[GuestPost] Has G1/24 made the referral of the question of amendment of the description from T697/22 inevitable?

The European patent community is once again holding its breath. Following the landmark Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) decision in G1/24 on claim interpretation, the significant loose end of description amendments remains. With a decision expected tomorrow, 30 July, in case T697/22, a referral to the EBA seems imminent. This could finally bring clarity to the thorny question of whether, and on what legal basis, the description should be brought into conformity with the allowed claims. In a timely analysis, KatFriend Greg Corcoran looks into the proposed referral questions, the potential impact of G1/24, and the possible implications for practitioners, the EPO, and the wider goal of legal harmonisation across Europe.

A cat in a basket (or box)
– an inevitable outcome? 

Over to Greg: 

"The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) decision, G1/24, is considered clear and succinct. Whilst G1/24 provided us with clear answers to the question of how the description should be used to interpret claims, the potential impact of G1/24 on the EPO’s practice of description amendments on allowance remains open to question. Notably, nowhere in G1/24 is there explicit mention of amendment of the description, let alone support or criticism of this practice. However, there is now a pending appeal and potential referral which will potentially address this question (T697/22), and for which a decision is expected by tomorrow (30 July). What are the proposed referral questions? Can issues be identified in view of G1/24 which might be relevant for the Board of T697/22 to consider? And how can G1/24 help in deciding T697/22?

What is G1/24: The decision

To recap, G1/24 had a referral of three questions which were answered as follows:

1. Neither Articles 69 nor 84 European Patent Convention (EPC) serve as basis for interpreting claims when assessing patentability at the European Patent Office (EPO).

2. The description and figures shall always be consulted for such interpretation of the claims.

3. Question 3 regarding use of a patent description as its own dictionary was found to be inadmissible in view of the answers to questions 1 and 2.

Specifically, the EBA’s answer to the first two questions was:

The claims are the starting point and the basis for assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC. The description and drawings shall always be consulted to interpret the claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Articles 52 to 57 EPC, and not only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation.

Reference to the Description

Throughout the decision, the description is only expressly mentioned as a reference for claim interpretation (G1/24, Reasons 12, 14, 15 and 18). There is no explicit reference to amend the description. However, the EBA stresses the importance of a claim fulfilling clarity requirements, Art 84 EPC (G1/24, Reason 20), and asserts that: the correct response to any unclarity in a claim is amendment, citing paragraphs from the Comments of the President. Although the text in the decision explicitly relates to claim amendment, the referenced text of the President (President’s Comments to G1/24; paragraphs 87, 109 and last sentence of para 135) recommends striving for clarity by amending the description (President’s Comments to G1/24; only paragraphs 87 and 109) as well as the claims. The decision can thereby be considered to affirm EPO practice whatever that may be.

Divergent case law exists whether the description should be amended. T438/22, for example, supported the practice of adaptation of the description relying on Arts 84 & 94(3) EPC and Rules 42, 48 and 71(1) EPC, minding that any amendment of the description should not add matter to the application as filed, Art 123(2) EPC. The Board of T56/21, by contrast, found there is no basis from Art 84 EPC, or elsewhere in the EPC, for amending the description to comply with claims. A view can be taken that both decisions are now inconsistent with G1/24 because they both affirm application of Art 84 EPC for interpreting claims at the EPO and of Art 69 EPC and its protocol post grant (T56/21, Reason 86; T438/22, Headnote 2).

What Support is there for Amendment of Description in G1/24?

Reading the leading decisions on description amendments in view of G1/24, suggests that G1/24 could be considered incomplete. So why did the EBA not consider the consequences of its decision on claim interpretation to the practice of description amendments? One reason could be that providing such an answer was not relevant for the issue in the underlying case before the EBA. Nonetheless, the President of the EPO commented that amendment of the description was essential to G1/24, because amendment of the description was an established practice that could have been affected by the final decision. By contrast, late filed communications in G1/24, e.g. from epi, asked the EBA to keep to the explicit questions of the referral which did not refer to the practice of amendment of the description.

