UPCKat: Proportionality defence against life sciences injunctions takes shape at the UPC

The duration of cat naps are all proportionate, 
whether injunctions are may be a different
story  



If a patent is valid and infringed, the UPC may grant an injunction
(Art. 63 UPCA). Long before the UPC opened its doors, there was speculation as to how the court would exercise what appears to be discretion – would injunctions be imposed automatically, or would patentees have to justify them? Different legal systems have arrived at varying approaches to injunctions. The UPCKat (in the form of Niels Hölder and Andreas Hänsele of Carpmaels) is here to examine how the UPC’s approach is starting to take shape: the UPC normally does grant an injunction, unless there are special reasons why it shouldn’t, such as protecting the interests of patients that depend on the contested product.

Over to Niels and Andreas:

"From Meril v Edwards to Hologic v Siemens

In Meril v Edwards, the UPC Court of Appeal (Panel 1) made it clear that the “need for a high level of protection for intellectual-property rights means that, in principle, the proprietor may not be deprived of (…) effective enforcement of his exclusive rights, and that (…) where (…) the Court finds that an intellectual property right has been infringed (…) it shall issue an order prohibiting the … infringement unless there are special reasons for not doing so” (decision of 25 November 2025, para. 189 and headnote 14).

The UPC’s position is thus that an injunction generally follows if a valid patent is infringed. But what amounts to a “special reason” not to grant an injunction? According to Art. 3 of the EU Enforcement Directive (48/2004), remedies for enforcing IP rights must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.

When assessing the proportionality of an injunction, the UPC takes the interests of third parties into account, notably those of patients. They can be severely affected by an injunction banning their medication from the market if they receive a different – possibly inferior – treatment as a result, or no treatment at all. In these scenarios,

“interests of the patients justify an exception to the right to injunctive relief … if it is established that the infringing embodiment is the sole available treatment method or represents an improvement upon the available treatment methods, resulting in a notable enhancement of patient care.” (Meril v Edwards, para. 191 and headnote 16, emphasis added)

The first criterion, “sole available treatment”, seems quite clear and straightforward to apply. For example, the Court of Appeal carved out certain sizes of Meril’s heart valve prostheses which were needed for some patients but not offered by Edwards. The court ordered that the injunction does “not extend to XL devices that have been the subject of a notification of an intention to use by a physician confirming that the XL device is the only available treatment option for a particular patient”, thereby also providing for a mechanism ensuring in practice that the exception is limited to cases where it is justified.

The second criterion, which applies if alternative treatment options are in principle available, is much vaguer than the first and seems to involve a sizeable grey area. When does a medicinal product improve on the available therapies such that patient care is notably enhanced? What is needed to meet this criterion remains undefined at this stage.

Given that the principle of proportionality by its very nature involves a balancing of interests, the court will need to weigh the patients’ interests against those of the patentee. The more pressing the patients’ need for the contested therapy – in terms of efficacy, avoidance of side effects, availability of the therapy, and the seriousness of the conditions to be treated – the more likely the court will consider an exception. The result will depend on an assessment of the overall picture, taking into account all relevant details. Whether a product qualifies as a therapeutically adequate equivalent alternative is, of course, highly fact dependent. The defendant must establish and prove in which ways and why its product notably enhances patient care.

In Hologic v Siemens (LD Düsseldorf, decision of 10 June 2026), Siemens failed to meet this standard when asserting that no other currently available breast tomosynthesis system provided comparable image precision. The LD rejected this argument as too vague, adding that even if Siemens’ system “may provide advantages” such as an examination which is faster, safer, more comfortable, less painful and more convenient and offers the same image quality using less radiation (!), these “alleged facts do not establish an exception to the general rule of enforcement of a valid patent” because “[t]he alleged improvement does not create a situation comparable to … Meril v. Edwards” (Hologic v Siemens, para. 309).

Reading this assessment, one gets the impression that the LD applies the second criterion quite strictly, if at all. By arguing that all these (alleged) advantages – which on their face do not seem to be insignificant at all – do not create a situation “comparable to Meril v Edwards”, the LD implicitly denies the second criterion (notable enhancement) a scope of application of its own, given that the Court of Appeal considered Meril’s XL devices as the “sole treatment option” for some patients rather than (just) an improvement resulting in notably enhanced patient care. If Meril v Edwards is the benchmark, the hurdle for showing a notable enhancement of patient care will be high.

In one aspect, however, the UPC’s approach to proportionality seems to be surprisingly generous: a defendant relying on the proportionality defence is not strictly required to make all reasonable efforts to obtain a licence first. Indeed, Meril’s earlier action for a compulsory licence had been rejected by the German Federal Patents Court inter alia for lack of sufficient efforts to obtain a licence. Under German law, this is a prerequisite for a compulsory licence, in addition to the public interest requirement (which is comparable to the UPC Court of Appeal’s proportionality test set out above) –  see German Federal Court of Justice decisions Interferon-gamma, Raltegravir and Alirocumab. In fact, the German court had even found Meril to be an “unwilling licensee”.

The LD Munich shared this assessment, but still carved out Meril’s XL devices, noting that patients cannot influence a defendant’s behaviour “and still might face serious consequences if access to the attacked embodiment was denied” (Edwards v Meril, decision of 15 November 2024, headnote 8). The Court of Appeal seems to have endorsed the LD’s – significant! – finding that even an unwilling licensee can rely on a proportionality defence based on third parties’ interests.

In contrast, the Regional Court Düsseldorf, in a case decided in 2022 (4 c O 18/21), did not carve out the use of an HCV drug for patients that suffered from severely decompensated liver cirrhosis and undisputedly depended on the contested product, in the absence of any alternative treatment. The court rejected the proportionality defence because it had not been convinced “that the defendant made a genuine effort to obtain a licence on reasonable terms in line with commercial practice”.

Practice points and outlook

Patentees will find comfort in the UPC’s position that an injunction is the general rule where a patent is valid and infringed. However, patentees should assess competing products on the market to determine whether a potentially infringing product might arguably provide a “notable enhancement of patient care”. Where that is the case – or indeed if patients have no alternative to the infringing product – a licence offer may be considered.

For potential infringers, a (dis)proportionality defence at the UPC should be considered, so that patients can continue to receive treatments even if these would otherwise infringe. Specific embodiments can be exempted or ‘carved out’ of an injunction order, so it is worthwhile assessing whether certain patient groups have a special interest in a particular infringing embodiment.

It remains to be seen how the UPC will deal with the question of compensation in lieu of an injunction, where some or all of the infringing acts are exempted from an injunction. Since the proportionality defence does not apply to claims for damages, the patentee can claim damages for infringing products even if the court refused to grant an injunction for those products. To this end, the court can, when determining provisional damages according to Rule 119 RoP, take the estimated scope of future infringing use into account. In doing so, the court may, in appropriate though exceptional cases, also fix a reasonable compensation by applying Art. 68.4 UPCA mutatis mutandis."

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