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Katfriend and private copying guru Javier Ramirez |
As reported by
the IPKat, last week Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalón issued his Opinion in Case C-463/12 Copydan
Båndkopi v Nokia, a reference for a preliminary ruling from
the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern Denmark) regarding - among other
things - the private copying exception within Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc
Directive, in particular private copying levies.
Prior to the AG Opinion, Katfriend Javier
Ramirez had explained that
this case is important because the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) has been asked to address some issues that are critical to both the
future of copyright levies in the internal market and the development of
legitimate digital licensing models in Europe.
Javier is now
back with a very thoughtful analysis of the AG Opinion [not yet available in English: will it ever
be?]. Here's what
he writes:
“The first challenge for the AG was to
simplify the long list of
prejudicial questions dealing with multiple aspects of
copyright levies which were referred by the Danish court and re-group them to
facilitate the analysis.
He consolidated them around seven
different subjects, but before starting to deal with each of those
re-formulated questions, the AG made a clear summary of the principles
established by the jurisprudence of the CJEU in relation to the private copying
exception and the notion of fair compensation (paras 24–30):
· Member
States may adopt an exception or limitation to the reproduction right to allow
private copying, but this requires compliance with both the requirements in
Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 5(5), ie the three-step
test) (paras 24-25), as well as providing rightholders with a fair
compensation (para 26);
· Such compensation is
intended to indemnify rightholders for the harm suffered as a consequence of
the establishment of the private copying exception; precisely, the principle of
“fair balance” between right-holders and users of protected works requires that
such compensation must be calculated based on such harm (paras 26-29);
· Member
States have a wide margin of discretion to determine who has to pay the fair compensation
and how, as well as details and level of such compensation. In any case,
fair compensation must be based on the harm caused by use of the works, and
comply with the limits posed by EU law, including the three-step test and
the principle of equal treatment as per Article 20 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the parameters of the fair
compensation have to be set in a coherent manner.
A levy on phone memory cards?
Following these preliminary
observations, the first question that the AG addressed (paras 33-39) was
whether a copyright levy may be imposed, in principle, on devices such as phone
memory cards whose primary function is not to make private copies, but nonetheless
are capable of making such copies.
Having recalled the Padawan decision,
the AG concluded that, in principle, levies can be imposed also on devices like
phone memory cards provided that there is a link between the application of the
levy and use of those devices for private copying. Such use may be presumed
when reproduction devices are made available to natural persons acting for
private purposes, but not otherwise.
However, this conclusion should not be
interpreted to mean that mere suitability for reproduction is sufficient to
place a levy upon a device to compensate for any “potential harm”
it might cause, as such presumption was subsequently blended when dealing with
the next question about the conformity of Danish levy system with EU
law.
Danish levy system
Danish system imposes levies on phone
memory cards but not on built-in memories of devices such as iPods and MP3
players that are designed and primarily used for private copying.
The AG concluded that Member States may
exclude reproduction devices from payment of levies when an objective
justification exists. This justification may consist (and in my view usually
does exist) where the likely and actual use for private copying will be low and
therefore logically any harm caused will be insignificant as determined under a
statistical assessment.
Moreover the objective justification to
exclude levies on devices may also be found within the particularities of the
device itself or the practical aspects of the compensation scheme, or further
if such devices operate with or in connection with other devices which are
already subject to such compensation.
Lastly and very importantly, there
could be also an objective justification if it is difficult or impossible to
distinguish between devices used for private or professional purposes. As the AG noted under the
application of the Padawan jurisprudence, it is forbidden to impose an
indiscriminate application of levies and payment is authorised only on devices
made available to natural persons for private purposes (paras 47-49). However,
whilst those criteria may apply for devices such as PCs, they do not seem
likely to apply to devices such as MP3 players and iPods that are specifically
designed and primarily or exclusively used for private reproduction purposes.
Moreover, a generic differentiation on payment of compensation based
exclusively on whether recordable memory is built-in or removable is against
the InfoSoc Directive (paras 50–53).
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Double payment? Nice try! |
Additional levies in connection with
online services
Next, the AG dealt with the critical
and controversial issue of whether additional compensation may be sought by
means of levies in connection with legitimate online business models, where
rightholders have already received direct or indirect compensation in the form
of a licence.
By relying on Recitals 35 and 48 of the
InfoSoc Directive, plus the principle that fair balance and
adequate correlation must exist between the harm caused and the amount of
compensation, the AG concluded that this piece of EU legislation precludes the
application of additional levies to reproductions authorised by rightholders
which have already resulted in payment of a fee or another form of
compensation.
Practical difficulties which may exist
for the application of such exemption, especially if levies are paid at the
manufacturer level, cannot justify a double payment under any circumstances.
This means that natural persons who have overcompensated rightholders should
have the possibility to obtain a refund (paras 57-68) in an easy and effective
way.
