[Guest post] Nigeria’s Copyright Collective Management Regulations: Justice for Members Only?

The IPKat has received and is pleased to host the following guest post by Katfriend Seun Lari-Williams (PhD researcher at the University of Antwerp), commenting on recent legislative changes to the Nigerian collective management system. Here is what Seun writes:

In January 2025, Nigeria introduced new Collective Management Regulations (CMR) [see also The IPKat here for earlier developments in this area]. The Regulations have been welcomed as a long-awaited upgrade to the country’s collective rights management regime, as it promises “transparency, accountability, and good governance” among Collective Management Organisations (CMOs). Nonetheless, while the Regulations indeed strengthen copyright governance, they stop short of guaranteeing that non-members enjoy equal treatment.

Non-members —creators whose works are licensed or monetized by CMOs without them being part of the organization (Section 88 (9) of Nigeria’s Copyright Act, 2022)— are economically included but procedurally excluded. They may generate royalties for a CMO, but the system offers them no guaranteed access to information, accountability, or redress (the latter of which I’ve criticized elsewhere as insufficient even for members).

This post explores that justice gap. It argues that while the CMR strengthens protections for members, it leaves non-members structurally invisible. In doing so, it risks undermining the fairness of Nigeria’s copyright system.

Apparent Inclusion, Practical Exclusion

The CMR explicitly acknowledges the reality that CMOs may collect royalties on behalf of non-members. Regulation 21 provides for a “holding account” where such royalties—collected when the rightful owner is unknown, unreachable, or otherwise unregistered— must be kept for at least seven years.

At first glance, this structure may resemble Extended Collective Licensing (ECL) models familiar in parts of Europe and allowed under Article 12 of Directive 2019/790 (which guarantees, in Article 12(3)(b), equal treatment of all rightholders). ECL frameworks are built to enable broad, efficient licensing while still respecting non-member rights. But what distinguishes ECL regimes in the EU from Nigeria’s version is the presence —or absence— of procedural guarantees. In Nigeria’s system, the obligations stop at the point of collection. There is:

• No duty to proactively identify or notify non-members (beyond updating opt-out members – e.g., see Diligent Search provision of Orphan Works Directive);
• No public-facing list or registry of unclaimed royalties;
• No standard process for nonmembers to verify entitlements, or contest ownership, or challenge licensing.

That’s Not All: No Right to Complain…

On top of the foregoing, the dispute resolution mechanism introduced in the CMR (Regulation 26), though a welcome development, is not available to non-members. It is expressly limited to members, licensees, and affiliated CMOs:

26.—(1) A CMO shall, upon demand, make available to its members and any CMO … its procedures for dealing with complaints, including those relating to authorisation to manage rights, termination or withdrawal of rights, membership terms, payment of royalties... [Emphasis of the author]

This exclusion undermines a basic principle of dispute system design in public-facing systems: that all affected stakeholders should have a channel for redress (see here). When your work is used, licensed, and monetized, but you have no say and no standing, you are functionally disenfranchised. Although non-members can pursue legal recourse in court, this is often more costly and time-consuming.

Putting it all together, one can only conclude that there exists a structural design failure because we have a system that (1) assumes the legitimacy of using non-members’ works; (2) grants CMOs authority to collect royalties for outsiders (under the Copyright Act, 2022, Section 88 (9)); (3) yet offers no standing, transparency, or accountability for those same outsiders.

As such, an affected creator must somehow discover that their work was licensed, locate the correct CMO, request payment (without knowing what is owed), and navigate a complaint system that does not recognize them as a stakeholder.

This inherent unfairness takes on even greater significance in the Nigerian music industry, where the Musical Copyright Society Nigeria (MCSN) Ltd/Gte stands as the sole approved entity empowered to collect royalties for musical works and sound recordings. The procedural exclusion of these non-member creators from basic rights within this dominant CMO raises important questions when considering the broader context of the Nigerian Constitution. While the right to freedom of association is typically understood as the right to form and join groups, its underlying principles of fairness and equitable treatment become particularly relevant when a single organization wields such significant influence over creators' livelihoods.

International Standards Offer a Better Path

Frameworks exist that offer models that are more inclusive. An example is Article 3 of the EU Orphan Works Directive. To determine if a work is an orphan work, Article 3 mandates that specific organizations must conduct a good-faith "diligent search" before using it, consulting appropriate sources defined by each Member State (including a minimum set in the Annex) based on the work's category and usual place of publication or production. If there's a reason to believe that rights holder information is in other countries, those sources must also be checked. Organizations must keep records of these searches and report the results, usage, status changes, and their contact information to national authorities, which then forward it to a central, public online database managed by the EUIPO.

Using examples from various jurisdictions, the WIPO Good Practice Toolkit for CMOs explains that “CMOs should provide a clear and effective internal dispute resolution procedures, for disputes between a Member/Rights holder and a CMO or between Members and Rights Holders, in order to facilitate to settle the dispute on a voluntary agreement. [Emphasis of the author]”. Readers are also invited to check its provisions on information for the general public.

Conclusion

Admittedly, Nigeria's new CMR represents a step forward in clarifying the operational framework for CMOs and strengthening protections for their members. However, they inadvertently create a "justice gap" by structurally excluding non-member rightholders. Despite their economic contribution through the use of their works, non-members lack guaranteed access to information, accountability, and effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Nigeria should consider further reforms that enhance transparency and align with international best practices for inclusivity. This includes introducing a publicly searchable database of unallocated royalties and establishing clear duties to notify or publish information about unclaimed entitlements, drawing from models like the EU Orphan Works Directive. Furthermore, Nigeria should translate WIPO's guidelines into enforceable rules, requiring annual reporting on how CMOs manage non-member claims and complaints. By implementing these reforms, Nigeria can ensure a fairer and more equitable copyright system that protects the rights of all creators, regardless of their membership status.