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All The Money in the World by Ridley Scott |
Last week, film director Ridley Scott announced that
the performance of actor Kevin Spacey will be removed
from his forthcoming film 'All the Money in the World'. Spacey is to be
replaced by actor Christopher Plummer, shortly before the release
of the film on December 22, 2017. The entire film has already been shot, edited
and made ready for distribution with Spacey portraying J. Paul Getty. In fact, Spacey had already
appeared in the official trailer made public a few
weeks ago. This last-minute editing project raises at least two questions: how will this be done,
and how legal is this strategy in light of Spacey's rights as a performer?
How?
According to special effect specialist Johnathan Fawkner, a number of
techniques can be used to edit Spacey out of 'All the
Money in the World'. First, the production company could 'cut around'
Spacey's character 'to minimize his screen time' and re-edit the scenes without
him. Spacey's shots could also be replaced by scenes featuring Plummer in their
stead, as it is often done in the context of stunt work. However, some scenes
are set in the desert with a cast of thousands, which may prove difficult to
re-shoot given the very tight timeline. For such scenes, the production company
may have to digitally remove Spacey out of the shots and replace the image of
his body with that of Plummer. To make this swap of performances appear
smoother to the eye, the production company may look to only remove Spacey's
head and have Plummer's face match his physical performance. Again, this
technique is fairly routine and is often used to edit stunt scenes.
How legal?
The idea of placing Plummer's head on Spacey's body in the film raises
interesting questions in relation to Spacey's performers’ rights. Unlike stunt
work, it is unlikely that the editing was foreseen and agreed on contractually
by the actor (if Kat readers know better, do say!). Could Spacey object to it?
Under US law, it seems extremely unlikely for the simple reason that the
federal intellectual property framework does not provide for performers’ rights. Unless Spacey manages to
expand the scope of an appropriate state law cause of action to fit such a
claim, which in this Kat’s view would
set a new precedent, the shunned actor has no leg to stand on under US
law. We only have to think 'Garcia v Google' in support of this
conclusion (see here and here).
What about France? We know since the Huston case (1991), French courts have allowed
foreign claimants, who have failed in asserting a claim in the US to seek relief
on the basis of moral rights elsewhere, to
be heard in France. This particular case had been brought by the heirs of
director John Huston, who objected
to the colourisation of his film 'Asphalt Jungle'. In this decision,
the French Supreme Court declared:
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Spacey's Getty's new face (left: K Spacey ; right: C Plummer) |
"According
to [French national laws], the integrity of a literary or art work cannot be [adversely]
affected in France, regardless of the State in whose territory the said work
was made public for the first time. The person who is its author, by its
creation alone, enjoys the moral right stipulated in his favour by [the French
Act of 1957]; these are laws of mandatory application." [see here for an English translation of a
subsequent court of appeal case].
Could or should the same reasoning apply to performers' moral rights,
which also exist under the French Intellectual
Property Code (IPC)? If Spacey were to complain that Plummer's head was being
transplanted onto his body digitally, could French national law be applied for
the claim to be heard in a French court?
"A performer
shall have the right to respect for his name, his capacity and his performance.
This inalienable and imprescriptible right shall attach to his person. It may
be transmitted to his heirs in order to protect his performance and his memory
after his death."
The right of integrity was successfully used by singer Henri Salvador to
prohibit the release of a compilation
of old records. In this dispute, the compilation at stake had not remastered
the sound recordings that it re-edited; the singer alleged that the recordings of his past
performances had done damage to his
reputation due to their poor quality (Court of Appeal of Paris, 14 November
2007, CCE 2008, No 18 Caron). This result shows how generous moral right
protection for performers can be in France.
Circling back to Scott's editing of Spacey's performance: could this
amount to treatment detrimental to either the performance or the performer's
reputation? It is possible. Although editing an actor’s performances is usual, as explained by Fawkner, it is rarely used
to remove a star actor from the film. Such a result could be found even more troubling or detrimental to
Spacey’s work or reputation if his body remains intact but his head given
another face. In other words, Spacey may
have a case here.
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Our spacey Kat does not like her new face |
Could this also be brought before
a court France by virtue of the Huston jurisprudence?
Again, it is possible. French jurisprudence has drawn parallels in the past between
the way author’s rights and performer’s rights are interpreted in order to
bring about cohesion to intellectual property law.
