The recent decision of the US Court of Appeal of the Federal Circuit in Alnylam v Moderna relates to the ongoing complex and high-stakes dispute over mRNA vaccine delivery technology. In a blow for Alnylam, the Federal Circuit found that Moderna did not infringe Alnylam's LNP platform patents in view of a definition of a technical term included in the description that narrowed the claims. The Federal Circuit concluded that, by including this definition in the description, Alnylam had acted as its own lexicographer and deliberately narrowed the meaning of the term. The decision in Alnylam v Moderna thus confirms the established US case law whereby the description of a patent may serve as a dictionary for the claims. The clear US case law in this area contrasts with the current uncertainty in Europe over how and if the description should be used to interpret the claims of European patent (G 1/24). As with the EBA referral in G 1/24, Alnylam v Moderna is further confirmation of the perils inherent in the overuse of boilerplate in patent specifications (IPKat).
Checking the dictionary definition |
Legal background: Lexicography in US patent law
Under established US patent law doctrine, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. However, this presumption can be rebutted in two specific circumstances. First, where a patentee acts as their own lexicographer and clearly sets forth a definition of a claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning. Second, where the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution (file wrapper estoppel) (IPKat). The threshold for establishing either exception is deliberately demanding. In particular, for the lexicography exclusion to apply, the evidence must clearly set forth or clearly redefine a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to redefine the claim term (MPEP 2111.01, MPEP 2173.01, CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., CAFC 2022).
Case Background: LNP vaccine dispute
The decision in this case relates to the ongoing patent dispute over delivery technology for mRNA-based vaccines, including the COVID vaccine. In this particular case, Alnylam brought two patent infringement suits against Moderna. Alnylam argued that Moderna's mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccine SPIKEVAX infringed Alnylam's patents US 11246933 and US 11382979, relating to lipid nanoparticles (LNPs) used for delivery of nucleic acids to the body. The broader LNP/COVID-19 vaccine dispute is hugely complex and a classic example of the important intersection between freedom to operate and patentability for technologies with both product and platform IP (IPKat).
The central issue in this case related to the definition of a technical term in the claims: "branched alkyl". The claims of the patents specified "a branched alkyl, where the branching occurs at the α-position relative to the biodegradable group". In chemistry, the term "branched alkyl" is normally understood to mean a non-straight hydrocarbon chain, which could include secondary carbons (bonded to 2 other carbons) at branch points. However, contrasting with the normal definition, Alnylam's patent specification provided its own, more restrictive, definition of the term. The specification stated that "Unless otherwise specified, the term 'branched alkyl' refer[s] to an alkyl group in which one carbon atom in the group (1) is bound to at least three other carbon atoms and (2) is not a ring atom of a cyclic group."
The District Court found that it was clear from this definition that Alnylam was acting as its own lexicographer for the term and had narrowed the meaning of "branched alkyl" as used in the claims to mean an alkyl group in which one carbon atom in the group is bound to at least three other carbon atoms. Under this narrower definition, Moderna was found not to infringe the patents.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit confirmed the District Court finding. The Federal Circuit particularly noted a number of facts that supported the narrowing effect of the description definition. First, the relevant sentence appeared under the title "Definitions." Second, the term to be defined, "branched alkyl," was set off in quotation marks. Third, the sentence used the term "refer to," which generally conveys an intent for the sentence to be definitional. Fourth, elsewhere in the Definitions section, Alnylam had used non-limiting terms that contrasted with the "refer to" language at issue. Finally, the inclusion of the phrase "[u]nless otherwise specified" suggested that the rest of the sentence laid out a generally applicable rule or definition.
The Federal Circuit concluded by explaining the common policy rationale behind its strict approach: "There are familiar reasons that definitions in the patent context deserve at least as much force: Public notice is a central policy, public reliance is a known reality, precision is at a premium, and the applicant has ample control over provision of definitions, so when a definition is expressly stated, the public is generally entitled to expect clear notice of exceptions" (page 12).
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the District Court's claim construction and judgment of noninfringement.
The European perspective
The US Federal Circuit's clear decision and reasoning in Alnylam v Moderna contrasts with the current uncertainty in Europe surrounding claim interpretation and the importance, or otherwise, of description definitions. It is hoped that the pending referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) in G 1/24 will resolve some of the uncertainty in Europe.
