion: BREAKING: Board of Appeal provides some initial thoughts on the Broad Institute’s CRISPR appeal (T0844/18)
- Hearing, Day 1: The Broad Institute's CRISPR patent appeal hearing: Day 1, Setting the Stage
- Hearing, Day 2-3: CRISPR hearing days 2-3: Board of Appeal poised to refer to the EBA?
- Hearing, Day 4: CRISPR hearing Day 4: Still a clear cut case of invalid priority, Broad Institute's appeal dismissed
Considering the appellants’ conduct of proceedings, it would be rather surprising if The Broad filed a petition for review in order to get the decision T 844/16 set aside. The consistent case law of the Enlarged Board of Appeal requires for a petition to be admissible that the petitioner has raised an objection under R. 106 EPC which must be specific, indicating clearly and unambiguously on which procedural defect the petitioner intends to actually rely. The objection has to be additional to and distinct from other statements, such as arguing or even protesting against the conduct of the proceedings or against an individual procedural finding.
ReplyDeleteThe appellants’ representative in the oral proceedings may be supposed to know this requirement quite well. Following the discussion of the appellants’ three approaches why the priority should be considered valid, the Chairman informed the parties of the Board’s conclusion not to refer a point of law to the EBA. Whereas the representative submitted that the appellants’ right to be heard had been violated by not discussing the question of a referral separately, he did not raise an express objection. Even after the break requested before the final requests, such an objection was not raised.
The Board’s conclusion not to refer a point of law was the result of the oral proceedings which apparently clarified the priority question to an extent that the Board can answer the question by reference to the EPC and the Paris Convention without doubt. Thus, the Board may have considered a referral not to be required within the meaning of Art. 112 (1) EPC.