The IPKat has received and is pleased to host the following guest contribution by Katfriend Alberto Godioli (University of Groningen), discussing the interplay between copyright protection and freedom of expression in the aftermath of the 2025 decision of the High Court of England and Wales in Samherji v. ODEE, and the recent inadmissibility decision by the European Court of Human Rights. Heres’s what Alberto writes:
I hoped you’d like (culture) jamming too: ODEE, Samherji and the ECtHR
by Alberto Godioli
What ever happened with Samherji v. ODEE? As IPKat readers might recall, the case stems from the 2019 ‘Fishrot scandal’, where Samherji (a large Icelandic fishing company) was accused of bribing Namibian officials to secure fishing quotas.
On 11 May 2023, ODEE – an Icelandic conceptual and performance artist – created a spoof website under the domain samherji.co.uk, featuring the company’s logo and a large ‘WE’RE SORRY’ sign on the homepage. The website also featured a fictional press release titled ‘Samherji Apologises, Pledges Restitution and Cooperation with the Authorities’, which ODEE sent to media outlets that had covered the Fishrot scandal. On 17 May, ODEE issued another press release, revealing that the website and apology were part of an artwork – which was also presented as an installation at the Reykjavík Art Museum on 18-29 May.
In March 2024, Samherji applied for summary judgment in the UK on the grounds of passing off, infringement of its logo copyright, and malicious falsehood. The summary judgment was issued on 14 November 2024, with the High Court of England and Wales granting restraining relief and the permanent transfer of the domain name, and ordering ODEE to pay Samherji’s costs.
ODEE’s arguments under Article 10 ECHR – drawing in particular on Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom – were thus rejected, as the High Court held that they did not provide the defendant with any ‘real prospect’ of effectively opposing Samherji’s claims in a full trial (at 52).
After being refused permission to appeal, ODEE sought to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The hope for his artwork to be thoroughly analysed under Art. 10, however, did not last long – on 9 April 2026, sitting in a single-judge formation, the ECtHR declared the application inadmissible. The unpublished decision, which was kindly shared by the artist, has not been covered yet by any media or academic outlet. In its concise wording, it dismisses the application as ‘manifestly ill-founded’, as ‘the matters complained of do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention’.
As a scholar of humour and the law, I could not help but see this as a major missed opportunity for the Court to reflect on the balance between freedom of expression and IP rights in cases involving parody – or culture jamming, to be precise.
ODEE’s culture jamming defence
As reported by High Court judge Master Teverson in his summary judgment, ODEE argued that the website and fake press release were ‘elements in a performance artwork following the practice known as “culture jamming”’ – and as such, in order for the artwork to be effective, ‘there needed to be an element of deception’ (at 61).
![]() |
| A detail from Nadia Plesner’s ‘Darfurnica’ (2010) |
In the High Court’s summary judgment, however, no substantive discussion of culture jamming takes place. Rather, Master Teverson seems adamant that ODEE’s work does not qualify as parody, therefore amounting to outright (not just ‘an element of’) deception: ‘This is clearly not a case of dealing with a work for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche. The Logo and Brochure as well as the whole design of the Website was intended to make it appear to be the official website of the Claimant’ (at 73). Consequently, ‘the Domain Name and the Website were instruments of fraud in the sense that they were set up with the deliberate intention of deception’ (at 85).
While, in the UK proceedings, ODEE acknowledged that his work necessarily featured an element of deception, the ECtHR application downsizes the deceptive component of culture jamming, maintaining that ‘ODEE’s work was patently satirical’ as ‘any reasonable viewer would have known or inferred’, and clearly did not intend to ‘deceive anyone’ (p. 9).
Contrary to the High Court and ECtHR rulings, this post seeks to take ODEE’s claims more seriously, by reflecting on the relationship between the disputed website, the longer tradition of culture jamming, and relevant legal precedents. Hopefully, this will also shed some light on the usage of the term ‘deception’ in the passages above – does culture jamming necessarily feature ‘an element of’ deception, as admitted in ODEE’s UK defence? Is it fully (maliciously) deceptive, as concluded by Master Teverson? Or not deceptive at all to any ‘reasonable viewer’, as per the ECtHR application?
Jamming, fast and slow
Academic literature on culture jamming is strikingly sparse, with notable exceptions such as DeLaure & Fink 2017 and McLeod & Kuenzli 2011. In particular, we are still missing a dedicated comparative analysis of relevant case law, or an attempt to distinguish between different subgenres falling under this broad umbrella term. This post will simply sketch an indicative distinction between two fundamental subgenres – namely what I propose to call ‘instant’ and ‘slow-release’ culture jamming.
