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Gigi is very adaptable when it comes to where to sleep, but is this what the adaptation right is about? |
Calling all students who are revising
for their spring exams! What is the right answer to this question?
Until now most people - including a
number of leading copyright academics - would have easily opted for
'true'.
However, following a number of recent
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the even
more recent leaked text of the draft Impact Assessment (IA) of the Commission
on the modernisation of the EU copyright acquis [here and here] this
may no longer be the right answer.
First of all: what is the right of
adaptation all about?
As explained by leading UK copyright
commentary Copinger and Skone James on Copyright,
adaptation is usually understood as the transformation of a work into another
form of expression that is not tantamount to a simple reproduction, eg making
a film out of a novel, although “there is an unclear dividing line between
what amounts to a reproduction of a work and what amounts to an adaptation of a
work”.
The problem lies indeed here.
At the international level, besides the
right of reproduction within Article 9, Article 12 of the Berne Convention states
that authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorising adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works.
However, the systematic approach of the Berne Convention does not require Union
countries to do the same.
As a result, there have remained
significant differences in national laws as to whether adaptations and other
transformations are to be regarded as forms of reproductions (as is the case,
for instance, in France and The Netherlands), or whether they are subject to a
separate right (as is the case, for instance, in Italy, Germany and the UK).
As regards EU copyright, the InfoSoc Directive [which - among other things - intended to implement into the EU legal
order the WIPO Copyright Treaty, which requires compliance with Articles 1-21 Berne] does not contain any reference to the right
of adaptation, which has been instead expressly harmonised in relation to
databases [Article 5(b) of Directive 96/9/EC] and computer programs [Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2009/24/EC].
Therefore, the main question is whether
Member States have retained their competence to define the right of adaptation
in respect of literary and artistic works [these are the only works subject to Berne right of adaptation and, as
such, are the only subject-matter for which possible EU constraints might
subsist] other than databases and computer
programs, as well as its related exception(s) and limitation(s).
The part about exceptions and
limitations is particularly topical.
IPKat readers will remember the very
interesting, imaginative and fascinating Modernising Copyright Report released
in late 2013 by the Irish Review Committee [if you happen to be in London, do not miss next week's BLACA meeting starring
one of the authors of the Report, ie Prof Eoin
O'Dell].
This Report included innovative stances
on copyright reform policy [this
is something to welcome, as boldness and copyright policy have not been seen
together very often in recent times],
in particular as regards new exceptions and limitations that, while not
expressly envisaged in the exhaustive list within Article 5 of the InfoSoc
Directive, may be introduced at the level of individual Member States.
Among other things, the Report
recommended introducing an innovation exception [here] and
also a fair use exception [here].
Speaking of fair use, one of the one
of the Terms of Reference for the Review Committee was indeed to "[e]xamine
the US style ‘fair use’ doctrine to see if it would be
appropriate in an Irish/EU context."
Seeking "to
accommodate a range of apparently incompatible views", the Irish
Report proposed "a possible draft of a
tightly-drawn Irish [so
not exactly US-style] fair use exception [according
to the Report, this would be necessary to "enable context-sensitive
accommodations to be developed as the occasion arises"]", that would be aimed at complementing existing
exceptions. These should be exhausted before any claim of fair
use could be considered, but also considered as examples of fair use so as to
allow workable analogies to be developed.
According to the Report, "there is scope under EU law
for member states to adopt a fair use doctrine as a matter of national
law, and [the InfoSoc Directive] does not necessarily preclude it (not
least because, in our view, [the InfoSoc Directive] has not harmonized
the adaptation right [this is also the reason why the Report did not see
any obstacles to the adoption of an innovation exception])."
Is this true?
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How a Kat feels when the Commission agrees |
This Kat said
'Yes, but just in part' in a recent longer piece [which you can
access and download here], and the Commission
appears not to disagree [failed attempt to imitate typical British
understatement].
At page 99 of its leaked draft IA, the
Commission writes:
"Contrary to the reproduction right and the
communication to the public/making available right, there is no express rule
with respect to adaptations in the InfoSoc Directive (unlike the Software and
in the Database Directive). However, the broad manner in which the reproduction
right in Article 2 of that Directive is formulated [yet not defined] and
the CJEU's jurisprudence on the scope of the reproduction right notably in Infopaq and Eva-Marie Painer seem to cover
adaptations which give rise to a further reproduction within the meaning of
Article 2. The pending case Allposters [here; this Kat is confident in saying that this will
be one of the most important recent copyright rulings] will shed further light on the scope of Article
2."
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Here's George after a most engaging 3-hour discussion on the adaptation right under EU law |
From what the Commission said in its
draft IA, it would seem that the room left for indipendent national initiatives
- including the adoption of national fair use exceptions - is not that broad,
and probably not as broad as submitted by the Irish Review Committee.
This is because any exceptions or
limitations to the right of adaptation would have to comply not
just with the three-step test [see the ACI Adam case for a recent CJEU
application], but also be designed in a way that
would not transform them into further – and, as such, forbidden – exceptions
(in disguise) to other exclusive rights, notably the right of
reproduction.
This Kat believes that Member States
are free to legislate in relation to exceptions or limitations to
the right of adaptation, but these must be intended narrowly, ie as
limited to what can be considered as pure adaptations, not transformative uses
of a work that nonetheless also involve its simple reproduction.
For instance,
while it is arguable that creating a play from a novel may fall exclusively
within the
scope of the right of adaptation, it may be more difficult to sustain that the
same would happen in the case of an
artist that – among other things – reproduced an artistic work in an altered
form, eg by adding new elements, or changing the contrast and
colour [as recent US fair use examples, see Cariou v Prince and Seltzer v Green Day].
So what is the
answer to the initial question? Probably that adaptation has not been expressly
and generally harmonised for subject-matter other than computer programs and
databases. Nonetheless, Member States' freedom to legislate in respect of this
right and related exceptions and limitations does not go as far as to cover
activities that would fall within the (broad) scope of the right of
reproduction.
Apparently there was a great hearing on Allposters yesterday in the CJEU with some surprising twists and turns and it took a full morning. Anyone who attended care to tell us more?
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