This is the second instalment reporting
on the opening of the Getty Images v Stability AI case. The first part, setting
the scene and covering the trade mark and passing off claims, is available
here.
I had intended to cover the safe harbour defences in this post, but the
copyright and database right claims are meaty enough for one day, so that will
have to wait.
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This Kat has a headache. |
Copyright
This is probably the area of the
case most closely watched.
There are broadly three copyright
claims: copyright infringement by copying Getty’s works in the course of training
Stable Diffusion; secondary copyright infringement by deploying Stable
Diffusion in the UK; and copyright infringement in relation to the outputs
created by Stable Diffusion.
Taking those in turn:
Training: Getty appears to
have accepted now that some training of Stable Diffusion took place outside of
the UK (the ‘Final Training’). Whether there was any reproduction of copyright
works in the UK in earlier parts of the training is going to be a matter for evidence.
If there was no downloading or storing copyright works in the UK, there is no
infringement of UK copyright. Getty claims that the absence of evidence from
key people means that the court should draw an inference; Stability says that
it has spent approaching £3m on its disclosure, and has done everything it is
required to do.
Deploying (secondary
infringement): This is the bit of the judgment I will be scrolling to first,
after the end to see who won. Getty’s case is that “
Stable Diffusion is an ‘article’
which is, and which Stability knows or has reason to believe is, an infringing
copy of the Copyright Works or each or any of them” (see ss
22 and
23 CDPA).
Stability attempted to obtain summary judgment on this point earlier in the
proceedings, but that application was refused (
[2023] EWHC 3090
(Ch)). The question of whether an AI model is an ‘article’ or an ‘infringing
copy’ is novel and will come down to both factual issues and statutory
interpretation (including the so-called ‘always speaking’ principle). Getty’s case is
that ‘article’ includes intangible articles, and that as the making of the
model would have constituted an infringement of Getty’s copyright, then the
model itself is an infringing copy, notwithstanding that it may not actually retain
any copy of the works used to train it. Stability’s case is that articles must
be tangible, and the model cannot be a copy if there is no copy of the works
retained.
Outputs: According to
Stability’s skeleton argument, only 13 images have been identified that appear
to have been reproduced in outputs. Even then, Stability’s case is that the
prompts used to generate those images (apparently verbatim or
near-verbatim/reworded copies of the captions used on Getty’s database) would
not have been inputted by real-world users, at least in sufficient quantities
to justify the claim. Stability says they were ‘contrived’.
A neutral observer might hope that
Getty does get past this hurdle (if it is actually a hurdle), so that the court
can go on to consider whether Stability authorised the infringement (c.f
CBS
v Amstrad [1988]
UKHL 15) and/or communicated the copies to the public. The
authorisation claim is particularly interesting as
Amstrad involved a
very old world form of copying (double cassette decks which
could be
used for piracy), and how that case overlaps with AI could be fascinating.
Database right
The claim is under the sui generis
database right, continuing to be available in the UK post-Brexit.
Subsistence
Stability’s attack on Getty’s database
right claim starts with subsistence. As is common in many intra-group licensing
structures, IP rights have (according to Stability) been assigned to a US
entity. Readers may know that this quirk of database rights and collision of Brexit and EU law
has come up before in
Genius Sports Technologies Ltd v Soft Construct
(Malta) Ltd [2021] EWHC 3200
(Ch).
Non-EU/UK readers may be
unfamiliar with database rights as they are not the result of any global treaty.
In short, they are a creation of EU law designed to protect investment in
obtaining, verifying and presenting the contents of a database. Another key
feature of the EU sui generis database right is that it is available
only to individuals who are nationals of or resident in EEA member states and
companies that are incorporated in EEA member states. The UK equivalent of this
right, post-Brexit, is equivalent individuals or companies in the UK.
The right was also significantly
limited by a CJEU decision in 2004 (
BHB
v William Hill Case C-203/02,
EU:C:2004:695),
where the CJEU held that the investment must be in the obtaining, verifying and
presenting of pre-existing data, not the creation of it.
Stability’s position is that (a)
by virtue of costs sharing agreements (the details of which are largely redacted
from the non-confidential skeleton arguments), the second claimant (an Irish company) did not
make a qualifying investment, and (b) the Irish second claimant has assigned
its database rights to the first claimant (a US company), thereby extinguishing
any database rights. Getty disputes this interpretation, arguing that the Irish
company has made sufficient investments and that its right has not been so transferred
or extinguished. Getty however accepts that it does not have any rights in
materials added to the database after Brexit. The question of whether the
contract assigned the Irish company’s database rights to the US company is one
for trial, and involves an assessment under Washington law.
Infringement
The first point, again, is where
the training took place (training outside of the UK not being an infringement
of this database right, which will need to be determined at trial). The second
is whether the fairly limited number of copies in evidence (16) represent or
are indicative of sufficiently substantial re-utilisation in the UK.
On to safe harbours tomorrow! There really is about five cases wrapped up in this one.
In terms of the secondary infringement claim, if the the High Court initially determines that the term 'article' includes intangible goods, could it potentially rule that since Stable Diffusion can be substantially used for non-infringing purposes, it does not constitute secondary infringement?
ReplyDeleteConsidering that Getty Images has now conceded their claim that Stability AI had used its images as data inputs for the purposes of training and developing Stable Diffusion and there is lack of evidence as to the model's development process, does this significantly reduce the possibility of succeeding the secondary infringement claim because to establish that Stable Diffusion is an infringing copy is predicated on demonstrating at the outset that it was made in a way that constituted infringement, irrespective of the 'knowledge' element and the issue whether the term 'article' includes intangible goods? Please note that I am simply a copyright law enthusiast, and therefore I would like to apologise in advance if my question is erroneous from a conceptual perspective.
ReplyDeleteYou are correct in thinking that Getty's second infringement claim is on shaky ground. Getty were unable to establish the the model was made in a way that constituted infringement. They are asking the Court to treat Stability Diffusion as an infringing copy without having proved that it was created through infringing acts. Therefore, the second infringement becomes harder to sustain.
DeleteGetty is now trying to argue that the absence of evidence should allow the Court to draw adverse inferences against Stability AI. Those inferences being:
1. Stability knew or had reason to believe that Stable Diffusion was trained on infringing content and;
2. Stability was aware of the risk of copyright infringement and failed to take adequate steps to prevent it.
Similarly, if Stability cannot show how it controlled or limited the use of Getty’s content, the court might infer that Stability authorised or facilitated the infringement, even if indirectly. Furthermore, that the company’s systems or policies were designed in a way that enabled infringement.
So it remains to be seen; will adverse inferences be allowed to plug the evidentiary gap? In most cases, courts are very cautious in this regard