[Guest post] Getty Images v Stability AI: the parties’ submissions and key points from the appeal

The IPKat has received and is pleased to host the following guest post by Katfriend Monica Ezsias, discussing last week’s hearing in the appellate proceedings relating to Getty Images v Stability AI [see IPKat here for the first instance judgment]. Here’s what she writes:

Getty Images v Stability AI: the parties’ submissions and key points from the appeal

by Monica Ezsias
Kats on Getty

The Court of Appeal hearing ran for two full days over 11 and 12 November 2026 in London. Getty appeals the High Court’s Judgment of 4 November 2025 and Order of 17 December 2025, in respect of the dismissal of its claim for secondary copyright infringement arising from Stability’s development and distribution of its AI model, Stable Diffusion (fun fact: James Cameron is on the Board of Directors of Stability AI).
At first instance the High Court found the AI model could be an “article” under sections 22 and 23 the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), but held that it was not an “infringing copy” under section 27.
The central question before the Court of Appeal is whether the AI model can be an “infringing copy”, taking into account where copyright works were reproduced during training, and where that training occurred outside of the UK, but where the works are not retained as copies in the resulting model weights.
The appeal is not concerned with the High Court’s conclusion that Stability had infringed Getty’s trade marks, nor with the abandoned claim for primary infringement of copyright and database right, on the basis that inter alia the acts relating to the training and development of Stability’s AI model using Getty’s photographs had occurred outside the jurisdiction.

Getty Images’ submissions (Appellants)

Getty’s central submission is that the High Court took too narrow a view of what amounts to an “infringing copy”. In Getty’s view, the question is whether making the article would have infringed copyright, not whether the article continues to contain or store the original copyright work after it has been made.
The main strands of its submissions are:
  • Getty relies in particular on section 27(3)(b) CDPA, arguing that an article may qualify as an infringing copy if its making in the UK would have constituted copyright infringement.
  • The training of the AI model involved acts of reproduction of Getty’s copyright works. Getty points to the retrieval and processing of images, including temporary copies made, and relies on section 17(6) CDPA that transient or incidental copies can amount to infringing copying.
  • The absence of Getty’s images in Stability’s final model weights is not decisive. Getty says the model weights are the relevant article and that their status should be assessed by reference to the infringing copying involved in their creation, rather than by asking whether they preserve the training images. Getty relies on inter alia the following case law: Chappell & Co Ltd v Columbia Graphophone Company [1914] 2 Ch 745 citing that “the end does not justify the means”; Designers Guild Ltd v Russel Wiliams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 WRL 2416 citing that “No one else may for a season reap what the copyright owner has sown”; and Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch), [2005] FSR 9 citing “[The RAM chip] is always an article but it is only an infringing article for a short time […] the definition in s.27 points to the instant of making of the copy as crucial to the determination of whether or not it is an infringing article”.
  • The statutory scheme should not permit circumvention by offshoring the training. Getty argues that the secondary infringement provisions can catch articles made overseas where making them in the UK would have infringed copyright.
  • Getty’s Reply also disputes Stability’s case on importation and distribution. It argues that downloads of the model into the UK can amount to importation, and that Stability’s role in making the model available in the UK supports the relevant distribution allegations.

Stability AI’s submissions (Respondent)

Stability asks the Court of Appeal to uphold the dismissal of the secondary infringement claim. Its principal position is that an “infringing copy” must itself be a copy of the copyright work. That protected images were reproduced during training does not mean that the model weights produced by that process are themselves copies of those images.
Stability’s principal points are:
  • The resulting model does not store or reproduce the training images. The temporary copies made while processing the training data should not be treated as copies contained in the finished model. Copying during the process does not automatically make the product of that process an infringing copy.
  • It challenges whether an intangible AI model can constitute an “article”, arguing for a meaning that does not extend to information or software in the abstract.
  • It disputes that it carried out the acts of importation or distribution by way of downloadable copies of the model weights in the UK.