These petitioners argued that, if the EBA did expressly consider amendment of the description in its decision, third parties would be denied the opportunity to represent their views because the period to file amicus briefs had elapsed. At the hearing the two parties to the proceedings expressly represented that their position was consistent with amendment of the description, Art 84 EPC, which may have made this issue moot. Nonetheless, the final decision of G1/24 answered the referral so it can also be interpreted to be consistent with EPO practice, yet also complying with the late filed requests to limit the impact of the decision on EPO practice. The decision thus respected several public policy matters that were at stake. Some may view this as an accomplishment.

So how can G1/24 apply to the question of amendment of the description? G1/24 provided a new interpretation of Arts 84 and 69 EPC which is consistent with some of the pre-existing case law for claim interpretation. However, it is still unclear if and how the principles of G1/24 may be relevant to the question of adaptation of the description. In fact, it appears that G1/24 was intentionally written to avoid directly addressing the question, leaving a lacuna in the case law. Could a referral from T697/22 fill the gap?

What are the questions proposed in T697/22?

In T697/22, the undecided issue is whether adaption of the description to amended claims is needed to comply with Art 84 EPC. The Board in the case has observed that the parties have diverging views and has identified the divergent case law. The Board has thus proposed to refer the issue to the EBA and has suggested four draft questions (Communication from the Board 26 March 2025 page 2 paragraph 5 to page 3 paragraph 3).

Question 1) If the claims of a European patent are amended during opposition proceedings or opposition-appeal proceedings, and the amendments introduce an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description of the patent, is it necessary to comply with the requirements of the EPC, to adapt the description to the amended claims such that the inconsistency is removed?

Question 2) If the first question is unconditionally answered in the affirmative, which requirement of the EPC necessitates such an adaption?

Question 3) If the first question cannot be unconditionally answered in the affirmative, what are the conditions under which adaption of the description is necessary to comply with requirements of the EPC?

Question 4) Would the answer to these questions change if an inconsistency existed between the claims and the description of a European patent application?

The first draft question addresses the fundamental question of amendment of description and the second draft question seeks its legal basis:

So how is G1/24 relevant to these two questions? Intriguingly, the line of case law citing Art 84 EPC as the legal basis for amendment of the description (e.g. T438/22), appears to be inconsistent with G1/24. The EBA in G1/24 emphasized that Art 84 EPC "addresses the content of the patent application and is formal in nature, does not mention the invention and provides no guidance on how to interpret claims" (r. 8). One view is that if Art 84 EPC’s application is so limited that it cannot be used as basis for claim interpretation, then how can it serve as legal basis for amendment of the description?

The third draft question suggested by the Board in T697/22 asks whether there is any other legal support or material such as case law from which a legal principle can be derived.

This question has parallels to question 2 of G1/24, which the EBA answered by extracting applicable principles of claim interpretation from one of the two bodies of pre-existing diverging case law (G1/24, paragraph VII, Reasons 10 and 12). In a new referral, the EBA may therefore be expected to take a similar approach and look to the pre-existing case law on description amendments. However, it is unclear whether there is a similar level of generality in the case law on amendment of the description from which a principle could be abstracted

The final draft question suggested for the referral is perhaps of the most interest to practitioners, i.e. do we have to amend the description in line with the allowed claims?

Importantly, the case at the heart of the possible referral in T697/22 relates to an opposition where the application of Art 84 EPC differs from that used in examination (EPO Guidelines IV.C.5.1.2.b). Because of this difference, there is a risk that the EBA may decide that the fourth question is inadmissible, given that an answer to this question would not serve to resolve the underlying case (EPO Guidelines 2025 V.B.2.3.3). This principle appears to have been applied in the recent G1/23 decision. Consequently, a referral from this appeal might not in fact provide the long-sought-for-answer on whether the description should be amended in line with the allowed claims in examination.

Towards harmonization?

At its core, the EPC has a philosophy of harmonisation, which is sought by both the EBA, whereby “the EPO should not deliberately adopt a contrary practice to that of the tribunals that are downstream of its patents” including the national courts and the UPC. How the EBA may choose to seek that objective can be considered for example by identifying if the UPC has commented on the EPO practice of amending the description and how the courts have responded to amendments which may be occasioned by application of the EPO’s practice as noted in third party observations of 23 May 2025. Note: other lines of argument exist, for example application of G2/10 as applied in the third-party observations which will not be discussed in this article.