G1/24 arose from a Philip Morris patent for heat-not-burn e-cigarettes requiring "a gathered sheet of aerosol-forming material," where the key novelty question was whether prior art disclosing tobacco that "may be spirally wound" anticipated a "gathered" sheet of tobacco. The definition of the term "gathered" tobacco as understood in the art would not normally be understood to include spirally wound tobacco. However, for reasons lost to the mists of time, the description of the patent defined "gathered" more broadly as "convoluted, folded, or otherwise compressed or constricted" tobacco. Under this broader definition, the term was broad enough to encompass the prior art's spirally wound tobacco. In view of a cited conflict on the case law on how the description should be used to interpret the claims, the EBA has been asked to clarify whether the description should be referred to when interpreting the claims and whether the specification can be a dictionary of definitions for the patent, i.e. as the US would put it, whether a patentee may be their own lexicographer.
In this Kat's view, the question of whether a patentee can be their own lexicographer is different to the questions of whether the claims should be read in the context of the description as a whole and/or whether the description should be used to resolve a lack of clarity in the claims (IPKat). However, we await the EBA's interpretation and decision on the case.
Final thoughts
Whatever the outcome of the case in G1/24, the take-home message is nonetheless the same as that for Alnylam v Moderna. Patentees in both the US and Europe should be exceedingly wary of using boilerplate definitions in their specifications. As shown in Alnylam v Moderna, an overly narrow definition may lead to problems of enforcement. Equally, as highlighted in G 1/24, an overly broad definition may lead to unforeseen validity issues. In Europe, amendment of description definitions, e.g. to bring the description in line with the claims, or to describe background prior art, also presents the additional risk of contravening the EPO's strict approach to added matter (IPKat).
In this Kat's view, the use of boilerplate definitions of commonly understood terms in a patent specification is in most circumstances unnecessary. If a patentee wishes to narrow or broaden the scope of their invention to something different, the best and safest place to do this is the claims, and not via the back-door of description definitions (IPKat).
However, there are cases where definitional language is required, for example in Europe unusual parameters must be defined. Interestingly, the decision of the Federal Circuit in Alnylam v Moderna case contrasts with that in Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech (CAFC, 2022), in which a narrowing definition of "antibody" was found not to limit the claims, in view of the more general tone of the definitional statements. What Alnylam v Moderna really teaches us therefore is, not that all definitions should be avoided at all cost, but instead that we should be cautious in how definitions are presented and to provide definitions in a manner as non-limiting as possible.
Further reading
- IPWatchdog: CAFC Affirms Moderna’s Win, Holding Alnylam Narrowly Defined ‘Branched Alkyl’
- Beware of boilerplate: Practical lessons for patent drafting from G1/24 (Claim interpretation) (April 2025)
- The description of a patent should "always" be used to interpret the claims (DexCom vs. Abbott, UPC_CFI_230/2023) (Feb 2025)
- US Supreme Court decision in Amgen v Sanofi: The European Perspective
- Can amending the description to summarize the prior art add matter to the patent application as filed? (T 0471/20) (Jan 2022)
It is difficult to follow you when you state that Introducing background art in Europe risks adding matter. European case law is clear on this point.
ReplyDeleteIn T 275/07, it was held that the amendment to the description to add an acknowledgement of the prior art does not bring any new content to the disclosure of the invention, even if it could be considered to put the invention in a different light. This decision goes back to T 11/82.
In the Guidelines, F-II, 4.3, it is specified that “References to the prior art introduced after filing must be purely factual. …. New statements of advantage are permissible if they do not introduce into the description matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed”.
It is further regularly claimed that bringing the description in line with the claims, presents the additional risk of contravening the EPO's strict approach to added matter.
Besides a case in the UK in which it was the proprietor which amended the description of its own volition, I have not yet seen a European patent revoked in post-grant procedures for aligning the description with the claim.
If you want to avoid the creation of angora cats when it comes to infringement, it is actually necessary to align the description with the claims. Otherwise it would be easy for a proprietor to have a claim with a limiting feature, whereby the description would allow a broader scope of protection.
This is exactly what Agfa did when it claimed for infringement by a Gucci group of companies before the UPC. The base coat as granted was limited to an “achromatic colour different from black”, whereas the description included a base coat containing chromatic pigments. See decision UPC_CFI_278/2023 from the LD Hamburg on patent EP 3 388 490 B1. This decision has been commented in my blog.
This is a similar situation to that when an independent claim is limited by including the subject-matter of a dependent claim, but the latter is still considered optional in the not amended description.
As we are all awaiting G 1/24, it is to be hoped that the EBA will clarified the matter. I am personally hoping that the EBA will not accept that the patent can be its own dictionary, or at least only if the definition in the description is narrowing the scope of the claim.