BPI’s intervention

British Recorded Music Industry Limited (BPI), intervening in support of Getty, emphasises the importance of the appeal for the wider creative industries:
  • BPI argues that section 27(3) CDPA is intended to prevent the UK market from becoming a route by which products made through acts that would have infringed UK copyright can be brought into the country after the relevant activity has taken place offshore. It warns that a contrary interpretation could encourage developers to train models outside the UK and then make them available here, weakening the practical protection afforded to UK creators.
  • It supports the conclusion that an AI model can be an “article”, while resisting the requirement that the final model must retain a reproduction of the protected works.

The appeal hearing

Getty began its submissions highlighting the court’s task to give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has enacted. Arnold LJ was concerned that Getty claimed Stability’s first act of alleged infringement took place in 2022 and yet the parties were focusing on the CDPA as enacted in 1988. Getty argued that the essence and substance of the relevant provisions, in particular section 27, have not and could have not changed. At the beginning of its submissions, Stability commented that the 1988 Act as enacted at the time is useful to understand the purpose of the provisions and the Act as a whole.
Getty argued that the High Court ignored the wording of section 27(3) CDPA and thereby did not focus on what is meant by the wording “its making … constituted an infringement”. It argued that the development of the AI model and model weights were dismissed, rather than considering whether development might amount to, or be part of, “making”. It is akin to saying that the writing of an infringing computer program cannot be the relevant act of making. Getty pointed to a JIPLP article:
When one makes a cake, it is not the act of taking it out of the oven that is ‘making’, but of the weighing and combination of ingredients, followed by its baking. When one makes an artwork, it is not the act of displaying it that is ‘making’, but of sketching, painting or sculpting it. A magic trick is not ‘made’ when the rabbit is pulled from the hat.
Arnold LJ at the same time noted that it is well-known that creating a cake from a copyright recipe is not an infringement of that recipe. Stability agreed that the cake is not a reproduction of the work as per section 17.
Stability argued that even if “at least some” of Getty’s images were used in training its models, the training models were product A. In product A the images were copied but also destroyed. Product B is the end product, the commercial objective, and it holds no copies. Section 17(6) confirms that the copies used for creating product A are transient or incidental; and so, whilst product A might be infringing, product B cannot be since a transient copy was never brought into the UK. Stability used as an analogy ‘The Da Vinci Code’ novel as product B and ‘The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail’ novel as product A: the process of producing product B may have been influenced by product A, but product B does not contain a copy of product A. Meade LJ voiced concern that this approach would allow the relevant infringement to be moved offshore, depriving Getty of the benefit of its copyright works.
In its Reply submissions, Getty reverted to the “always speaking” principle as a rule of statutory interpretation (that provisions of a statute are to be construed as speaking continuously in the present, that is, taking account of technological developments since its enactment). There was extensive discussion about whether Parliament in 1988 would have contemplated copies being downloaded from cloud storage. Getty argued that “article” is the genus and cloud storage is the new specie. Arnold LJ challenged this: electronic storage and file transmissions were already known in 1988 and Getty provided no evidence for a technical definition. Getty argued that a copy of the model weights, downloaded and received at a user’s computer in the UK, is an article, that an article can encompass the intangible, and therefore a copy of the model downloaded is an infringing copy. Stability argued that an article can only be tangible. Arnold LJ pointed out that even an intangible article is stored somewhere physical such as on a data server. Are the downloaded model weights a different article from the model weights held on the originating data server?

The central question for the Court of Appeal

The appeal ultimately turns on the meaning of “infringing copy” in section 27 CDPA. Must the article imported or distributed in the UK itself contain a reproduction of a copyright work? Or is it enough that making that article in the UK would have involved copyright infringement, even if the article no longer retains the work?
Getty and BPI favour the latter approach, emphasising the statutory wording, the treatment of temporary copying, and the risk that overseas development could otherwise sidestep UK secondary infringement provisions. Stability argues that the model weights are not copies of the training images and that the copying which occurred during training cannot determine the status of the finished model. The Court’s answer will help define how far the CDPA’s secondary infringement provisions reach in relation to generative AI models developed offshore and made available in the UK.
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