The UPC approving the EPO practice

The UPC has expressly ruled at first instance that the description should be amended in line with the allowed claims: "specifications that are not consistent with the granted claims cannot serve as a basis of a broad claim interpretation" (UPC_CFI_278/2023). The Hamburg Local Division, which decided this case, stated that a particular inconsistent term should have been deleted from the description (headnote 3, page 23). However, this is only a first instance decision and a wave does not represent a storm at sea. Indeed, there may be similar decisions which are as yet unreported. We await to see if this approach will be followed by other UPC divisions, how the Court of Appeal responds to its use, and what account the EBA may choose to take of this decision.

How the Courts have Responded to Amendments to the Description

Third party observations filed in T697/22 on 23 May 2025 presented arguments that amendments to include language that the EPO commonly considers innocuous e.g. "outside the scope of the claims" and requires on allowance for clarity, can be found to add matter and to influence claim interpretation (Ensygnia v Shell [2023] EWHC 1495 (Pat) (IPKat). Although this decision is from the English courts about a UK filed patent which was amended post grant, the amendments were made to bring the description into conformity with the amended claims.

The referral decision for G1/24, T439/22, observed that this jurisprudence on claim construction at the English courts is essentially the same as that applied in other national courts and in the UPC, i.e. Nanostring (T439/22, Reason 4.3). Notably, G1/24 later expressly approved Nanostring (G1/24 r. 19) in line with the principles of harmonisation.

Jurisprudence is not yet clear for the added matter limb. The Opponent/Appellant has already commented on the third-party proceedings, arguing that an amendment should satisfy the added matter requirements of the EPC, but that “cannot justify omission of an amendment of the description which would be required … due to an inconsistency between an amended claim and an unamended part of the description.” (Para 11 to 12 especially para 12.4 of letter dated 18 June 2025). Is the Opponent/Appellant advocating that the requirement to amend the description is independent of added matter? If these two EPC requirements are treated independently of each other, it is foreseeable that on occasion both requirements cannot be satisfied. So, following this line of reasoning, a proportion of patents will grant having added matter as a consequence of the amending the description to the allowed claims, as found in Ensygnia.

This outcome does suggest such a policy would be contrary to the principle of harmonisation identified in G1/24. Although there is no record of the UPC cases with an added matter objection occasioned by amendment of the description on allowance, added matter is the leading reason for invalidity at the UPC at first instance and the central divisions. As of 1 July, 31% of all validity decisions at the Court of First Instance were based on added matter, and 50% of all revocation cases at the Central Division. Consequently revising the description on allowance could be unwittingly adding matter to a patent on grant making it unsuitable for use in the courts.

In which direction will the EBA take harmonisation?

Given that an objective of the EPO is to grant high quality patents suited for use at the courts (Quality Action Plan 2025 | epo.org), it would seem unlikely that the EBA would choose to affirm the EPO process of amending the description at grant that appears intentionally to risk adding matter. It would be contrary to harmonisation that the EPC represents. Yet the EBA could decide that the importance of legal certainty in a granted patent of how the description supports allowed claims is an indication of the quality of a patent and is important for harmonisation between the EPO and the Courts. So, the EBA could affirm the established EPO practice. Of course, should a referral be made, it may decide differently. How it decides may depend on how the arguments in support of the different options are argued and substantiated (not just the two exemplary arguments presented here) by all parties to proceedings including the President and third parties. This is a point to be watched. 

How could G1/24 be relevant for deciding T697/22?

None of the parties to T697/22 have had the opportunity to account for G1/24 in proceedings. The last filing by the Opponent/Appellant was on the same day as G1/24 was decided. The next communication is expected from the Board on 30 July.

At present the Opponent/Appellant relies on Art 84 EPC for amendment of the description, and the Proprietor/Appellant has the contrary view applying T56/21. However, even if the EBA agrees with the Proprietor that Art 84 EPC is not the basis for amendment of the description, it could still decide the third draft referral question using an approach similar to the second referral question of G1/24, i.e. by extracting principles from relevant case law. In one view, the most reasonable approach now would be for the parties to have the opportunity to account for G1/24 and its implications in their arguments, whether in the present proceedings or in a referral.

Summary

G1/24 can be argued to be essential for deciding T697/22. The two leading divergent cases on description amendments apply Arts 84 and 69 EPC inconsistently with G1/24. The deciding board could decide T697/22 without a referral, but the long existence of divergent case law justifies a referral. A referral would also be an efficient way of simultaneously granting the parties to the proceedings and third parties an opportunity to present their arguments based on G1/24 as some requested late in the proceedings of G1/24.

