The IPKat has received and is pleased to host the following guest contribution by former Kat Anna Maria Stein, Alessandro Greco, and Giuseppe Rizzo (all Eversheds Sutherland) on a recent Italian decision concerning selective distribution agreements from a competition and trade mark law perspective. Here’s what they write:
The price of protecting a brand: Italy’s Morellato case between IP and competition law
by Anna Maria Stein, Alessandro Greco, and Giuseppe Rizzo
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| An Italian cat with jewels - genuine, of course |
In its judgment No. 17844/2026 of 11 November 2026, TAR Lazio partially upheld the appeal brought by Morellato S.p.A. (Morellato), a leading Italian manufacturer of mid-range jewellery and watches, against a decision of the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) imposing a fine of approximately Euro 25.9 million for anticompetitive vertical agreements.
While confirming the unlawfulness of the company’s conduct, the Court reduced the fine by 20% on proportionality grounds, finding that the ICA had failed to give sufficient consideration to the company’s arguments concerning brand protection and the prevention of counterfeiting. The judgment is a first instance ruling and might be appealed before the Council of State.
Background
Morellato distributes its jewellery and watches through a selective distribution network, under which authorised retailers are appointed because of predefined qualitative criteria. The company’s distribution agreements included a clause prohibiting authorised retailers from selling Morellato products through third-party online marketplaces, such as Amazon and eBay. However, Morellato itself remained active on those platforms through its official stores and permitted certain digital platforms to distribute its products.
In March 2025, the ICA launched an investigation to assess whether these restrictions infringed Article 101 TFEU. In July 2025, the proceedings were extended to cover a practice of resale price maintenance (RPM). According to the ICA, Morellato restricted the discounts that authorised retailers could offer through their online sales channels and monitored compliance with those restrictions, including through dedicated software tools. The Authority also found that Morellato had adopted measures against non-compliant distributors, including requests to withdraw discounts, suspension of orders and threats of termination of the commercial relationship.
In its decision of 17 March 2026, the ICA found that Morellato had infringed Article 101 TFEU through both its marketplace restrictions and RPM practices, and set a fine of approximately EUR 25.9 million.
Morellato challenged the decision before the TAR Lazio, arguing, among other things, that the restrictions pursued legitimate objectives relating to trade mark protection, product quality and the prevention of counterfeiting, as according to the company 20-30% of the product offered on the marketplaces were counterfeits.
The decision
The Court partially upheld Morellato’s appeal and, exercising its full jurisdiction over administrative fines, reduced the fine by 20%.
Importantly, the Court did not overturn the ICA’s infringement findings or question the unlawfulness of Morellato’s conduct. On the contrary, it held that the company had failed to prove that the restrictions pursued pro-competitive aims, and that the retaliatory measured functioned as a means of imposing RPMs to the detriment of consumers. Rather, the reduction rests on a finding on insufficient investigation.
In this respect, the Court took the view that the ICA had not adequately considered certain considerations advanced by Morellato concerning the protection of its trade marks and the prevention of counterfeiting. Referring to the CJEU’s case law, including Case 26-76 Metro and C‑230/16 Coty Germany [IPKat here], the Court recalled that competition law does not protect price competition alone, but also encompasses other dimensions of competition, including product quality.
The Court criticised the ICA for an “insufficiency of perspective”, having treated competition as “a sort of monad” rather than as a “necessary polysemy” that includes the fight against counterfeiting as “a natural pillar of consumer protection”.
Building on Coty Germany, the Court observed that it cannot be excluded that a marketplace ban might be justified not only by the need to preserve a luxury image, but also by the need to prevent genuine products from being confused with counterfeits. In both cases, the purpose is to ensure the authenticity of consumers’ purchases, an interest which is itself encompassed within the objectives pursued by competition law. According to the Court, the protection of consumers against counterfeits was therefore a relevant consideration that the ICA should have assessed during its investigation, even though it did not exclude the unlawfulness of the restrictions imposed by Morellato. TAR Lazio accordingly found that the ICA’s failure to consider this aspect justified a reduction of the fine on proportionality grounds.
The Court also cited the CJEU’s judgment in Louboutin v Amazon (C-148/21 and C-184/21) [IPKat here] on how marketplace users perceive listings and on the link that a uniform presentation of offers may create between the platform operator and a third party’s trade mark. It followed that an internet policy focused on prices might also have acted as a “warning light”, flagging abnormal transactions that concealed counterfeits or goods from unauthorised channels.
Comment
The European Commission’s 2022 Guidelines on vertical restraints expressly acknowledge that restrictions on the use of online marketplaces may pursue legitimate objectives, including protecting brand image and preventing counterfeiting (paragraph 334). However, where the market share threshold of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) are exceeded, the Guidelines consider it unlikely that such restrictions meet the requirements of appropriateness and proportionality, or the conditions of Art. 101(3) TFUE, where the supplier itself uses the marketplaces from which its authorised distributors are excluded (paragraphs 337 and 338). This tension is particularly clear in Morellato, where the supplier’s own use of the prohibited platforms casts doubts on the necessity and consistency of the restrictions imposed on independent retailers.
The most significant aspect of the judgment, however, lies in the distinction between the assessment of the infringement and the proportionality of the sanction. While the TAR confirmed that Morellato’s conduct infringed Article 101 TFEU, it recognised that protecting consumers against counterfeit products serves an interest that is also encompassed within the objectives of competition law. That interest, according to the Court, deserved consideration, at least in the circumstances of the case, when determining the appropriate fine.
From an IP perspective, the judgment confirms that trade mark protection and competition law do not always pursue conflicting objectives. Preventing counterfeiting protects not only trade mark owners but also consumers, who have an interest in purchasing authentic products.
Notably, the Court extended the Coty reasoning beyond the luxury sector. Morellato’s products sit in the accessible mid-range segment (below Euro 500 for jewellery and Euro 1.000 for watches) and would have fallen outside the Coty rationale, which rests on the “aura of luxury”. By shifting the basis from image to authenticity, and thus to the trade mark’s function as a guarantee of origin, the judgment opens the way to anti-counterfeiting justifications for a much wider range of branded goods. The scope of the ruling should nonetheless be measured with care: the Court did not hold that the marketplace ban was justified, and the Coty requirement of non-discrimination still applies.
The key message is that IP protection objectives do not provide an automatic defence against antitrust liability but may still play a role in assessing the proportionality of fines. The case therefore illustrates the importance of considering trade mark protection and competition compliance together when designing and implementing online distribution strategies. The anti-counterfeiting rationale of any online restriction should be documented when the restriction is adopted, rather than raised for the first time during the investigations. Furthermore, anti-counterfeiting monitoring should be kept separate from the monitoring of resale prices and restrictions should be applied in a consistent manner, without the supplier reserving to itself the channels from which its distributors are excluded.
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