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“[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” (empahsis added)
“shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” (emphasis added)
"In Fourco, this Court definitively and unambiguously held that the word “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations: It refers only to the State of incorporation. Congress has not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, and neither party asks us to reconsider our holding in that case. Accordingly, the only question we must answer is whether Congress changed the meaning of §1400(b) when it amended §1391. When Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provision. See United States v. Madigan, 300 U. S. 500, 506 (1937)Heartland had challenged the decision by Kraft Foods to commence infringements proceedings in Delaware (where Kraft is incorporated) on the basis that Heartland shipped the allegedly infringing products into the state. Heartland, otherwise, had no meaningful local presence in Delaware. Heartland applied to dismiss the case or transfer venue to Indiana, where it is headquartered. The case has now been remanded.
. . .
The current version of §1391 does not contain any indication that Congress intended to alter the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco. Although the current version of §1391(c) provides a default rule that applies “[f]or all venue purposes,” the version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a default rule that applied “for venue purposes.” 353 U. S., at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context, we do not see any material difference between the two phrasings
. . .
Fourco’s holding rests on even firmer footing now that §1391’s saving clause expressly contemplates that certain venue statutes may retain definitions of “resides” that conflict with its default definition. In short, the saving clause makes explicit the qualification that this Court previously found implicit in the statute. " (emphasis added)
Based on the wording of the statute, venue will only be appropriate where a defendant is incorporated in the Eastern District of Texas, or "has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business" there. 28 USC §1400(b). The "and" is going to be the key, and more-or-less puts the stake in the heart of ED Tex's patent practice.
ReplyDeleteWhether this is entirely a good thing remains to be seen. Patent suits are complicated, and the US (still) does not have a dedicated trial court for patent proceedings. And there are a lot of federal courts in the USA where the judges have absolutely no experience with patent cases. (My home jurisdiction of D. Haw. is a good example of this.)
The US does not need to have a dedicated trial court for patent proceedings. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to ensure there was uniformity among US Federal trial court decisions in patent cases. This case is one of venue and not inconsistency in the application of substantive patent law. True, under the ambiguity created by 28 USC §1400(b) the Eastern District of Texas created a 'cottage industry' which grew along with the rise of the NPE (or troll if you prefer). But the outcome of this case points to the real question here: 'Are the recent decisions of the US Supreme Court eroding the value to the entire US patent system?' This is an important question raised by the retired Former Chief Judge for the Federal Circuit Paul Michel, as shown on http://www.clause8.tv
ReplyDeleteWe can be sure that Paul Michel is happy with the outcome of this case, because he filed an amicus brief in support of petitioner.
ReplyDeleteWhat surprises me is that the defendant was not incorporated in the State of Delaware; pretty well every US company that I had professional dealings with, was incorporated there, apparently due to its favourable registration arrangements.
ReplyDeleteex-examiner,
ReplyDeleteWhat surprises me is that the Court failed to take note** that neither party was incorporated AT ALL.
Both of the parties were LLC's.
The legal question answered by the Court is purely an advisory opinion. At the federal level in the United States, such advisory opinions carry no force of law.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advisory_opinion#United_States
**Other than an oblique comment in a footnote. This aspect appears to control, and yet the Court could not restrain itself because "patents."