Nevertheless, a referral in T697/22 might still not provide an answer to the long-sought-for-question of amendment of the description of a patent application in view of allowed claims, i.e. examination as opposed to opposition. Practitioners may thus want to delay raising their hopes for a solution just yet. Still, it is hoped that any referral and its eventual decision would represent a further step along the path of harmonisation between the EPO and the European courts.

Of course, before there can be a referral, the present Board needs to decide to make one. We all await its decision with anticipation."

Update (29 July 2025): Referral in G1/25 has now been confirmed!

Further reading

[GuestPost] Has G1/24 made the referral of the question of amendment of the description from T697/22 inevitable? [GuestPost] Has G1/24 made the referral of the question of amendment of the description from T697/22 inevitable? Reviewed by Dr Rose Hughes on Tuesday, July 29, 2025 Rating: 5

22 comments:

  1. It's T 0697/22, not T 0679/22

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  2. Nice article.

    Personally, I think that it is too soon for any of us to determine how the EPO will interpret claims in the light of G 1/24. So far, the two (reported) Board of Appeal decisions that have applied G 1/24 have essentially ignored definitions / disclosures of the description and have done so on the basis of a so-called "primacy of the claims" principle.

    At this point, it is hard to determine whether there are any situations where a Board of Appeal would be prepared to allow a description definition to prevail over a "standard" definition that is (allegedly) clear. The Board in T 1999/23 suggested that, in certain cases, there might be "objective reasons" to override the primacy of the claims principle. However, they did not provide any indication of what such "objective reasons" might be, or indeed whether they could even conceive of any such reasons.

    If the EPO continues granting patents based upon claim interpretations that rely upon "standard" definitions of terms (which conflict with definitions / disclosures in the description), this is guaranteed to raise added matter issues. This is because the EPO does not pay anywhere near enough attention to the question of whether the (amended) claims intended for grant, as interpreted by reference to "standard" definitions, find clear and unambiguous basis in the disclosures of the application as originally filed.

    As things stand, the EPO's practice is to arbitrarily afford a term a "standard" meaning when (and only when) that term appears in the claims. It does not take a genius to work out that the risk of adding matter will be very high if the "standard" meaning selected by the EPO has no basis in common general knowledge and/or if it conflicts with the meaning ascribed to that term by the author of the patent application. Also, the risks on this point are further increased by the fact that the EPO rarely, if ever, deigns to provide evidence for the "standard" definition that it selects.

    Taking all of this into account, I think that the chances are low that the TBA will come up with questions for the EBA that stand any chance of resolving all of the issues connected to description amendments. However, I wish them good luck - they will certainly need it!

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    1. @ Proof of the pudding,

      For a start, it is not correct to state that "the two (reported) Board of Appeal decisions that have applied G 1/24 have essentially ignored definitions / disclosures of the description and have done so on the basis of a so-called "primacy of the claims" principle".

      In T 1999/23 and T 1561/23 the boards did not ignore the definitions given in the description. They have simply considered that it is not acceptable to give a claim a limited meaning as it is given in the description. In this respect, they followed a long lasting line of case law, cf. Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th edition, July 2022 – II.A.6.3.4.

      I still fail to see how added matter could, even remotely, play a role if a claimed feature, clear as such for the skilled person, is contradicted in the description, but the claim and the description were both originally filed.

      If an applicant finds it necessary to give in the description a limited meaning to a claimed feature, clear as such for the skilled person, why does he not bring the limited meaning in the claim? In T 1993/23, the board held that there was an inconsistency between claim and description. How can this finding be incorrect?

      In T 1993/23, the board saw no objective reason why a proprietor should be permitted to deviate from the established technical terminology without recognisable justification when formulating the subject-matter from the use of which third parties are to be excluded and to refer to this only in the description. An unrestricted right to do so would undermine legal certainty.

      The same applies mutatis mutandis when a claimed feature, clear as such for the skilled person, is broadened in the description. If the applicant wishes a broad scope of protection, then he has to bring the corresponding features in the claim and not hide them in the description.

