Victoria’s Secret Triumphs over Thomas Pink in Co-existence Dispute


When does business not mean business?  To what extent does the factual matrix play a part when trying to understand the terms of a settlement?  How far will a court go to find a party just “got a bad deal” when agreeing co-existence?  These are some of the questions Deputy Judge Justin Turner KC had to grapple with in the latest round of the long-running dispute between Thomas Pink (TP) and Victoria’s Secret (VS) ([2026] EWHC 2817 (BP), judgment here).

Background (Part I)

Back in 2014, Birss J (as he then was) found that VS had infringed two trade marks owned by TP, through use of PINK by VS on its stores and articles of clothing sold in the UK and Europe ([2014] EWHC 2631, IPKat article here). The two marks held to be infringed were:

1.      Community Trade Mark (remember them?) 3,949,906 for goods in classes 3, 14, 18, 25, 26 and retail services in Class 35:



2.      The UK Trade Mark Number 2,565,078 (series mark) for goods in classes 14, 18, 25 and retail services in Class 35:




Permission to appeal was granted, but the parties entered into a global settlement agreement (the “SA”) on 27 July 2015.  The SA (governed by English law) was designed to dispose of the proceedings in the UK (and related proceedings in Canada) and also set out a framework to minimise disputes in the future.

Fast-forward to August this year, when VS discovered that TP was selling, in the US, a range of athleisure womenswear externally branded in prominent letters with the word PINK (VS product on the left, TP product on the right):

VS issued proceedings for trade mark infringement in the Southern District of Ohio (the “Ohio Proceedings”).  Both parties brought Part 8 claims in the English court seeking determination of the key clauses in the SA.  In addition, TP sought an anti-suit injunction.

The law

There was no dispute on the applicable law when construing the SA.  Quoting Lord Hodge in JSC in Wood v Capita Insurance [2017] AC 1173, the judge summarised the relevant criteria as follows:

·        Interpretation is a unitary exercise;

·        Where there are rival meanings, the court gives weight to these by considering which construction is more consistent with business common sense;

·        The court must be alive to the possibility that, ultimately, a party may have struck a bad bargain and any later construction may be coloured by hindsight.  It must not, however, lose sight of the fact that drafting can be imprecise and ultimately reflects a negotiated compromise;

·        Context is a tool (but only a tool) to help decide the objective meaning of the language the parties have chosen.  In some cases context is unnecessary, as the language is clear and precise.  In other cases the factual matrix is crucial; for example where the parties are unrepresented or, even if both parties are professionally represented, where reasons such as hard-fought negotiations or lack of time result in unclear wording.  Such was the case here.

When considering the factual matrix, Merpel wondered if taking both blue and red pills would help her understand a trade mark dispute about PINK…

Background (Part II)

Both parties relied heavily on Birss J’s original judgment in outlining the factual matrix.  It was noted that, at the time the SA was entered into, there were no infringement proceedings in the US (but there was a US trade mark opposition against a TP application).  There was also no evidence of any US trade by TP, its affiliates or licensees under the mark PINK.

What did the agreement say?

The key clause of the SA was clause 5.  This contained mutual obligations on both parties not to assert their marks against each other, with certain specified exceptions.  For TP, these exceptions included if VS used PINK alongside other marks belonging to TP, or if any of the PINK marks were used on men’s and women’s formal shirts (where TP had a particularly strong presence).

For VS, these exceptions included if TP used PINK alongside VS’s marks, to sell women’s lingerie, or if TP used PINK “in connection with a brand or a range of products associated with a brand or business other than the TP Business, including but not limited to the other brands owned or controlled by any of TP's Affiliates”.  “TP Business” was defined as “the business from time to time which is conducted under the brand name THOMAS PINK”.

It was this last clause (clause 5.5.2) which was pivotal.  TP argued that the protection given by 5.5.2 was only lost if a product or business is connected with a brand or business other than the TP Business.  In other words, any company “connected” to TP could sell anything under the PINK mark (save for women’s lingerie).  Those products which were the subject of the Ohio Proceedings were produced under licence from TP and so were from a business “connected” with TP.

VS’s argument was that the reference to “business” is a reference to branding; the SA settled a dispute about branding in the UK and branding was central to the agreement.  TP Business is defined not by who carries on the business, but what brand name the business is carried out under, being THOMAS PINK.  “Associated” in the sub-clause was used in a trade mark sense.

Judgment

In light of the factual matrix, the judge preferred the construction advanced by VS.  Firstly, the tenor of the SA was largely to represent the status quo; the litigation being settled was in Europe and there was no evidence to suggest this would impact the US market relating to the use of PINK.  Secondly, PINK was widely used in the US (and not by TP) at the time of the SA. It appeared to make no business sense for VS to permit TP, its Affiliates and its Licensees to use its mark PINK in the US.  TP suggested VS had just made a bad deal; but given its importance to VS, it was not reasonable to expect them to overlook this.

The definition of “business” in clause 5.5.2 was held to refer to trade mark use.  In the context of a dispute about trade marks, the natural interpretation of "associated with a brand or business other than the business... conducted under the brand name THOMAS PINK" means associated in a trade mark sense as VS had argued.  TP’s interpretation was inconsistent with the clause and SA in general (being part of the LVMH group, TP was also “connected” with brands such as Christian Dior and Louis Vuitton; the judge opined it was unclear whether TP’s construction meant they, too, could use PINK).

Comment

As is to be expected, the main takeaway is that clear, unambiguous drafting wins the day, given that terms will aways be construed objectively.  If a party expects something beyond the status quo in a settlement agreement, spell it out.  Similarly if a clause goes beyond what one would expect the parties to agree in, for example, a settlement agreement to end a trade mark dispute, make this express.

When construing a settlement agreement after the event (which can be many years after the event – see, for example, Merck v Merck posts here and here), remember that the factual matrix is important but is only ever a tool.  The court will always start and end with the words on the page; hindsight is a wonderful thing, but has its limits.  Also consider relief carefully; courts are reluctant to re-write even single sub-clauses of long agreements, and will generally decline invitations to give broad relief.  Here the scope of relief is still up for grabs (to be ordered if not agreed), but the judge made clear his preference is to tie any such relief solely to the alleged infringements in the Ohio Proceedings.

Finally (if not too obvious to mention), if a confidential settlement agreement ends up being litigated, it’s likely any secrets within it (Victoria’s or otherwise) won’t be secret for much longer.

 

 Image credit: Copilot

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