Yesterday Jeremy reported on the latest addition to the (abundant) case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on
Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. This was Case C‑572/13, Hewlett-Packard Belgium SPRL v Reprobel
SCRL, Epson Europe BV intervening [earlier Katposts here], a
reference for a preliminary ruling from Belgium seeking clarification on a
number of issues, including whether:
(1) The term ‘fair compensation’
contained in Articles 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive must be
interpreted differently depending on whether the reproduction is carried out by
any user or by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither
directly nor indirectly commercial;
(2) Member States
can allocate half of the fair compensation due to rightholders to the
publishers of works created by authors, the publishers being under no
obligation whatsoever to ensure that the authors benefit, even indirectly, from
some of the compensation of which they have been deprived;
(3) Articles 5(2)(a)
and 5(2)(b) must be interpreted as authorising the Member States to introduce
an undifferentiated system for recovering the fair compensation due to
rightholders in the form of a lump-sum and an amount for each copy made, which,
implicitly but indisputably, covers in part the copying of sheet music and
counterfeit reproductions.
(4) Articles
5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) preclude national legislation which combines, in order to
finance the fair compensation granted to rightholders, two forms of
remuneration, namely, first, lump-sum remuneration paid prior to the
reproduction operation by the manufacturer, importer or intra-Community
acquirer of devices enabling protected works to be copied, at the time when
such devices are put into circulation on national territory, the amount of
which is calculated solely by reference to the speed at which such devices are
capable of producing copies, and, second, proportional remuneration, recovered
after the reproduction operation, determined solely by means of a unit price
multiplied by the number of copies produced, which also varies depending on
whether or not the person liable for payment has cooperated in the recovery of
that payment, which, in principle, is to be made by natural or legal persons
who make copies of works.
Background
This reference
originated in the context of litigation between Hewlett-Packard (HP) and
collective management rights organisation Reprobel.
In 2004 the latter
informed HP that the sale of multifunction devices entailed payment of a levy of
EUR 49.20 per printer, and - from what this Kat understands - this should apply
retrospectively.
In 2010 HP summoned
Reprobel before the Court of First Instance of Brussels, seeking a declaration
that no remuneration was owed for the printers which it had offered for
sale, or, in the alternative, that the remuneration which it had paid
corresponded to the fair compensation owed pursuant to the Belgian legislation,
interpreted in the light of the InfoSoc Directive.
Following a number of
claims, counterclaims, and issues of (lack of) compatibility of Belgian law
with EU law, the Court of Appeal of Brussels decided to stay the proceedings
and seek guidance from the CJEU regarding the issues above.
The Court's response
(1) A distinction must
be made depending on the user of the multifunction device, because the amount of
fair compensation depends on actual harm
The Court answered the
first question in the affirmative.
It distinguished
between Article 5(2)(a) and Article 5(2)(b) situations, although it
acknowledged that there are cases in which these overlap,
eg reproductions made by natural persons for private use and for ends that
are neither directly nor indirectly commercial.
Then the Court
recalled that the notion of 'fair compensation' is an autonomous concept of EU
law, and the relevant amount must be calculated on the basis of the criterion of the harm caused
to authors of protected works. It is clear(er) that this is to be intended as actual, rather than potential harm [this conclusion also appears supported further by what is stated at
paras 48 and 49, as well as 70]. At para 35 the Court noted how:
"It is apparent from recitals 35 and 38 in
the preamble to [the InfoSoc Directive] that the notion and level of fair
compensation are linked to the harm resulting for the author from the
reproduction of his protected work without his authorisation. From that perspective,
fair compensation must be regarded as recompense for the harm suffered by that
author".
The CJEU added that such finding is
supported by the argument based on the
requirement that Member States be consistent in the application of the
exceptions.
The Court then
considered whether reproductions made for private use and for ends that
are neither directly nor indirectly commercial by natural persons and those
made by other users and/or for other ends would cause rightholders different
degrees of harm. The CJEU concluded in the affirmative, and held it
appropriate to draw a distinction, in the context of the reprography
exception, as regards fair compensation, between the making of reproductions by
natural persons for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor
indirectly commercial and the making of reproductions by natural persons but
for a use other than private use or for ends that are directly or indirectly
commercial or the making of reproductions by other categories of users.
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Poor Mabel: Actual harm? It's (sadly) required |
(2) Publishers should
not be entitled to any fair compensation because they do not suffer any harm
As IPKat readers might
remember, this point of the Reprobel reference generated
an Opinion of the European Copyright Society [here, holding the view that only authors should
be the beneficiaries of fair compensation], and a response from IFRRO, the International Federation of
Reproduction Rights Organisation [here].