      In case of broadening statements in the description, there is no objective reason why a proprietor should be permitted to deviate from the established technical terminology without recognisable justification when formulating the subject-matter from the use of which third parties are to be excluded and to refer to this only in the description. An unrestricted right to do so would undermine legal certainty.

      In other words, the board’s consideration applied in case of a limiting feature in the description, apply as well when the description contains a broadening statement.

      The following conclusion can be drawn: if a limiting or a broadening statement found in the description is incorporated in an independent claim, there is no inconsistency between claims and description, and no objection under Art 123(2) can be raised before or after grant.

      There is nothing arbitrary in affording a claim "a "standard" definitions of terms", if this definition corresponds to the understanding of the skilled person.

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    2. Do you not think that "ignoring on the basis of the primacy of the claims principle" is pretty much the same thing as "considering not acceptable in accordance with a long line of case law"? The end result is the same. The reasons for reaching that result are the same. So if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck ...

      We shall have to agree to differ on the rest.

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    3. Let's keep ducks out of all this. They can't help their walk and they can't help the noise they make.
      Not only for the rest, we disagree on the whole lot. But this does not come as a surprise.

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  3. My main problem is with the EPO practice as it is currently applied. It overshoots massively. It's a cannon to kill a fly.

    I have no problem with amending the description to avoid conflicts between claims and description, but I do have problems with amending just because there is an actual potential for a conflict, and even more problems with amending if the potential conflict is not even a actual potential conflict, but mere perceived because there might be inattentive readers of the patent.

    For instance the blanket ban on claims-like clauses is one in the latter category. Unless these claims-like clauses are preceded by a phrase implying that they intend to modify/replace the claims, they do no harm. Especially not when keeping the primacy of the claims, confirmed by G1/24, in mind.

    IMHO statements which are, upon attentive reading, merely inert ballast, should not be objected to but allowed, if only to comply with the principle that the patentee/applicant is the master of his own patent/application.

    So I would answer Q1and Q4 as: 'No, an inconsistency is not enough, but an inconsistency which results in a change of scope of the claims (as opposed to merely having the potential to do so) should be removed.'

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    1. @ BJ,

      Claims-like clauses are an invention of US applicants, or better their representatives. This bad habit has been happily taken over by lots of other representatives.

      It is absolutely normal and correct that the EPO requires deletion of claim like clauses as they have no legal basis in the EPC. If you have one let me know. I wish just to observe that R 42 is silent about claim-like clauses.

      Whether or not they are preceded by a phrase implying that they intend to modify/replace the claims, they have not lost anything in remaining in the description before grant.

      Whether or not they are intended to modify/replace the claims they directly and unambiguously introduce an uncertainty between the actual claims, and we are back to T 1999/23. If they are intended to modify/replace the claims, they manifestly introduce an uncertainty.

      There is no doubt that the patentee/applicant is the master of his own patent/application, but this has to remain within the limits of the EPC and its Implementing Regulations.

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    2. If you consider that claim like clauses are prohibited because they are not mentioned in Rule 42, am I correct to assume that you agree statements such as "The invention is defined in claim 1" are also prohibited because they are not mentioned in Rule 42?

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    3. Let's remain serious! By the way, you are not as anonymous as you think.

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    4. I am fully serious. If your position is that anything not mentioned in Rule 42 is prohibited, such statements must also be removed. Or perhaps your position is logically inconsistent.

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    5. Anon, I have learned from long experience that it is a fool's errand to use logic to try to prise DXT away from his fixed opinions on certain topics. Rest assured that there are many others out there that do appreciate the point you are trying to make.

      I would also add that "claim-like clauses" merely represent one possible format for clauses that disclose the invention in the sense of Rule 42(1)(c) EPC. They are therefore explicitly covered by that rule.

      The EPO's objections to claim-like clauses relate solely to their format. This is nothing other than a triumph of form over substance.

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    6. @ Proof of the pudding,

      As far as sticking to one’s opinion and trying to use logic to prise you away from your fixed opinions on certain topics, I would say that we are on a par.

      That we thus disagree on many topics is no surprise. I base my opinions of my experience at the EPO, and not on some theories which you hold for the real and only correct way to interpret the EPC.

      There is however a big difference between us. I do not defend my opinions under a pseudo, I have the courage of doing it openly, and do not hide under a pseudo or as anonymous. Ever heard about the parable of the beam and the straw?

