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What to do on a rainy Sunday? Put your new nail polish on ... |
Earlier this week the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its decision in Case C-355/12 Nintendo v PC Box [here],
in which it held that - in certain circumstances - it may be lawful to
circumvent a protection system.
However, what this Kat
(and some of the readers she engaged in email correspondence with) found most
interesting about this judgment was not really the interpretation of Article 6
of Directive
2001/29/EC (the 'InfoSoc
Directive') that the Court provided therein, but rather its understanding of what
protection is available for videogames, as well as the relationship between this
directive and Directive
2009/24/EC (the 'Software
Directive').
Starting with videogames,
the Court made clear that these are not just software:
"[V]ideogames ...
constitute complex matter comprising not only a computer program but also
graphic and sound elements, which, although encrypted in computer language,
have a unique creative value which cannot be reduced to that encryption. In so
far as the parts of a videogame ... are part of its originality, they are
protected, together with the entire work, by copyright in the context of the
system established by Directive 2001/29."
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Play your favourite videogame (not just software, of course) ... |
This
conclusion is not surprising, at least in Italy, ie where this reference
originated.
As
Advocate General Sharpston noted in her Opinion, the
Tribunale di Milano had already found that, in line with the case-law of the
Italian courts, videogames such as those in issue could not be regarded simply
as computer programs. Being complex multimedia works expressing conceptually
autonomous narrative and graphic creations, such games must be regarded as
intellectual works protected by copyright.
However,
this conclusion is particularly relevant because it appears to narrow down the
scope of applicability of the Software Directive, and - most importantly -
confirms the 'lex specialis' nature of this directive.
As the AG
stated in her Opinion (in terms which - by the way - are more explicit than those employed by
the CJEU in its decision), the special nature of the Software Directive means
that its provisions take precedence over those of Directive 2001/29/EC, but
only where the protected material falls entirely within the scope of the
former.
The
implications of this statement seem particularly relevant for the videogame
industry, in that they appear to limit the applicability of the (disruptive)
conclusions that the CJEU reached in its 2012 decision in
Case C-128/11 UsedSoft [on which see Katposts here and
1709 Blog posts here] to subject-matter that falls exclusively within the scope of the Software Directive.
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... Or contemplate exhaustion, as Shammai loves to do? |
In particular, it would seem that interpretation of
exhaustion of the right of distribution pursuant to Article 4(2) of the
Software Directive would not extend to digital subject-matter other than
"pure" software.
This might imply the exclusion under EU law of the
possibility of having a market for second-hand videogames which have
"just" been licensed (and not sold) to the user.
IPKat
readers will probably remember the Katpoll on UsedSoft [background
information here], in which the question was whether the CJEU is likely to
extend that ruling to works other than software. At that time, a broad majority of
voters (57%) said that, yes, when
given the opportunity to address this issue, the CJEU would say that exhaustion
of the right of distribution as per Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive encompasses both
tangible and intangible copies.
However, following this week's
ruling in Nintendo that stressed once again the special nature of the Software
Directive, it looks like this conclusion may be more difficult to achieve in a
future case involving the interpretation of this provision of the InfoSoc
Directive ... But what do readers think?
I am a little surprised that here and in your earlier report you say that the CJEU held that technological measures may be circumvented legally in certain circumstances.
ReplyDeleteWhile this is true it is not an accurate reflection of what the court found.
The court held that that the prohibition only extends to technical measures which pursue the objective of preventing or eliminating acts not authorised by the rightholder (para 31 of the judgment).
Thus there is subtle and important difference rather than circumvention being legal in exceptional circumstances it is the other way around. Circumvention is only illegal in the particular circumstance where the measure in question pursues the objective of protecting the exclusive rights granted under copyright.
In all other circumstances they may be circumvented legally.
Like many things, how a question is phrased reveals quite a bit about how the subject is viewed by the person making the post.
ReplyDelete"Truth" then, often is a silly-putty term, and like other terms that carry subjective connotations perhaps should not be used by either side in a legal debate. Everyone wants to be 'truthful,' and if your view is 'truthful,' then the other side must not be truthful if they do not agree with you (ignoring of course the shades of truth that the real world brings and likewise ignoring the maxim that the best lies have a kernel of truth).
>> "In particular, it would seem that interpretation of exhaustion of the right of distribution pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Software Directive would not extend to digital subject-matter other than "pure" software."
ReplyDeleteNope. Both the Computer Program Directive and the Copyright Directive contain the same Article 4 exhaustion of distribution rights clause that says works are subject to the first-sale doctrine.
See here:
Computer Program Directive:
"Article 4
Restricted acts
2. The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof."
Copyright Directive:
"Article 4
Distribution right
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the
original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent."
So, all software in the EU, whether it is productive or video game software, features the same resale rights. Video games being evaluated by the Copyright Directive doesn't change a thing regarding the right to resell since the Copyright Directive's right to resell is the same as the Computer Program Directive's right to resell.