One of
the joys of blogging is that commenters, as well as alerting the hapless
blogger to typographical errors and terminological infelicities, can alert to
interesting aspects of a decision that did not seem striking at a first review.
So it was with the case of the appeal decision Hospira v Genentech [2016] EWCA Civ 780, which, when this Kat first reviewed it, seemed
to be a fairly straightforward case of the first instance judgment being
affirmed on appeal – no, the judge did not make any error of principle, appeal
dismissed, move on. However, as the
comments on the original post showed, in fact there is an interesting
discussion of the law of obviousness that basically says that each case turns on
its own facts, because the evaluation of obviousness involves a multi-factorial
assessment in order to answer the sole statutory question – whether the
invention was obvious at the priority date.
"The
question of obviousness must be considered on the facts of each case. The court
must consider the weight to be attached to any particular factor in the light
of all the relevant circumstances. These may include such matters as the motive
to find a solution to the problem the patent addresses, the number and extent
of the possible avenues of research, the effort involved in pursuing them and
the expectation of success."
One consideration, which nevertheless does not replace the
statutory question, is whether the invention was “obvious to try”, which must
however be coupled with a “reasonable or fair prospect of success” (mirroring
the EPO test of T 60/89). In relation to
this last point, however, the question arises, what is “success” and how strong
must the prospect of success be? One way
of putting this is whether the skilled person “would”, rather than “could”, arrive
at the claimed invention without inventive effort (mirroring the EPO test of
T2/83), but Lord Justice Floyd (delivering the Court of Appeal decision with
which Lord Justice Kitchin and Lord Justice David Richards agreed) stated that
this dichotomy can be misleading, as it may bring in non-technical
considerations that are not relevant.
Furthermore, “success” does not necessarily entail arriving
at the precise combination claimed:
Floyd LJ further stated:
“I would however not accept … that it must be established in
every case that the skilled person would necessarily have arrived at the precise
combination claimed. That would be to place another straitjacket on the law of
obviousness. The skilled person may be faced with a range of obvious
possibilities, making it statistically unlikely that he will settle on any one
of them. They will all be obvious.”
"Whether
a route has a reasonable or fair prospect of success will depend upon all the
circumstances including an ability rationally to predict a successful outcome,
how long the project may take, the extent to which the field is unexplored, the
complexity or otherwise of any necessary experiments, whether such experiments
can be performed by routine means and whether the skilled person will have to
make a series of correct decisions along the way."
"What
is a reasonable or fair expectation of success will again depend upon all the
circumstances and will vary from case to case. Sometimes, as in Saint Gobain,
it may be appropriate to consider whether it is more or less self-evident that
what is being tested ought to work. So, as this court explained in that case,
simply including something in a research project in the hope that something
might turn up is unlikely to be enough. But I reject the submission that the
court can only make a finding of obviousness where it is manifest that the test
ought to work. That would be to impose a straitjacket on the assessment of
obviousness which is not warranted by the statutory test and would, for
example, preclude a finding of obviousness in the case where the results of an
entirely routine test are unpredictable."
The patent that was found to be obvious in the present case
[EP 1 516 628] claims a lyophilised formulation of trastuzumab with three excipients
– histidine as a buffer, Tween 20 as a surfactant and trehalose as a
lyoprotectant. The judge at first
instance considered that each of those was an obvious candidate for the
respective function and would be in the first or second tier of candidates to
be tried. He therefore considered that
the claimed invention was an obvious result of using standard screening
methods, using routine approaches applied to excipients which were part of the
common general knowledge, even though the skilled person would not know at the
outset that the formulation arrived at would be that consisting of polysorbate
20, histidine and trehalose. The Court
of Appeal confirmed this ruling of Mr Justice Birss, and noted that at the
beginning of the project the skilled team would expect to be able to produce
promising candidates, while at the end of the project, the skilled team would
not be surprised by the result, so that the skilled team had
ex ante a fair expectation of success of
the project overall.
The situation under consideration was distinguished from
that in
Teva v Leo [2015] EWCA Civ 779 (
Katpost) where Sir Robin Jacob in the Court of
Appeal overturned a finding of obviousness by Birss J at first instance,
upholding the validity of another pharmaceutical formulation patent. In that case, “it was far from established
that any non-aqueous non-toxic solvent would produce a stable ointment”, and “it
was not even proved that there was a good expectation that if you did try 20
[non-aqueous solvents] one of them would work”, and so there was no reasonable
expectation of success.
The insistence on the statutory question as the sole
standard for assessing obviousness is welcome as a matter of law, but the
multi-factorial and fact-dependent nature of the assessment must make it
difficult to predict how an English court will judge the validity of a patent.
For some time it has seemed to me that the UK courts' approach to obviousness makes little overall commercial sense. Obviousness is a difficult, fairly subjective question, based on a number of legal fictions. The UK court approach leads to massive expense in terms of gathering evidence to try to definitively demonstrate points that are not real but are wrapped up in the legal fictions.
ReplyDeleteSo is the current UK approach in fact causing massive expense to arrive at a fairly artificial, one might say arbitrary result?
It seems that the current approach leaves little certainty and it is hard to advise (especially without all the evidence that the current approach seems to demand) - as this case/blog suggests.
To me adopting, say (or whisper..) an EPO style approach might make more sense. Yes justice might be rougher. But it would be much easier to know the likely outcome, and the cost of litigation could be massively reduced.
Wouldn't better certainty, reasonable cost and a likelihood of a reasonable result (most of the time) be attractive to business?
Hear him, hear him. well said Herr Faulkner.
ReplyDeleteGiven that, for determination of obviousness objectively, the addressee is the hypothetical skilled person, it is well to set up his or her hypothetical task to match. The EPO PSA rubric does that. The skilled person is given the objective technical problem (OTP), and required to scroll through the state of the art for a hint or suggestion how to crack it. Isn't that what real researchers do, in real life?
As to the OTP, that is determined by Applicant. Full faith and credit for what the application as filed states to be the technical field and the technical problem solved by the invention. Nothing fairer, than that, or simpler to explain to the patent litigation community.