      I fully support the position expressed in the Guidelines F-IV, 4 on claim-like clauses. That we disagree on this point is thus not a surprise, but not a reason to take such a derogatory tone. It does not make your argumentation more convincing.

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    7. Mr Thomas, if I understand you correctly, your approach to interpreting the provisions of the EPC is to prioritise your experience at the EPO over detailed (and logical) consideration and analysis of the law. If that is the case, then it is no surprise that you are entirely unpersuaded by logical analyses based solely upon the EPC (and applicable methods of interpretation of the same). However, it does make your approach somewhat dogmatic.

      It is hard to lend any weight to your accusations regarding my own approach when your comments contain nothing other than mere assertions (or repetitions of well-rehearsed arguments that have been discussed and countered in the past). For example, merely pledging your allegiance to the views expressed in the GL does nothing to engage with the points that I made regarding Rule 42(1)(c) EPC and the absurdity of objections based solely upon the format of a disclosure.

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    8. Proof of the pudding,

      As I have the privilege to know who you are, and that I know how you think that only you know what the truth is (if anything like this at all exists), I happily accept that, as far as dogmatism is concerned, I am defeated.

      I have no choice but to return your statement as it applies directly and unambiguously: “your comments contain nothing other than mere assertions (or repetitions of well-rehearsed arguments that have been discussed and countered in the past)”. What you call “logical analyses based solely upon the EPC (and applicable methods of interpretation of the same)” is your opinion, it is not the truth.

      When the EBA interprets the EPC, it is an opinion, with the difference that the opinion is binding for all the instances of the EPO. Even the EBA has accepted to changed its opinion. In G 1/84, OJ 1985, 299, the EBA ruled that the proprietor could oppose its own patent. In G 9/93, OJ 1994, 894, the EBA ruled that a European patent cannot be opposed by its own proprietor.

      As even the EBA can change its position, how can you be so self-assured that your interpretation/opinion is the only valid one?

      As an opinion, it worth being considered, but it cannot be considered the only answer to some legal questions.

      As far as the Guidelines are at stake, I simply remind you that examiners are bound with what the Guidelines say. They have to apply them. That some times the way the Guidelines are applied can be criticised, and I can even agree that sometimes it is hair rising.

      The Guidelines are however regularly revised in order to take into account case law of the boards and decisions of the EBA. That you dislike some parts of the Guidelines is your good right, but there again it is your opinion, and certainly not the truth.

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    9. Mr Thomas, it is only you who interprets my comments as being presented as some kind of immutable truth. Quite clearly my comments represent my opinions.

      I will freely admit that there is nothing special about my opinions. They derive from logical analyses of the law, and take account of (but are not constrained by) experience and case law. Whether or not that is the best way of interpreting the EPC is not for me to say. However, it is at least not an entirely unreasonable approach. Moreover, I am always open to persuasion by coherent and convincing counter-arguments.

      What I find particularly unpersuasive, however, are personal attacks, ie tactics of "tackle the person and not the ball". To this end, I might point out that you appear to have taken your eye off the ball. That is, whilst your comment explained at length what you perceive as my personal characteristics, it contained precisely nothing of substance in response to the points that I had made (regarding Rule 42(1)(c) EPC and the absurdity of objections based solely upon the format of a disclosure).

      To be absolutely clear, I am not trying to "win" the argument, or to belittle you in any way. I am merely trying to explain my point of view and to understand whether there are any convincing counter-arguments. In other words, this is not personal - and there is no need to make it so.

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    10. Proof of the pudding,

      I can agree with you, that what is the best way to interpret the EPC, is not for you to say.

      It is your right to consider that it is at least not an entirely unreasonable approach. Needless to say, I beg to disagree. You appear to hang on your interpretation and you are willing to stick to it at any cost. It is your good right to do so, but on the more fundamental aspect of inconsistency between claims and description, you are not prepared to accept what the case law of the boards, besides the odd decisions, has established for a long time.

      Coming up with R42(1,c) is a side track, I am refusing to enter. We have exchanged at multiple occasions and there is not much more to say. You pick out a small part of the discussion, in order to attempt to show that I was not willing to enter a discussion.