As there is also a referral in the pipeline on the adaptation of the description, see EP 2 124 521 B1 (T 697/22), clarification can also be expected on this point.
On added matter and definitions, T 500/01 is worth a mention. According to the headnote: "A claim, the wording of which is essentially identical to a claim as originally filed, can nevertheless contravene the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC, if it contains a feature whose definition has been amended in the description in a non-allowable way." See also T 471/20, r 2.4.
ReplyDeleteThanks for drawing my attention the attention to T 500/01 and T 471/20. I will add them to my presentation on added matter. T 471/20 confirms what is said in the Guidelines: the presentation of the prior art introduced after filing has to remain purely factual.
DeleteI would add the following: what is disclosed in connection with background art is not part of the invention. It infringes Art 123(2) when added to the claim. It can neither support novelty nor inventive step, see T 1652/06. In the same vein T 1084/06 or T 912/08. In this respect, I do not share the OD’s position in T 471/20. Art 69 has a priori nothing to do with the presentation of prior art.
Thank you, Rose, for a super foundation for a useful discussion. We European patent attorneys are going through "interesting" times after a "Golden Age" of jurisprudence on the validity of patents. Golden because it has been shaped by cases at the EPO debated in front of an expert court by technically expert advocates. It is no surprise to me to read yesterday on a leading US patent law blog that if you want patent eligibility in the USA then frame your patent application as a technical solution to a technical problem. Well done, Europe!
ReplyDeleteIn my 40 odd years of practice, helping US clients to grant in Europe, the gulf between best drafting practice in the USA and that in Europe has always been wide. I would assert that this is because in the USA patent drafters do what they are told by patent litigators, and those zealous lawyers seek to be able to "argue it both ways" for as long as possible. They don't talk about Angora Cats but anybody who does know about them will see their presence in most every US-based effort to get to issue a patent that can be both enforced and defenced. Hence all those definitions. Hence all that boilerplate.
But now in Europe, with the advent of the UPC, the litigators are re-asserting themselves. I can visualise the topic of patent validity getting, here in Europe, ever more complex and complicated. Who will tell me that I see it wrong? Who will see to it, that this does not happen?
@MaxDrei
DeleteI am no big fan of some aspects of US patent law esp. as to obviousness assessment, but sometimes Europe (I mean EPO and UPC but European practitioners as well) may learn from the US commonsense approach.
The question of whether a patent should be allowed to be its own dictionary has no reason to be approached in the restrictive, divisive mode of calling for a square YES or NO. A sensible approach is more inclusive and accepts that the answer may be a conditional YES or a condition NO. This is illustrated in the CAFC’s statement quoted by Rose :
"There are familiar reasons that definitions in the patent context deserve at least as much force: Public notice is a central policy, public reliance is a known reality, precision is at a premium, and the applicant has ample control over provision of definitions, so when a definition is expressly stated, the public is generally entitled to expect clear notice of exceptions" (page 12).
When the description of a patent makes it unmistakable the intent of the patent owner that a claimed term be given the meaning defined by a statement of the description, it makes full sense for such statement to be given full weight. This appears to be the case for the patent-in-suit of the referring decision of G 1/24 (EP3076804) in which the relevant paragraph [0035] begins with « as defined herein » and then cites three specific embodiments, which leaves no doubt as to the patent owner’s intent.
Because it is so specific, I will distinguish such a definition from a « boilerplate definition » as referred to by Rose. The term « boilerplate » in the context of contracts refers in contrast to standard, general language.
Dear Francis Hagel, I have just quickly read your comment and am inclined to welcome it. The thought it provokes in my mind is that the EPC excludes clarity as a ground of revocation of a duly issued claim so that Daniel Thomas is right, that the EPO, prior to grant, should strive to ensure that every claim it grants is clear. If the description recites, directly and unambiguously, a special definition of a term recited in the claim, that definition should be imported into the claim, or else the claim fails the Art 84 test.
DeleteBut there is what somebody else calls the "vast middle ground" between i) merely eliminating grotesque contradictions between description and claim and ii) strict "conformity" between description and claims. Where within that vast middle ground G1/24 will lay down the law we all await with keen interest.
Dear MaxDrei,
ReplyDeleteI agree, the ED could have raised an Art 84 objection if it has realised the awkward situation of a definition of « gathered sheet » in para 0035 of the description, including three embodiments one of which is the ordinary meaning of « gathered sheet ». The applicant would then have had the choice between two options, necessarily meeting the support condition of art 84 : the broad scope option you suggest of importing the definition of para 0035 into the claim ; and a narrower scope option of adding to the claim a limiting feature having support in the description.