An example of the ‘instant’ kind is the Billboard Liberation Front’s reworking of a McDonald’s billboard (2010), with the modified slogan reading: ‘You have about 10k tastebuds. Kill them all’. In this example, the implausibility of the slogan – what humour scholars usually call incongruity – is immediately clear to any reasonable viewer. Things are somewhat more complicated in ‘slow-release’ culture jamming, such as the Yes Men’s Dow Chemical hoax. In 2004, after creating a spoof Dow Chemical website, the group managed to infiltrate a BBC programme, where an impersonator (posing as a Dow spokesperson) announced that the company was ready to ‘accept full responsibility’ for the Bhopal disaster. The news immediately caused Dow’s share price to fall; however, all financial losses were restored after the company’s immediate disavowal. Within a few hours, the Yes Men issued a sarcastic press release, stressing that Dow shareholders had nothing to be worried about because ‘fortunately, there is no chance that the company will ever do anything like this unless forced to by law’.
When comparing the Yes Men performance with the McDonald’s billboard, some clear differences emerge:
- First, delayed resolution – meaning that the satirical implausibility is present but less obvious than the McDonald’s example, and is only confirmed at a later stage through the press release.
- Secondly, tactical embarrassment – namely putting the target in such an embarrassing position that they are forced to disavow, thereby increasing the media exposure of a given issue. This can only be achieved by creating some confusion at the start, which is not typically the case with the ‘instant’ variety.
- Lastly, splitting the audience – while the most focused (‘reasonable’) viewers will immediately get the joke, others will be temporarily left in doubt, which is exactly part of the plan. As pointed out in a recent article about hoaxes, this strategy also has an educational function: ‘one is confronted with the fact that others were in the know all along, and that one might have been among them, had one attended more carefully to the relevant cues’.
In short, slow-release culture jamming is not ultimately meant to deceive (pace Master Teverson); but neither is it meant to be immediately recognised as parody by all members of the public. This might help explain why the judicial fate of the two subgenres often differs. Generally speaking, instant culture jamming seems to have higher chances of succeeding in an IP case – see for instance Laugh It Off v. SAB, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, or Plesner v. Louis Vuitton. In all these occurrences, courts were keen to emphasize that large companies – as also stated in Steel and Morris – ‘inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny’ (at 94).
What is striking in Master Teverson’s decision, instead, and implicitly uncontested by the ECtHR, is the categorical statement that ODEE’s website is ‘clearly’ not a parody (at 73). The same stance was taken by the Austrian Supreme Court in a comparable case, FPÖ v. Die Tagespresse (2025), concerning a satirical magazine’s use of a political party’s logo to satirise their ‘patriotic’ agenda.
Yet, in both cases, the disputed materials arguably do qualify as parody – just like the Yes Men hoax, they are based on ‘repetition with critical distance’ (Hutcheon), where the distance is established through implausibility. In ODEE’s case, the implausibility lies precisely in the unlikelihood of the apology: as pointed out by Sabine Jacques, ‘given Samherji’s consistent denial of responsibility, it is arguable that an average member of the public would not reasonably believe the website in question was genuinely associated with Samherji’. Ultimately, the difference from the McDonald’s billboard is not one of essence, but of gradation; the parodic clues are still there, they’re just slightly less obvious at the start.
With its inadmissibility decision, the ECtHR missed a significant opportunity to further its otherwise underrated influence on IP law, leaving some important questions unresolved – to what extent can (slow-release) culture jamming be seen as legitimate parody? How can IP rights be fairly balanced with freedom of expression, especially in the absence of significant commercial damage (as is the case here)? These questions are not likely to become less relevant anytime soon, as ODEE is only one of countless contemporary artists proving that culture jamming is not just a thing of the past. What its legal future is, remains to be seen.
Do you want to reuse the IPKat content? Please refer to our
Policies section.
If you have any queries or requests for permission, please get in touch with the IPKat team.


Comments
Post a Comment
All comments must be moderated by a member of the IPKat team before they appear on the blog. Comments will not be allowed if the contravene the IPKat policy that readers' comments should not be obscene or defamatory; they should not consist of ad hominem attacks on members of the blog team or other comment-posters and they should make a constructive contribution to the discussion of the post on which they purport to comment.
It is also the IPKat policy that comments should not be made completely anonymously, and users should use a consistent name or pseudonym (which should not itself be defamatory or obscene, or that of another real person), either in the "identity" field, or at the beginning of the comment. Current practice is to, however, allow a limited number of comments that contravene this policy, provided that the comment has a high degree of relevance and the comment chain does not become too difficult to follow.
Learn more here: http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/p/want-to-complain.html