      I would like to note that you are still not prepared to accept, that if there is an inconsistency between claims and description, the description cannot stay as it is. Decisions post G 1/24 are clearly showing that, when there is an inconsistency between claims and description, be it in a broadening or a limiting sense, it cannot be resolved to the benefit of the applicant/proprietor. For you, and by the way Mr Snodin, what matters is what is in the description and not what is in the claim. Or did I misunderstand you?

      You claim not wanting to "win" the argument, but it is difficult to follow you there, as you always come back with your way of interpreting the EPC.

      You also claim not wanting to belittle me, but when I read the following sentence in your comments on this blog: “I have learned from long experience that it is a fool's errand to use logic to try to prise DXT away from his fixed opinions on certain topics”, what else are you doing? It is anything but a compliment. My reply is thus twofold: what goes around comes around, and have you ever heard about the parable of the beam and the straw

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    11. Mr Thomas, your pugilistic style makes me pine for the days before certain online fora turned almost every debate into an unedifying slanging match.

      I mean, is it really necessary for you to respond to every (perceived) sleight by punching back harder, and (further) below the belt? Does it achieve anything to turn every allegation against you back on your accusers, regardless of whether there is any justification for doing so?

      Debates need not be a zero-sum game. A debate can serve to probe the strengths and weaknesses of arguments from those having different perspectives, with a view to identifying the best possible solution to a particular problem. All it takes are participants that are willing to allow others to speak, and to listen to and understand what those others have to say.

      For example, you ask me what, other than belittling you, I might be doing by way of my comment to Anon on 30 July. One answer to that is that it was my attempt at using light-hearted humour to express empathy with Anon. A further answer is that it was fair comment supported by verifiable evidence (Exhibit A being this comment thread). However, I can see that I have offended you. Therefore, to prevent any further unpleasantness, I apologise for any offence that my comment caused you.

      I hope that you can accept my apology and move on. I also hope that you can agree to return to the topic at hand, which (in my 30 July comment) was the legal basis – or alleged lack thereof – for the EPO’s objections to claim-like clauses.

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    12. @ Proof of the pudding,

      There is nothing pugilistic in the style of my reply. The mere fact that I can return the compliment by return of post actually shows the inanity of your argumentation, and the fact that it fails to convince.

      I would be prepared to acknowledge that we strongly disagree on many points, and leave at this. The problem is that you systematically come back.

      I base my argumentation on case law of the BA and EBA, whereas you come always with nice law theories, which I understand, but they fail to convince me. You might not like what the BA say, or how they interpret G decisions, but those decisions are a matter of fact which cannot be ignored.

      There is no humour to be seen in your comment about the fool’s errand. Would you have said this directly to me, I would have shrugged my shoulders. As it was addressed to a third party, it was, again to use your own wording, it was below the belt. Do not forget that when you point your finger at somebody, you point three fingers at yourself.

      I happily accept your apologies, and I do not wish to continue the discussion, as I will not convince you and you will not convince me.

      As far as R 42 is concerned, you and Anon might be right that claim-like clauses are not prohibited, but this does not mean they have to be accepted.

      Reading and interpreting R 42 with the propensity to understand and not to misunderstand the basic requirements, as well as the format of a description, behind the rule, the logical conclusion, at least for me, is that claim-like clauses do not fit in the picture, and the EPO is right not to accept them. What might be hidden in claim like clauses, should be expressed in plain language in the description.

      I said it many times before, and have to repeat it once more, unless I will be provoked, I do not intend to reply further.

      Delete
  4. https://www.epo.org/en/case-law-appeals/communications/referral-enlarged-board-appeal

    ReplyDelete
  5. @Proof of the pudding

    I agree with your emphasis on the 2024 revised GL : "an inconsistency" should be dealt with (only) if "it casts doubt on the subject-matter for which protection is sought". It is very significant that « if it casts doubt » has replaced the language « if it could cast doubt » of the 2021 GL.

    This is so significant for several reasons.

    Removing the conditional « could » seems to imply a change of tack at the EPO. The ability to consider hypotheticals as permitted by the 2021 GL was linked to an objective of improving post-grant legal certainty, as such hypotheticals arise in arguments possibly submitted in court proceedings. In other words, the EPO’s objective could be understood as an attempt to interfere with the interpretation of claims by the courts, i.e. as an overreach. The 2024 revision of the GL is welcome as it implies that this objective has been dropped.