What about the UK?
UK law too confers performers with a right to object to derogatory
treatments made to their performance (1988 CDPA, s. 205F). The scope of this
right is similar to the French doctrine, as it sanctions any derogatory
treatment to the performance that would be prejudicial to the performer's
reputation. This may include putting another's face on one's body. However, it
is unclear how far this right of integrity could be stretched in the context of
performances; a restrictive approach has been followed in the context of
authorial works (see Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR
168, Confetti Records v
Warner Music UK Ltd [2003]
EWHC 1274 (Ch), Harrison v Harrison [2010] FSR 25, compare with Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History Museum (1995) 39
IPR 501).
It is not at all certain that UK courts would interpret performers’
moral rights as applying to any foreign artist bringing a claim in the UK, as the Huston jurisprudence
does in France. This Kat is inclined to conclude that UK courts are unlikely to
follow the French result, because the moral right doctrine is a more recent
development of UK intellectual property, and was introduced only in 2006 for performers (Performance (Moral Rights etc.) Regulations
2006, SI 2006/18).
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One
of the few scenes featuring Spacey in the film
by R. Scott which may be difficult to re-shoot |
What about the integrity of Scott's work?
One question nobody needs to ask is 'why' the
last-minute decision to remove Spacey's performance from the film, given the
recent allegations of sexual abuse reported in the press against Spacey. Still,
one may wonder: is this ultimately about money or morality? 'A bit of both',
said film critique Karen
Krizanovitch to BBC Radio 4, as
the director and the production company wish to both shield themselves from the
negative publicity currently associated with Spacey as well as protect the market value of the film at the box office.
Indeed, the film has already been pulled from festivals and it risks being
boycotted by viewers, according to Krizanovitch.
Considering this, what if removing Spacey's
performance is viewed a creative
decision to protect the integrity of Scott's work? Could Scott's moral right (at
least in France or the UK) trump Spacey's claim of moral rights? Could the
director invoke his own moral right to protect the integrity of his film (in
France) or the integrity of his reputation as a
film-maker (in
the UK) to block a moral rights claim by Spacey ?
The French IPC is clear; authors' rights trump performers'
rights in cases of direct contradiction such as this. Article L 211-1 reads:
'Neighboring rights shall not prejudice authors’ rights. Consequently, no
provision in this Title shall be interpreted in such a way as to limit the
exercise of copyright by its owners'.
Of course, Scott would still have to make the case
that the allegations made against Spacey after the production of the film makes
his continuing performance detrimental to the work. A stretch?
Concluding remarks
Going forward, it will be interesting to see whether the precedent set
by Scott with this film will have an impact on the contractual agreements
between performers and production companies. Are we to see new contractual
practices, whereby performers will agree by contract that their performance may
be removed in cases of a public scandal that occurs between the completion of production
of the film and its subsequent release? Perhaps. Still, such agreements will
only be effective in those countries
where no performers' moral right in favour of a performer exists and/or where such moral rights can be waived by the artist
who enjoys them.
NB: This
post is not to be read as undermining the very serious allegations raised
against Kevin Spacey. It merely aims to explore the implications of
editing decisions made in reaction to such allegations from the perspective of
intellectual property law.
“NB: This post is not to be read as undermining the very serious allegations raised against Kevin Spacey. It merely aims to explore the implications of editing decisions made in reaction to such allegations from the perspective of intellectual property law.”
ReplyDeleteSorry, but since when discussing someone’s rights equals endorsing that person ethically?! I find this disclaimer not only useless but also dangerous: self-censorship or restraint when neither is necessary.
@Perplexed, I hear your point but discussions on social media (and also sometimes in the news) have confused the two on more than one occasions. I felt it was worth stressing this to avoid going into this debate. So I do wish it is/was useless to insert that comment.