Technological protection
measures and levies
The AG then dealt with the impact that
effective technological measures (TPMs) have on the compensation. He mainly
relied on VG Wort to
conclude that availability and/or application of TPMs does not preclude the
right to receive fair compensation, but may nonetheless have an impact on the
level of such compensation (paras 69-80).
In my view, there is a gap in this
assessment, because the VG Wort case
dealt only with the issue of whether the mere availability of TPMs which were
not voluntarily implemented by rightholders may prevent them from receiving
fair compensation. A different situation exists when TPMs are effectively
applied by rightholders either to prevent reproduction (and no copying means no
compensation, and attempts and actions to circumvent TPMs will be illicit and
not subject to fair compensation either) or authorise and limit the number of
copies that can be made (licensed copies mean minimal or no harm). Therefore, a
distinction should be made between the case when TPMs are effectively applied and when they are merely available but not applied by rightholders.
Illegal copies and fair compensation
Subsequently, the AG considered the
impact on the validity or otherwise of the level of compensation arising from
the making of copies from an illegal, legal, or third-party-owned source. He
referred to the recent ACI Adam judgment [on which see here and here], where the Court followed his
recommendation [that
indeed still happens, from time to time] and concluded that copying from illicit
copies cannot be subject to fair compensation.
The AG also found that a sensu
contrario interpretation is not possible either, and that private
copying from legal sources must not necessarily result in the payment of fair
compensation. Rather an additional and prior harm assessment must be
made.
The particular circumstances of the
case must be also taken into account when assessing whether fair compensation
is payable for copying from third-party owned sources, as an individual copy of
a CD cannot be assimilated to a massive copying of files contained in a
borrowed device. Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive is especially relevant
to such assessment (paras 81-96).
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Suarez's suggested defence: it was de minimis harm! |
De minimis harm
After this, the AG briefly analysed the
so-called “de minimis” rule provided in the last sentence of Recital 35
of the InfoSoc Directive, and concluded that Member States have a wide margin
of appreciation when implementing such rule in order to exclude from or subject
to fair compensation those situations where harm is minimal (paras
97-101) [this bit of the
Opinion is crucial, particularly in the context of current UK debate about
proposed private
copying exception, on which see the recently
released take of UK-based IP professors here].
My opinion is that such conclusion may
eventually (almost inevitably) result in an incoherent application of the
exception at the level of Member States, and undermine the goal of ensuring a
smooth functioning of the internal market (Recitals 7, 31 and 32 of the
Directive). Therefore, whether this goal is compromised or not should become
the threshold to limit the wide discretion of Member States. It is worth
remembering also the applicability of the principle of proportionality, which
requires that disadvantages
caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. Consequently it would
require a holistic analysis of the implications of requesting compensation
where harm from copying is minimal (eg reproductions for
time-shifting, as specifically provided in the Commission statements on Recitals 35 and 50 when the Council
Common Position on the Directive was adopted) and consider in particular the
distortions that may result for internal market from subjecting to burdensome
levy schemes situations where harm is minimal.
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Also Benny is all for balance |
At what point the levy is
imposed
Finally, AG analysed the
implications of a levy scheme which is applied at the manufacturer or
importer level when these parties in the supply chain do not sell directly to
end-users but through distributors, and consequently are not in a position to identify
if those finally acquiring phone memory cards are private or professional
users.
The AG recalled that the
principle of fair balance requires that a close link must exist between payment
of the levy and its use for private copying and that a levy scheme charged at
manufacturer/importer level which does not consider the condition of the
end-users that then purchase the devices or the use made of those devices, is
not in conformity with Article 5(2)b of the InfoSoc Directive. However, such a
levy system may potentially conform to the Directive but only if
manufacturers/importers (i) may effectively pass the levy onto natural persons
who make the private copies or (ii) can get a refund when devices are acquired
for ends manifestly different than private copying (paras 102-112), for
instance when purchased by subjects other than natural persons acting for
private purposes (para 109).
Unfortunately, given that
the decision of the referring court did not detail the circumstances under
which Danish law exonerates or secures a refund of levies, the AG did not
elaborate on the preference of an “ex-ante” exoneration system over an
“ex-post” refund system (as results from Amazon judgment, paras 35-36), and
does not refer either to the recommendation
raised by Mediator Vitorino of shifting the obligation to pay
the levies to the last point of sale, who is in direct contact with
the end-user customer and has the ability to filter between business users and
consumers efficiently and effectively to apply the Padawan jurisprudence.
In conclusion
Overall, AG Cruz Villalón thoughtfully
analysed the role and challenges of copyright law in the Information Society,
as it was recently evidenced in ACI Adam and UPC Telekabel, where the Court
followed his observations. Let’s stay tuned for the judgment of the Court after the summer break.”
Thanks so much Javier for this detailed
and very helpful note!
You almost got there a monorail cat!
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