    The influence of adaptations of the description on claim interpretation by the courts is doubtful anyway. See UPC LD Paris 358/2023 HP vs Lama §41 dismissing the adaptation (statements that some embodiments are outside the scope of the invention). What matters is the original description showing these embodiments in Fig 4-8.

    See also LD Düsseldorf 26/2024 Headwater vs Samsung §68 : «To answer the questions of infringement and validity, the claim has to be interpreted by the skilled person at the priority date in order to define its scope of protection ». The principle is clear : validity being assessed at the priority date, the critical date for claim interpretation has to be the priority date as well. The logical conclusion is then that the description to be considered by the skilled person is the description of the original application, not an amended description.

    The 2024 GL also implies that the onus is on the ED to prove that an inconsistency does cast doubt to justify a requirement to adapt the description. A mere reference to the GL devoid of specific justification is not sufficient.

    The 2024 revision is also welcome because it aligns the GL with Rule 5.29 of the PCT ISPE guidelines, which harmonizes the rules applicable to the PCT phase of EPO applications and to the EPO examination. According to Rule 5.29, an inconsistency can be overlooked except if it causes doubt (in the present tense). This is not a binary approach (always adapt vs. never adapt) but a nuanced approach. Adaptation can indeed be required, but subject to a showing that an inconsistency causes doubt.

    A recent development related to G 1/24 illustrates a connection with the adaptation of description issue now referred to the EBA. The patent in suit in T 439/22, the referring question to G 1/24, is EP3076804, in which the claim term « gathered sheet » was formally defined in [0035] of the description as including « gathered sheet » and two different embodiments. The reply of G 1/24 that the description was to be consulted for claim interpretation implied that the definitional statement of [0035] should be taken into account, contrary to the patent owner’s position that only the ordinary meaning of « gathered sheet » was to be considered.

    On 3 July, the patent owner reacted to G 1/24 by submitting an auxiliary request to adapt the description, namely the deletion of [0035]. The opponent replied that first the request was not admissible under the RPBA, and second that it was new matter as it would constitute an intermediate generalisation. An OP has been scheduled by the Board on 11 December 2025.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Mr Hagel,

      I have just checked the valid Guidelines and F-IV 4.3-Inconsistencies reads:
      You are right to say that the language « if it could cast doubt » has indeed been replaced by « if it casts doubt ».

      In my humble opinion this does not “seem[s] to imply a change of tack at the EPO”.

      That it aligns “with Rule 5.29 of the PCT ISPE guidelines, which harmonizes the rules applicable to the PCT phase of EPO applications and to the EPO examination” is to be welcomed, but does not changes the approach at the EPO. In any case, the EPO applies its own rules when an international application enters the European phase.

      In T 735/03, it was held that amendments filed during the international phase have to comply with the substantive requirements of the EPC, in particular that of Art 123(2). It other words, what happened under the PCT becomes irrelevant when the PCT application enters the European phase.

      I invite you to carefully read F-IV, 4.3(iii) “Part of the description and/or drawings is inconsistent with the subject-matter for which protection is sought”. The examples given are very clear and alignment of claims and descriptions is necessary.

      Quoting UPC decisions, is also quite nice, but the EPO is not bound by the way the UPC interprets the claims and the UPC is not bound to the way the EPO interpret claims.

      If the description contains statements which are at odds with what is claimed, see F-IV, 4.3(iii), is not considered as an inconsistency, I wonder what will ever be consider an inconsistency.

      An inconsistency is present, if the description attempts to give a clear claimed feature a limiting interpretation, or inversely attempts to broaden the possible interpretation of clear claimed feature.

      That a mere reference to the Guidelines is not an argued objection is not at stake. The inconsistency can be resumed in a few words, and should not come as a surprise to the applicant, as he has deliberately brought the inconsistency in the description.

      With filing AR1 in which § [0035] is deleted, the proprietor clearly sees the danger that the board might consider that the broader definition of “gathered” given in the description could become a problem. It will interesting to follow the OP in December. Filing a new AR in which the definitions of § [0035] are incorporated would not bring much as being too late and open to the novelty attack.

      If the ED had done its job and requested alignment between claims and description before grant, we would not have had G 1/24.

      Delete

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