ReplyDeleteI think it is implicit in the whole process of how films are made that the director has the absolute right to decide what performance(s) goes into the finished film. Take, for example, the shooting of a single scene: the director shouts action and the actors act out the scene: the director shouts cut. The director then asks an actor to go again but altering his delivery or facial movements or some other feature of his performance. This could perhaps be repeated several times with a pernickety director. Which of these takes (if any) goes into the final edit is the decision of the director (perhaps on the advice of his editor). That is the performance which might possibly attract moral rights; the others are destined for the cutting room floor (metaphorically speaking, since most films are shoot digitally these days). I would argue that this author's right of the director exists right up to the time of the film's release and even beyond in some cases. It is well known that studio executives also have a say in how the final work will look, often against the director's wishes, and sometimes resulting in the director demanding his name is removed from the credits (google Alan Smithee). This intervention sometimes results in the subsequent release of a director's cut version of the film. All of this serves to strengthen the position of the director in the editorial process, and minimise the actor's performance rights, and by extension. his/her moral rights.
ReplyDeleteAs for the possibility of a French court hearing a claim, surely this would have the effect of ensuring that the film would not be released in France.
The posting fails to mention one prevalent form of altering a film actor's performance: that of dubbing his/her words into a foreign language. This could result in some quite atrocious detrimental treatment of the original performance. Has anyone ever sued over that, I wonder.
And finally I believe that Article 19 of the WIPO Treaty on Performances and Phonograms effctively prevents any national court in a signatory country such as France from finding for a performer in circumstances such as described in Mathilde's posting: "Article 19 [Performers’ Rights in Films] Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, once a performer has consented to the incorporation of his performance in a visual or audio–visual fixation, Article 7 [Protection for Performers] shall have no further application."
Very interesting points. I am not all that sure that Article 19 include moral rights. Article 7 only outlines economic right. I read Article 19 as implying consent for the record of the performance and its release once the performance is incorporated in the film.
ReplyDeleteThe more recent Beijing Treaty provides for moral rights and does specify that even if economic rights are transferred, moral rights are still applicable. (Article 5 [Moral Rights] (1) Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live performances or performances fixed in audiovisual fixations, have the right: ...(ii) to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation, taking due account of the nature of audiovisual fixations).
The same does mention that editing (and dubbing) which is part of the normal course of the making process of a film will not class as 'distortion' (footnote 5, page 6), which I think is a welcome clarification and supports your argument as well.
In relation to dubbing, obviously we have the Garcia case in US (though it is was not a case of mere translation into a foreign language) which did not go very for from the actress's point of view. In France we did have a very early case, where dubbing had been added to a actor's performance as an after thought after the shooting of the film. The performer sued at a time when performers' had not yet been introduced in France (end 1930s) and won in the first instance (no appeal lodged after that). I think the dubbing was in French language, so it was not a case of foreign language here either. The tribunal found that authors' and performers' should receive the same level of protection, especially with regards to moral rights. Of course, one case does not carry a lot of a weight in a jurisdiction not based on precedent but I thought the facts made it worth raising. (Case in question: Trib Seine, 23 avril 1937, Rigault dit Marnay c. Chaperot et Copelier : Le Droit d’Auteur, No 11 p 129, 130).
I understand that editing is routine, and even when it involves putting one's face on another's body, but here the motivation of the director are quite different, which is why I wonder whether a case would be at all possible. Hence the posting.
Thanks, Mathilde.
ReplyDeleteI forgot to check the Beijing Treaty, mainly because it isn't in force yet, but your point is well made.
Thanks Mathilde, it is an interesting post. What do you think of an argument that after recent allegations Kevin Spacey now lacks sufficient reputation to succeed in the UK in an action to object to the right of derogatory treatment? This type of approach seemed to be floated as a possibility at the end of the Confetti Records judgment at paras 159 and 160.
ReplyDeleteAdrian - Oh that's a good question and twist on the argument! So you think that the allegations would damage the reputation of the performer to the extent that he would have no reputation to protect (with moral rights) in the first place? Do I understand your comment correctly?
ReplyDeleteI dont know if you could say Spacey has lost all reputation quite just yet. If the trend carries on like this, and allegations keep coming up, for sure Spacey's reputation will soon only become all about the sexual abuse, very little will remain of this acting reputation or 'Hollywood sweetheart' status. The argument that he has no reputation to defend... might be tenable then. Do you think we are there yet? In any case, I am not sure we should link the moral right doctrine to 'tabloid'/public opinion reputation that closely. I think we risk mixing IP law with questions that is outside the subject-matter it applies to. Then, what's the solution? Adopting a definition of 'reputation' specific to IP? Is that desirable? I am not sure. We need a case on this!