The Court noted at the outset [para 47] how publishers
are not among the reproduction rightholders
listed in Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive. It then highlighted how the
rationale of the fair compensation requirement is intended to compensate
for the harm suffered by rightholders as a result of the reproduction of their
works without their authorisation. Not only are not publishers exclusive
reproduction rightholders pursuant to Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive,
but they are not subject to any harm for the purpose of those exceptions. As
such, they cannot be the beneficiaries of any fair compensation.
(3) Sheet music
excluded from Articles 5(2)(a) and (b), and reproductions from unlawful sources
are not OK
The CJEU then
addressed the question whether EU law prevents national law (like the Belgian
one) that has an undifferentiated system for recovering fair compensation
which also covers the copying of sheet music and counterfeit reproductions made
from an unlawful source.
The Court began its
analysis by noting that sheet music is expressly excluded from the scope of
Article 5(2)(a), and must be also excluded from the scope of Article 5(2)(b).
The latter is necessary to prevent that the joint or parallel application
of the private copying exception and of the reprography exception by Member
States ends up being inconsistent.
The CJEU concluded
that Articles 5(2)(a) (b) preclude, in principle [but there may be exceptions pursuant to what
is stated sub para 56],
national legislations which introduce an undifferentiated system for recovering
fair compensation which also covers the copying of sheet music.
The Court then
addressed the issue of reproductions from unlawful sources [already discussed in relation to Article
5(2)(b) in ACI Adam, on which see Katposts here]. The Court recalled how these are
outside the scope of the private copying exception, and would also conflict
with the three-step test in Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive [if you are interested in the three-step
test, you can find a more detailed
discussion here].
According to the Court the reasoning in
ACI Adam is applicable to Article 5(2)(a) situations.
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Publishers getting fair compensation? Not OK |
(4) Ex ante lump sum remuneration that
only takes into account copying speed not OK. However combined levy system not
incompatible per se
As a final issue, the Court addressed
the compatibility with EU law of a remuneration system that
combines remuneration fixed prior to the
reproduction operation by reference to the speed at which the device in
question technically produces copies and remuneration fixed after the
reproduction operation by reference to the number of copies produced.
The CJEU answered the
question by recalling once again the rationale underlying the fair compensation
requirement, as well as levy systems. The Court noted how a distinction
should be made in principle depending on the types of reproduction at issue.
It follows
that Articles 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) preclude lump-sum remuneration paid
prior to the reproduction operation by the manufacturer, importer or
intra-Community acquirer at the time at which a device is put into circulation
on national territory, in a situation in which the amount of that remuneration
is fixed solely by reference to the speed at which that device is technically
capable of producing copies.
The Court also ruled
out the validity of a criterion that depends on whether those liable to pay
levy cooperate in the recovery of such levy.
Finally, the Court
examined the compatibility with EU law of a levy system that
combines lump-sum remuneration fixed in advance and proportional
remuneration fixed after the fact. According to the Court such system
cannot a priori be regarded as incompatible with
Article 5(2)(a) or Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive.
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Will the UK re-introduce a private copying exception? |
Conclusion
This is a that is likely to generate more than a headache in the world of collective
rights management.
This Kat wonders what implications the
requirement of an 'actual' harm might have, especially in the UK following the quashing of the private copying exception
pursuant to section 28B of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act [here].
It is worth recalling that the decision of Green J was motivated on grounds
that UK Government had failed to provide adequate evidence to justify the lack
of a fair compensation requirement/introduction of a levy system, not that lack of a fair compensation requirement would be per se inadmissible.
Following this latest
installment in the private copying world and the earlier decision in Copydan [Katposts here],
it would appear that in principle there is not much that prevents a
Member State from drafting a tight private copying exception that does not produce any actual harm, ie above de minimis pursuant to Recital 35 in the InfoSoc Directive, and - as such - does not envisage a fair compensation/levy system ... What do readers think?
Very interesting - I wonder where that leaves services like Google Music?
ReplyDeleteGoogle Music Manager is a bit of software with no other purpose than to search a user's computer for music (e.g. that has been ripped from a CD they own), then upload it to Google's servers, so that it can be listened to on any device that can access the Google Music service (limited to a specific number of authorised devices, but basically any computer/phone/tablet). It is intended to make it easy to put your music collection (that you have probably already ripped to a PC) into the cloud.
To what extent is this merely reproduction for private use? Does it cause "harm to the author"?
Would be interested in your views.
What does " nor indirectly commercial;" even mean in the context of a person obtaining something FOR ANY USE when the item obtained is only "out there" by a rights holder FOR commercial reasons?
ReplyDeleteIf the ONLY reason the item is made available at all is for commercial reasons, then ALL uses (personal, traditional Fair Use, or whatever) necessarily are indirectly commercial (from the point of view of the rights' holder).
errrrrrrmmm.....do they like complication?
ReplyDelete