BREAKING NEWS: AG Cruz Villalón thinks that there can only be "analogue" exhaustion and suggests that the right of adaptation has not been harmonised
Not all alterations are well-received |
Following his Opinion earlier today in Pez Hejduk [here], AG Cruz Villalón has in fact just issued another one [once again, available in - amongst others - Italian but not English], this being the much-awaited Opinion in Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright, a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Dutch Supreme Court seeking clarification as to the following:
To clarify, and as summarised by the AG himself, this very important case is just about this question: "Can the person who owns copyright to a painting and has previously consented to having the image represented therein marketed as a poster later object to the commercialisation of the same image transferred on canvas?"
As readers will remember, the background proceedings concern the unauthorised making and selling by Art & Allposters of altered versions of copyright-protected artworks, whose rights are managed by collecting society Pictoright. Art & Allposters used authorised posters of the artworks in question to transfer the images on canvas first, and sell them afterwards over the internet. It is worth adding that this process involves, first, the placing of a special cover on the poster and, secondly the transfer of the image from the poster to the canvas by means of a chemical process.
Kat-inspired artistic adaptations |
This Kat is not an expert in Dutch copyright law, but understands that in that ruling the Dutch Supreme Court had to deal with a very specific case, ie artist Poortvliet wishing to prevent the defendant who had purchased copies of his drawings embodied in calendars (for the realisation of which he had granted a limited licence) to sell them as separate reproductions after cutting them out from the calendars and fixing them on chipboard panels. The Supreme Court sided with Poortvliet and established the principle according to which a physical transformation of a physical copy prevents exhaustion. In other words: a transformation-preventing-exhaustion rule.
The litigation eventually reached the Supreme Court, that decided to stay the proceedings and seek guidance from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The AG Opinion
But there was "right of adaptation" |
It's all about the demon of artistic inspiration |
At last Gregory has found an acceptable tangible support |
This part of the Opinion is extremely important, and prompts the question (not at stake in this case!) as to whether EU law would allow digital exhaustion for subject-matter other than software, say ebooks [watch this space because tomorrow there will be a post on the new Dutch reference to the CJEU on this].
According to the AG, changing the material support has a bearing in determining whether there has been exhaustion of the right of distribution. In the case at hand (which might also involve, he said, an infringement of the right of reproduction by the way) there could be no exhaustion because the alteration by Art & Allposters was particularly relevant. Such relevance follows from the fact that the alteration concerned the same support which was used for the original artworks, and this might create a likelihood of confusion [look: another reference to the language of trade mark law in a copyright case]
The AG did not consider necessary to say what in abstract the criteria referred to by the national court in Question 2(b) could be. The AG also said that it is left to the national court to determine whether Portlievet and its progeny are compatible with EU law (Question 2(c)).
Let's now wait for the CJEU judgment!
Does this mean that a painting first sold in one frame can't be resold in another without the copyright owner's permission?
ReplyDeleteAll seems rather baffling.
The argument of Villalón is so illogical that one can only hope the Court will wholly disregard it. To him, exhaustion does not apply to the work as incorporated in a tangible support, but only to the "tangible support" as such (as if there is a "distribution right" in the first place for tangible supports, namely paper, blank CDs, canvas, etc.). In an almost identical case, the Canadian Supreme Court concluded convincingly that transferring the ink from one support to another is not “reproduction”, as there is no production of further copies (Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain). But for Villalón there is reproduction indeed, since the defendant does not sell an “image” of the painting, but an “equivalent” of the “painting as such”. This argument may be valid for patent infringement, but doesn’t make any copyright sense. Why should it be lawful to re-distribute a copy of a work, but not exact the same copy once transformed in something “equivalent”?
ReplyDeleteI would have thought that any process in which the original image is subsumed into the new image and there is no residue from the original image, cannot be said to be reproduction or copying. Such a process might constitute defacement or derogatory treatment if the final product lacks the quality of the original, but as that only infringes the unharmonised droit d'intregite, it should not be relevant to the CJEU's decision.
ReplyDelete